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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KYLEE J. SANDUSKY,
Petitioner

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 114500103

v.

GEORGE A. SANDUSKY,

Judge Kara L. Pettit

Respondent.
The Court has pending before it the final disposition of the issues in the case following
trial on the merits on April 28-30, 2015. On May 14, 2015, this Court entered an Order of
Bifurcated Decree of Divorce in this cause of action, nunc pro tune to April 30, 2015. Based on
the evidence and the arguments presented and the record as a whole, the Court now enters the
following:
I. JURISDICTION
1.

The parties, George A. Sandusky ("Respondent") and Kylee J. Sandusky

("Petitioner") were married in Ventura County, California on November I 0, 1986.

2.

riJ

I
I

On June 3, 2011, Petitioner filed a verified petition for a Decree of Divorce

pursuant to Utah Code §30-3-1 on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
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Petitioner is a resident of Park City, Summit County, Utah and she has been a

resident there for more than three months immediately prior to filing this action.
4.

Respondent is a resident of Hawaii.

S.

Respondent filed a counter petition for Decree of Divorce and Breach of Contract

~

rn

Iii
based on a Separation Agreement entered into by the parties.

~
.

.

I

6.

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction of this action and personal jurisdiction

'

.

~

over each of the parties. Venue is proper.

'

.

7.

At the conclusion of the trial, Respondent made a motion for bifurcated Decree of

Divorce. Petitioner did not oppose the motion and said motion was granted. The Decree of
Divorce was final and effective on April 30, 2015.
8.

All other issues related to this cause of action were reserved for determination by

this Court at a later date.
9.

The parties are the parents of one child, over the age of 18.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

I
'

The Court finds the following facts have been established in regard to the issues

.

presented in the trial of this matter:

In

~

2
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a) Separation Agreement and Property Valuation

10.

On or about February 10, 2010, Respondent and Petitioner executed a Separation

Agreement (the "Agreement") effective March 1, 2010.
11.

Each of the parties were competent and over the age of 18 when they entered into

the Agreement.

12.

The parties were living separate and apart at the time the Separation Agreement

was entered into, with Petitioner living in Park City and Respondent living in Hawaii.
13.

The Court finds the testimony of the parties' son very credible when he testified

that during the time he was in high school and his father was living in Hawaii, his father would
come back for his school sporting events and holidays, but his father would typically stay in the
third bedroom or on the couch. This testimony supports Respondent's testimony that by the
beginning of 2010, the parties were separated for all intents and purposes and Petitioner had told
him towards the end of 2009 that he could just go back to Hawaii and divorce him and they were
never having sexual relations again. The Court also finds Respondent to be credible in this
regard. The Court does not find Petitioner credible that she did not believe she and Respondent
were separated by March 2010.
14.

The Separation Agreement sets forth in the preamble "WHEREAS, each of the

parties is more than 18 years of age, and they desire to confirm their separation and to make
arrangements in connection therewith, including the settlement and adjustment of their property
3
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rights and other rights, responsibilities, and obligations growing out of their marital
relationship".

~
'

15.

The Agreement further sets forth "WHEREAS after careful consideration, each

.

'

rn

party believes it is in his or her own respective best interest to enter into this Separation

~

Agreement and Property Settlement and each party considers this Agreement to be fair,

~

reasonable and equitable."

',

'

16.

Petitioner and Respondent spent time discussing the specifics to input into the

form Separation Agreement and it was Petitioner who physically typed in the information to

fD1

I

complete the Agreement.

[Q
.

.

I
.

17.

The Separation Agreement states: "Each of the parties acknowledge that he or

she has read this Agreement and understands its contents and provisions; that it is a fair and

.

reasonable agreement to each of them, having due regard to the conditional and circumstances of

ml

~

the parties hereto on the date hereof; that each has signed and executed the Agreement freely and

I
I

voluntarily and without fear, compulsion, duress, coercion, persuasion or undue influence

'

.

exercised by either party upon the other or by any other person or persons upon either."

'

.

18.

The Separation Agreement further states above the parties signatures:
THE PARTIES AGREE AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SHOULD A
PROCEEDING OF LEGAL SEPARATION, DISSOLUTION OR
DIVORCE BE FILED IN ANY COURT OF COMOPETENT
JURISDICATIO, THIS AGREEEMNT SHALL BE INCORPORATED
INTO ANY SUCH COMPLAINT OR PETITION FOR DIVORCE,
4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

DISSOLUTION OR LEGAL SEPARATION, AND THEREAFTER BE
IN CORPORATED IN WHOLD IN ANY ORDER OR JUDGEMENT OF
LEGAL SEPARATION, DISSOLUTION OR DIVORCE.
19.

The Agreement is clear on its face describing the document as a

Separation Agreement having as its purpose a desire to confirm separation of the parties
and settlement of their property rights and other rights, responsibilities and obligations
growing out of their marital relationship.
20.

Significantly, the parties also entered into an Addendum to the Agreement, dated

February 8, 2010, stating: "At any time either one of the parties may terminate the monthly

I

alimony payments of $2000 with a lump sum cash payment of $400,000".
21.

The Addendum to the Separation Agreement became effective March 1, 2010.

Both Petitioner and Respondent signed the Addendum as well.
22.

The Court finds that no evidence was presented to support that the Addendum

served some financial aid purpose. Petitioner asserted that the sole purpose of the Agreement
was to enable their son to qualify for financial aid. If this was the sole purpose, the Addendum
was completely unnecessary. There was no testimony offered that a lump sum payment from
Respondent to Petitioner somehow enabled their son to qualify for more financial aid than if

I
I

Petitioner received it in monthly installments. The lack of such testimony undermines
Petitioner's assertion that Respondent duped her into signing the Agreement by allegedly
misleading her that it was only for the purpose of financial aid for their son.

5
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23.
~

For approximately 16 months after execution, the parties complied with the terms

of the Separation Agreement, all the way up until the time Petitioner retained an attorney and
filed for divorce.
24.

Respondent made monthly alimony payments of $2,000 to Petitioner per

[w

the terms of the Agreement. Although Respondent previously had made similar

mi

payments to Petitioner after she moved to Utah, and he stayed in Hawaii, prior to 2010,

'

I

~

I
I
i

the parties had not treated the payments as alimony. However, in 2010, both Petitioner

.

I

.

.

.

'

;
'.

m,
i

~

and Respondent reported the payments as alimony on their income tax returns. Petitioner
later amended her 2010 tax forms to omit the word "alimony," but this was done only
after she had retained counsel and filed her petition for divorce in which she asked the
Court to declare the Separation Agreement void. The Court did not find Petitioner
credible when she alleged that she did "not know what alimony is." The Court found
Petitioner to be an intelligent, articulate person, and does not believe that Petitioner
lacked understanding of such a basic concept.

'

.

25.

Petitioner filed her 2010 taxes as head of household and Respondent filed

as single. Prior to that time, the parties had filed their taxes as married filing jointly, and

I

in 2009 they filed as married filing separately.

.
.

~

26.

Perhaps most significantly, Petitioner repeatedly reported that she and

.

'

I

Respondent were separated as of March 2010 on various financial aid forms starting in

'

.

6
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February 2011 and continuing through 2013. For instance, Respondent Trial Exhibits 10
and 12-14 demonstrate that Petitioner understood that she and Respondent were separated
as of March 2010. See Respondent Ex. 10 at Bates 000110; Ex. 12 at 000983; Ex. 13 at

000987,· and 14 at 000122 (does not specify March, but states as of October 2010 the
parents were separated). Notably, Petitioner continued to report March 2010 as the date
of separation two years after she had filed for divorce, which discredits her testimony that
she did not understand that she and Respondent were separated as of that date. To the
contrary, it supports that she understood and agreed that the Separation Agreement was
not for the sole purpose of getting financial aid for their son, but was because they were
in fact separating as of March 20 I 0.
27.

Moreover, Petitioner testified that she learned as of October 2010, that pursuant to

the University of Pennsylvania's CSS profile online, all assets counted, including first and
second homes, stepparent and noncustodial parent's assets, thus negating the need for the
Separation Agreement if it was solely for the purpose of financial aid at their son's college of
choice. However, the parties, including Petitioner, continued to comply with the Separation
Agreement after October 2010.
28.

Respondent credibly testified that although he probably did not tell Petitioner that

they were getting "divorced" at the time of the Separation Agreement, both he and Petitioner
understood and discussed that they were separated. He further credibly testified that he may not
have mentioned divorce, as opposed to separation, because divorce was contrary to their
7
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religious beliefs.
29.

Petitioner asserts that the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Chaidez demonstrates the

sole purported purpose of the Separation Agreement stated by Respondent was for financial aid.
Although the Chaidez may have been told it was for financial aid purposes, this does not negate
that Petitioner and Respondent understood it was also for purposes of their separation. Petitioner
and Respondent simply did not disclose this to the Chaidez, which was their prerogative. The
conduct of Petitioner and Respondent in living separately, filing separate taxes and complying
with the terms of the Agreement demonstrate that they were in fact separated, regardless of what
they told the Chaidez.
30.

Furthermore, Mrs. Chaidez testified that Petitioner had never indicated an intent

to divorce Respondent, and she had understood that the plan was for Petitioner to move to
Hawaii after the parties' son graduated from high school. But Petitioner obviously did not reveal
her true intentions to Mrs. Chaidez, because as soon as their son graduated, she immediately filed
for divorce on June 3, 2011.
3 I.

Each party testified, and the Court finds, that contrary to Article 8 of the

Separation Agreement, neither party "furnished to the other various financial statements and
information reflecting the parties' financial condition as of March 1, 2010."

However, it was

undisputed that both parties were aware of the assets of each other and the financial account
statements were located in a drawer which either of them could have accessed had they wanted
to verify how much was in the accounts as of the date they executed the Separation Agreement.

8
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32.

The parties identified no marital real property in their Separation Agreement, but

identified ten lots in Kailua-Kona, Hawaii composing the He'eNalu property as the separate
property of Respondent. See Separation Agreement at Article J.B. The market value of the

m

;
I
~

I
I
it

property was estimated to be $300,000. However, Respondent later sold the 8 developable lots
(the other 2 parcels are roadway lots to which the tax assessor has assigned zero value; they are
where a highway will be located) for $335,000. See Ex. 178 Respondent's Response to

Interrogatory No. 8. The Court finds that the value of the 10 lots was $335,000 at the time of the
Separation Agreement, and allocates zero value to the two roadway lots.
33.

Respondent testified that he understood the He'eNalu property to be separate

because it was titled in only his name. Petitioner testified that she did not know the legal
analysis that is applied to determine whether property is marital or separate.
34.

No other real property was accounted for in the Agreement.

35.

Pursuant to Article l .F. Petitioner was entitled to the following separate personal

I

property: "All home furnishings, computers, TVs, jewelry, and Honda 2007 Civic, checking and

i]

savings accounts, and 401 K." The specific checking and savings accounts were not identified.

I
i
I
[;

The Court finds this renders this provision ambiguous because: it is not specific enough to be
enforced; the parties' had numerous accounts many of which were in both of their names; the
accounts were all acquired during the marriage and contain commingled funds (the Court finds
the accounts all were marital property, see infra); and none were obviously the separate property
of either Petitioner or Respondent. In 2013, Petitioner traded the Civic vehicle in for a CRV.
She also traded in a Ford Explorer that she had purchased after she filed the petition for divorce.
9

I
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She was given a trade-in value of $9,500 for the Civic and Explorer. The CRV was purchased
for approximately $26,000; Petitioner estimated it had a value of $17,500 as of March 2015, and
Respondent estimated its value to be $19,300. Petitioner has been making payments on a loan
for the CRY. The Court finds the value of the CRV to be $18,000 as of April 30, 2015. No
evidence was presented to the Court by either Petitioner or Respondent upon which to ascertain
the value of the home furnishings, computers, TVs, and jewelry. The Court finds the value of
the 401K was $58,107 as of April 30, 2015. The Court finds that it was undisputed the 100% of
the 401 K accrued during the parties' marriage. Thus, if the Separation Agreement were not
enforced by the Court, Respondent would be presumed to be entitled to 50% of $58,107, or
$29,053.

36.

Pursuant to Article l .G. Respondent was entitled to the following separate

property: "Honda Ridgeline 2007 truck, checking and savings accounts and retirement pension."
The specific checking and savings accounts were not identified. For the reasons stated above,
the Court finds the lack of identification of any particular accounts renders this provision
ambiguous. Respondent sold the Ridgeline truck for $10,000, but Respondent asserted he spent
approximately $6,000 on tires, so netted $4,400. After the Separation Agreement, he also
purchased a 2006 Acura, that he valued at $12,000 as of the end of 2014, and a 2013 Honda
Scooter, which he valued at $1,800 as of the end of 2014. The Court finds the values of the
vehicles in Respondent's possession as of April 30, 2015 to be $13,800. Based upon the Court's
January 2, 2015 Order, at p. 5, and Petitioner's Exhs. 177 and 178, the Court finds the value of
Respondent's pension as follows:
10
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Monthly pension entitlement: $2635.32
Total Service Credit: 20 years and 4 days= 7,304 Days;
Service credit earned during his marriage to Petitioner: 11/01/1986 - 03/08/1997=
10 years and 12 8 days.
Respondent's lost service time= 3 days.
Respondent's service credit purchase= 0 days;
Total days (marital period) minus lost service time plus service credit purchase=
3,775 days.
Therefore, the Court finds that 48% of the pension is Respondent's separate property,
accrued prior to his marriage, and 52% is marital property, accrued during the marriage. Thus, if
'

rm
.

m
.

'

~

-1

I

the Separation Agreement were not enforced by the Court, Petitioner would be presumed to be
entitled to½ of 52% of the monthly pension payments, or $685.18 .
37.

No marital debts were identified in the Agreement.

38.

Article 4 of the Agreement established an obligation for Respondent to pay

.

.

Petitioner spousal support of $2,000/month beginning March 1, 2010. Article 4 did not provide a
specific duration for such payments. Respondent's filings indicate he understood that Petitioner
had the option of $2,000 per month for life or the lump sum payment of $400,000. The
Addendum to the Agreement provided: "At any time either one of the parties may terminate the
monthly alimony payments of $2000 with a lump sum cash payment of $400,000."
39.

Respondent testified that he understood that Petitioner's share of the property

division was $400,000 and that under the terms of the Separation Agreement her $400,000
property share was to be paid to her by Respondent as alimony, at the rate of $2,000 per month
or a lump sum payment option of $400,000. However, this is in direct conflict with the plain
language of Article 4 which states: "The provisions for the support, maintenance and alimony of

rl

~

Petitioner are independent of any division or agreement for division of property between the
11
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parties, and shall not for any purpose be deemed to be a part of or merged in or integrated with
the property settlement of the parties."
40.

Pursuant to Article 8: "In the event it is hereafter discovered that either party has

failed to disclose, whether knowingly or inadvertently, an asset the value of which is substantial
(herein defined as having a value in excess of $500.00) the other party shall be entitled to onehalf if it is a di visible asset or 50% of the value, as independently ascertained, of said asset."
41.

The Court finds that both parties testified that they were aware of the existence of

the following assets or debts as of March 2010, but they did not account for them in their
Separation Agreement:
a. Bishop hard money loan valued at $450,000 (Petitioner's Ex. 79). Petitioner
testified she was aware of the hard money loan, but did not know the amount. The
testimony was undisputed that Respondent received the full loan amount of $450,000
after the Separation Agreement was executed. Thus, the value of the loan will be
accounted for in the Court's distribution of the parties' financial accounts below.
b. Purchase Contract for the "Foo House" and lot (Purchase Contract dated in
January 12, 2010) (See P. Exhibits 96, 97; 3) for $415,000. Respondent listed the Foo
House (76-6230 Ali 'i Dr, HI) as his address on the Separation Agreement. Petitioner
testified she was aware that Respondent was intending to purchase the home and was
living in it and fixing it up for that purpose. Petitioner was not aware that Respondent
had actually entered into a purchase contract in January 2010, but the Court does not find
this to render the agreement unenforceable. Petitioner knew he intended to purchase it at
12
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the time she entered the Separation Agreement. Respondent valued the Foo House and
the adjacent lot at $428,500 total in his September 2014 Financial Declaration, based
upon the tax assessor's values. Respondent purchased the property in 2010 using funds
from the 55155 Bank Account. Respondent still holds title to the Foo House and adjacent
lot. The Court finds the value of the Foo House and adjacent lot to be $428,500 as of
April 30, 2015.
c. Smart Car; later sold for $7,500 by Respondent. Thus, the value of the vehicle
will be accounted for in the Court's distribution of the parties' financial accounts.
42.

Assets that were in the parties' possession at the time of trial, but were acquired

after the Separation Agreement was executed (aside from the exchange of vehicles set forth
above) include:

a.

$181,721.98 plus $106.85/day interest since June 1, 2012 in a deficiency

judgment against Benita Mednick related to a hard money loan agreement
entered into by Respondent in 2010 after the Separation Agreement was
executed, but utilizing funds from the parties' financial accounts;
b.

·'Loans" to Respondent's sister of $230,000 and niece of $35,000 as
testified by Respondent and set forth in his financial declaration, made from
the parties' financial accounts. When asked why he put those monies into his
joint account with his sister, he responded, "It was an account with my sister.
It was separate property. Keep it away from Petitioner." Respondent, testified
that he was not hiding it from Petitioner, but that he was protecting it so that
13
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Petitioner would not take the money as she had withdrawn $90,000 from their

~

joint account (See also Petitioner's Exhibit #172).
c.

t

payable 60 days upon demand, made from the parties' financial accounts.

~

Petitioner's Ex. 150;
d.

Ul

a gold watch, gold and silver dollar pieces given to Respondent by his
grandfather, and some gold pieces bought after the Separation Agreement by

~

Respondent. Petitioner's Ex. 151. The Court finds that the gifts to

~

Respondent from his grandfather are his separate property. He has not
commingled them with Petitioner's property and no evidence was presented

~
ij

that Petitioner augmented, maintained or protected the separate property. The
Court was not provided with any evidence upon which to place a value upon

~

the gold pieces Respondent obtained after the Separation Agreement;
e.

~

~
~
~

$40,000 in 100 dollar bills obtained in 2011 by Respondent for "trust
deeds" and kept in a safety deposit box. The safety deposit box also contains

Q

~

Loan by Respondent to M. Anderson for $40,000, in August 201 0;

$310,000 in attorney trust account from sale of Maui condo/Mednick hard
money loan

43.

At the time of the Separation Agreement in March 2010, the parties had the

following checking and savings accounts:
a.

Hawaii Community Credit Union Account #551555; balance of $453,279;

Petitioner's Ex. 147;
14
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~

b.

~

Petitioner's Ex. 148;
c.

E

d.

e.

tr

~

~

0
~
Q

Los Angeles Firemen's Credit Union Account #7833400; all three share

accounts (SI, S7 and S8) balance of$412,340; Petitioner's Ex. 90.
44.

Based upon the evidence, as of the date of trial, the parties' financial account

balances were as follows:
a.

Hawaii Community Credit Union Account #596889; balance of $166,694;

Respondent's Ex. 66; (Respondent closed out account #551555 in July 2011 and
opened this one);
b.

Los Angeles Firemen's Credit Union Account #7833401; balance of

$860.59; Petitioner's Ex. 184;

c.

C
C

Los Angeles Firemen's Credit Union Account #7833401; balance of

$8.413; Petitioner's Ex. 58;

~

;

Vanguard account #09901289798, balance of $11,855; Petitioner's Ex.

149;

~

0

Utah Home Savings Bank Account #05 015077220 05; balance of $2,835;

Los Angeles Firemen's Credit Union Account #7833400; all three share

accounts (S 1, S7 and S8) balance of $345,020; Respondent's Ex. 57A.
d.

Chase Bank Account $2,400.22 (as of 11/19/14 R Ex 70); opened by

Petitioner; and
e.

Mountain America Credit Union Account $250; opened by Petitioner;

Petitioner's Ex. 179.
15

~
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The Utah Home Savings Bank and Vanguard accounts were also closed out by the
time of trial.

MARITAL VS. SEPARATE PROPERTY CLASSIFICATION
45.

Petitioner testified that she had had assets prior to the marriage, but they were not

of substantial value nor were they retained by her as separate property. Petitioner is not asserting
she owns separate property.
46.

However, Respondent claims a substantial amount of separate property.

Respondent asserts that at the time of his marriage to Petitioner, on November 1, 1986 he had
$400,000.00 in premarital assets which he was investing and which he maintained as separate
property throughout the term of the parties' marriage through various property investments. He
argues he is entitled to the entire $400,000 plus the investment retwns indirectly derived from
that $400,000 as his separate property.
47.

As set forth in detail below, the Court finds that any premarital property that

Respondent brought to the marriage was commingled, marital funds were expended upon the real
estate and hard money loan ventures, and Petitioner's efforts over the 28 years of their marriage
assisted to augment, maintain or protect the property that perhaps initially was obtained through
the assets Respondent brought with him to the marriage. Thus, the Court disagrees with
Respondent that he has separate property of $400,000 plus the fruits of the investment of that
$400,000. In classifying prop~rty Utah law presumes that property acquired during the marriage
is marital property and subject to equitable distribution. See Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d
431, 432-33 (Utah 1982), cited in Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 23, 126 (Utah, 2015). Thus, to the
16
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extent an asset contains marital property, "Utah has a strong interest in ensuring that such
property is equitably divided in the parties' divorce action." Dahl, ,I26. The marital property is
equitably (presumptively equally) divided and the separate property is presumptively awarded to
the 'owner' spouse. See also Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887 (Utah App. 1999).
-~Premarital property may lose its separate distinction where the parties have inextricably
commingled it into the marital estate, or where one spouse has contributed all or part of the
property to the marital estate." Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P .2d 1314, 1321 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The
Court's conclusion regarding the lack of separate property as claimed by Respondent is based
upon the following facts:

Dover I, Ventura, CA. The Court finds that Respondent acquired a premarital 50%

i
~

~
~

interest in a residence on Dover I nine days before the marriage, on October 23, 1986
(Petitioner's Exhibit 1: Quit Claim Deed). The Court finds that Respondent financed such
purchase through jointly borrowing with Sellers and assuming a 50% obligation ($150,000) on a
Deed of Trust for $300,000 (Petitioner's Exhibit #2. Petitioner testified that she and Respondent
immediately upon marrying proceeded to work on repairing, improving and enhancing the value
of Dover I. She testified that she did the following: cleaned out garage, mixed cement, dry

i
C

walled a ceiling, shoveled sand, and painted. Respondent did not dispute Petitioner's testimony.
The court finds that Petitioner repaired, improved and enhanced the value of Dover I during the
marriage, and that no repairs, improvements, or enhancements to the value of Dover I were made

w
~
[I;)

prior to the marriage, but only after the marriage.
Additionally, Petitioner and Respondent were both employed. Petitioner and Respondent
17
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both testified that they also took in a tenant at Dover I and that Respondent's 50% share of the
payments on principal, interest, taxes and insurance ("PITI") and on the repair and improvement
expenses were paid solely through marital income, that income earned during the marriage
(employment compensation and rents). While Respondent asserts that he made the check
payments on the PITI, it is undisputed, and the Court so finds, that such payments were paid

I
i

solely with marital income and that other marital expenses were also paid solely by marital

~

pay the PITI. Further, the Court finds that no PITI payments or repairs and improvement

ll
~

It
E
~

=
i

'1
IJ

income earned by Petitioner and Respondent. And, while Respondent may have written the
check, Respondent admitted Petitioner paid for family expenses; thus enabling Respondent to

expenses for his 50% share on Dover I were paid by Respondent using premarital assets,
premarital income or funds or separate property.

Dover II. Respondent purchased the other 50% interest in Dover on July 10, 1987,
("Dover II" Petitioner's Exhibit 3, Quit Claim Deed). It is noted on the Quit Claim Deed for
Dover II that the Deed of Trust does not reflect the total consideration for purchase, but that
Respondent paid an additional $55,000. Respondent testified that the total consideration he paid
for Dover II was (i) assuming the obligation to pay the other half of the original deed of trust of
$300,000, and (ii) paying an additional $55,000. According to Petitioner's testimony, Petitioner
continued to work on repairing, improving and enhancing the value of Dover I and II. Petitioner
testified that she hung drywall on the ceiling, shoveled sand, painted walls and deck railings,
made cement, put a toilet in, pulled up carpet and carpet nails, put down new carpet, put in new
doors and windows, and cleaned up after helping pull out a large wall of cement to make a large
18
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window. Respondent did not dispute Petitioner's testimony. Moreover, it was their marital
home until they moved to 1516 Buena Vista in San Clemente. The court finds that Petitioner
repaired, improved and enhanced the value of Dover I and II during the marriage, along with
Respondent, and that no repairs, improvements, or enhancements to the value of Dover I and II
were made by either party prior to the marriage, but only after the marriage.
Additionally, like with Dover I, Petitioner and Respondent both testified that after the
purchase of Dover II they took in more tenants at Dover I and II and that Respondent's 100%
PITI payments on all of Dover and on the repair and improvement expenses were paid solely
through marital income, that income earned during the marriage (employment compensation and
rents). Furthermore, according to Petitioner's Exhibit 8 and the testimony of both parties'
Respondent sold Dover on 1/02/1990. Thus, for 3.25 years all PITI payments and payments for
repairs, improvements and enhancements for Dover I and II were paid entirely through marital
income. While Respondent asserts that he made the check payments on the PITI, it is
undisputed, and the Court so finds, that such payments were paid solely with marital income.
Further, the Court finds that no PITI payments or repairs and improvement expenses for Dover I
and II were paid by Respondent using premarital assets, premarital income or funds or separate
property. The Court finds from the evidence and Respondent's conduct that it was Respondent's
intent to make all such payments over the years from marital income and assets, there being no
other premarital assets to make such payments.

1516 Buena Vista, San Clemente, CA.

Promptly after selling Dover, on December

18, 1989 (Petitioner Exhibit I 0, Grant Deed recorded 0 1/05/90), Respondent and Petitioner
19
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purchased as Joint Tenants 1516 Buena Vista, San Clemente, CA ("1516 BV") with proceeds
from the sale of Dover and by jointly borrowing $135,000 (Petitioner Exhibit 11, Deed of Trust).
Respondent testified that he knowingly purchased 1516 BV with Petitioner as joint tenants and

~

they were jointly liable for the debt. Respondent testified that he thought the parties purchased it

[JJ

for $535,000, but there is no supporting evidence for that price.
Subsequent to the purchase of 1516 BV, in addition to the initial loan of $135,000,

it

Respondent and Petitioner took out additional loans in their joint names in the amounts of

Q

$100,000 (Petitioner Exhibit 12), $193,800 (Petitioner Exhibit 14), and $100,000 (Petitioner

C

i
~
~

D
~

Exhibit 20). While admitting to each of these loans, neither party had much recollection about
these loans or which loan may have paid off a previous loan, but Respondent testified that the
parties did use $100,000 from one of these loans (secured by 1516 BV) for the down-payment
and purchase of another property, 1107 Buena Vista, San Clemente, CA on July 1, 1994
(Petitioner, Exhibit 23 Grant Deed forH 1107 BV").
The parties owned 1516 BV from December 1989 to April 1996 (Petitioner Exhibit 18).
Petitioner testified that she substantially contributed to repairing, remodeling and enhancing the
value of 1516 BV, and provided details, such as painting, dry wall, pull up carpet and carpet
staples, put down carpet, fixed and replaced windows, and shoveled out a basement. Respondent

~

did not dispute Petitioner's testimony. The court finds that Petitioner repaired, improved and

;

enhanced the value of 1516 BV during the marriage, along with Respondent, and that all of such

~

i

repairs, remodeling and enhancements to the value of 1516 BV were made by the parties during
the marriage.
20
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Additionally, evidence shows that Petitioner and Respondent were both working and both
testified that after the purchase of 1516 BV they took in tenants and that all of the payments on

fl

171

all loans (PITI) for the 6 + years and on all of the repairs, remodeling and improvement expenses
were paid solely through marital income, that income earned during the marriage (employment

~

compensation and rents). While Respondent asserts that he made the check payments on the

rn

PITI, it is undisputed, and the Court so finds, that such payments were paid solely with marital

w
ITT

income. Further, the Court finds that no PITI payments or repairs, remodeling and improvement

~

expenses for 1516 BV were paid by Respondent using premarital assets, premarital income or

~

funds or separate property. The Court finds from the evidence, Respondent's conduct and

I

,

testimony that it was Respondent's intent for the parties' to purchase 1516 BV as Joint Tenants
and joint obligees on all loans secured by such residence and to make all such payments and
payments to repair, remodel and enhance the property over the years from marital income and
assets, there being no separate property. Moreover, it was their marital home, to which they both
contributed substantially. Furthermore, from the evidence, Respondent's conduct and his

rm

~

express intent, and the pattern of Respondent and Petitioner's joint involvement in enhancing the
value of properties from 1986 through 1996 and their use of marital income to pay for all

~
.

.

~
.

expenses on such properties the Court finds that Respondent abandoned any intent to maintain a
separate identity of property derived from the sale of Dover I and II and that with the purchase

'

{j7

IJ

of 1516 BV and thereafter (see below) the identity of separate property was entirely lost,
commingled, merged with or transmuted into marital property.
When the parties sold 1516 BV in April 1996, Respondent claims that they sold the
21
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property at a catastrophic loss, that the parties "got killed." Without supporting evidence,
Respondent testified that he thought that the parties purchased 1516 BV for approximately
$535,000 ($400,000 down {from Dover proceeds} and loan of $135,000) and that it was sold for
approximately $350,000 (which included taking back a note for $35,700, Petitioner Exhibit 16,
17), thus at a loss of $185,000.

1 I 07 Buena Vista. The parties purchased 1107 BV in July 1994, with (i) $100,000 in
borrowed funds secured by the jointly owned property at 1516 BV and a $463,000 Deed of Trust
(Petitioner Exhibit 25). Although Respondent acquired the $100,000 through a loan secured by
1516 BV, a jointly owned marital property, Respondent titled 1107 BV in his own name
(Petitioner Exhibit 23). When asked why it was so titled, Respondent testified that he was not
aware of that and that he did not know why he titled 1107 BV in his name (CD 04/30/15 at
11 :55:35).
1107 BV was sold June 13, 1996 (Petitioner Exhibit 27), shortly after the parties sold
1516 BV. Petitioner testified that from July 1994 to June 1996 Petitioner she substantially
contributed to repairing, remodeling and enhancing the value of 1107 BV, and provided details,
such as gardening, planting on the hillside, painting, carpeting, and putting in new windows.

~

Respondent did not dispute Petitioner's testimony. The court finds that Petitioner repaired,

~

improved and enhanced the value of 1107 BV during the marriage, along with Respondent, and

;
;
;

that all of such repairs, remodeling and enhancements to the value of 1107 BV were made by the
parties during the marriage.
Additionally, Petitioner and Respondent both testified that after the purchase of 1107 BV
22
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they took in tenants and that all of the payments on all loans (PITI) for the 2 year period and on
all of the repairs, remodeling and improvement expenses were paid solely through marital
income, that income earned during the marriage (employment compensation and rents). While
Respondent asserts that he made the check payments on the PITI, it is undisputed, and the Court
so finds, that such payments were paid solely with marital income (Respondent's marital income.
Petitioner was not employed during these two years, having given birth to MS 10/1992 and
caring for the parties' child). Further, the Court finds that no PITI payments or repairs,

.

i
i
i
.

remodeling and improvement expenses for 1107 BV were paid by Respondent using premarital
assets, premarital income or funds or separate property. The Court finds from the evidence,

.

'

.
.

if
'

Respondent's conduct and testimony that it was Respondent's intent to make all PITI payments
on 1107 BV and payments to repair, remodel and enhance 1107 BV from marital income and
assets. The Court further finds that although 1107 was titled in Respondent's name it was

.

m

acquired solely by funds secured by 1516 BV and solely maintained, repaired, remodeled,

.

'

enhanced and paid for by marital labors and income and Respondent testified that he had no idea
why he titled 1107 in his name. Also, by now the parties' had a child. Upon selling the two
"'BV'' properties Respondent retired from the fire department and the parties and their child

w
I

'

I
'

moved to Hawaii, initially renting a home for two years.
The Court finds that upon arriving in HI Respondent and Petitioner opened a joint bank

'

account at Hawaii Community Federal Credit Union #551555 with $100,000 in proceeds from

W1

11
~

tu
lif:1

lj

the sales of the BV properties (P. Exhibit 29, check and bank statement).
77-6311 A/ii Dr., Kailua-Kona, HI. Respondent testified that he and Petitioner purchased
23
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I
fi
~

~

i
~

i
~

I
~

Ii

I
I
i
le

I
E
I
I

a lot for $160,000 and titled the lot in their joint names as "Tenants by the Entirety" and built a
house with $90,000 on the lot. Respondent and Petitioner constructed the home, both providing
substantial labor (P. Exhibit 32, pictures), with Petitioner testifying that she razed the land, put
down gravel, shoveled dirt, framed, put in insulation, put windows in, put up dry wall, painted,
and carried roof tiles up two ladders to the roof. The Court finds that the house was marital
property. In July 1999, the parties sold the house for approximately $400,000 (P. Exhibit #31).

White Sands Condo, HI. In June 1999, the parties purchased the "White Sands Condo" as
"Tenants by the Entirety" for $170,000 using a portion of the proceeds of the sale of the Alii
Drive marital home. (P. Exhibit #33). In December 2001 the parties jointly took out an equity
line mortgage on the White Sands Condo for $200,000 in order to help purchase the "Lyman"
property (P. Exhibit #34) in January 2002. The family lived in the White Sands Condo from July
1999 until they sold it in 2002.

He 'eNalu JO Lots. In January 2000 Respondent purchased 10 lots in his name for
$197,525 from the Alii Drive marital home sale proceeds (P. Exhibit 43). After the purchase of
the Lots, the parties had an approximate financial account balance of only $34,475.

Lyman Property, Hl In January 2002 the parties purchased the Lyman's property,
consisting of three houses, for $1,800,000. Respondent and Petitioner purchased a 50% share as
"Tenants by the Entirety." The other 50% interest was purchased by Respondent's sister and
brother-in-law, Liz and Joe Chambers. To make the purchase possible the two couples borrowed
$1 million (P. Exhibit 55) and each of the couples paid half of the $800,000 balance ($400,000
each). Respondent and Petitioner borrowed $200,000 on the White Sands Condo equity line.
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Respondent testified that he and Petitioner received a gift of $25,000 from Petitioner's parents to
help out, but they paid that back in 2004. He said they also got a kickback of approximately
$13,000 from the agent, and the rest of their $400,000 contribution came from what was left of
the proceeds of the sale of the Alii Drive marital home and BV properties in California, if
anything was left from those in their joint financial accounts.
Both parties testified that at this time the parties were "all in" and totally stretched and
maxed out. Respondent and Petitioner were jointly obligated on the $1 million loan (P. Exhibit
#55). The parties testified that Petitioner was employed full time (P. Exhibit #52) so that the
parties could cover their debt obligations, insurance and taxes, improvement expenses, and living
expenses and Respondent received pension income too. Petitioner also testified, and it is
undisputed, that Petitioner also contributed material and substantial labor on building a rock
wall, painting, pulling up carpet and carpet tacks, putting down carpet, restoring window sills,
and kept up with vegetation growth to help improve Lyman over the 5 years that they owned
Lyman (P. Exhibit #71).
The parties testified and the Court finds that the parties (and their partners) sold off a

;

portion of the Lyman property for $700,000 to reduce debt and that they refinanced their loan

I
I
I
I

responsible for half of the debt ($200,000 per couple). The Court finds that Respondent and

from $I million to $400,000 in February 2003 (P. Exhibit #57), with each couple again being

Petitioner were jointly obligated on their half of this debt as well. At this time, Respondent
testified that they had a small negative cash flow. He said Petitioner contributed by paying

Ii ving expenses, such as groceries, vehicle maintenance, insurance, phone bills.
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Joe Chambers died in 2002, and in 2004 the parties sold the rest of the Lyman property to

i
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Michael Rich for $3 million. Each couple received $100,000 at the time of the sale, but it took
approximately three years of legal wrangling to get the rest of the approximately $1.5 million per

'

'

couple proceeds in August 2007 due to fraud perpetrated by Mr. Rich. Petitioner and
Respondent deposited these proceeds into their joint bank account (P. Exhibit #70) and paid
federal and state taxes, leaving a net balance in their account of $1,394,046.
Once they finally received their $1.5 million, Respondent, Petitioner and their son moved

rm

~

from Hawaii to Park City, Utah, in August 2007. Respondent and their son moved first. Their

~

son was just about to start high school. Petitioner was not as enthused about the choice of

.•

;1
.

.

location, but eventually came around. Petitioner gave notice to her employer in HI and joined
Respondent and their son in Park City. They discussed as a family staying in one location for

i
I

four years for their son. Neither party was employed, and they lived off the proceeds from the

~

some point that was not well-defined in the testimony, Respondent began to return to Hawaii

'

'

Lyman property sale.

.

'

.

Respondent and Petitioner traveled in a motor home for approximately 13 weeks. At

'

~

without Petitioner or their son, and the trips and duration of his stays became longer and longer.

'

.

I
'

.

;

Eventually, by late 2009, Respondent was rarely coming back to Utah, and would return for their
son's sporting events and major holidays. As set forth above, the Court finds that for all intents
and purposes, the parties were separated by early 20 I 0.

'

I

Foo House, HJ. The Court finds that Respondent was living in and renovating the Foo
house in Hawaii by approximately December 2009. The Court finds his testimony credible that
26
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he spoke to Petitioner about his intent to fix up and purchase the property so he could live in it in
Hawaii. He purchased the Foo property (house and adjacent "church" lot) in early 2010, using
funds from the parties' joint account at the Hawaii Credit Union (a portion of Lyman proceeds) ..
All monies spent on improving the house, taxes, etc. have been paid through marital assets and
marital income. The Court finds that the Foo house and lot are marital properties.

Financial Accounts. The Court finds that all of the aforementioned real property
purchases after Dover I were marital and not separate property because they were acquired
during the marriage, purchased using either joint account funds or proceeds from the sale of
property jointly held by Petitioner and Respondent, or debt for which both Petitioner and
Respondent were obligated. Moreover, as set forth and stated previously, Petitioner directly
assisted to augment, maintain or protect the property. It follows, therefore, that the proceeds
from the sale of the marital real estate is also marital property. The proceeds of the real estate
sales were ultimately deposited into the parties' financial accounts. The funds in the financial
accounts were all acquired during their marriage either from the sale of the marital real estate,
from Petitioner and Respondent's employment, Respondent's pension upon his retirement in
1997, or from Hard Money Loans (using money earned from the sale of the marital real estate) as
detailed below. The Court finds that all of the parties' checking and savings accounts are marital
property.

Hard Money Loans. In addition to the acquisition of real properties, starting in 1999 and
continuing thereafter Respondent used marital funds to make what he called "hard money loans"
secured by real property (approximately 6-7 transactions), using only marital funds to make each
27
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of these loans. The Court finds that these hard money loans were marital property.

m,

i.j

II.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

~

A. The Separation Agreement is a Valid and Binding Contract.

I

In Utah, both premarital and post marital agreements, as well as stipulations entered into

'

.

'

'

in contemplation of separation and divorce are valid, binding and enforceable. The Supreme

fm
~

Court of Utah has affirmed the "general authority of spouses to arrange property rights by a

I

contract that is recognized and enforced by a court in the event of divorce." Reese v. Reese, 1999

'

'

UT 75, 984 P.2d 987, 124. The court affirmed "the general principle that spouses ... may make
binding contracts with each other and arrange their affairs as they see fit, insofar as the
negotiations are conducted in good faith. Id., at 125. In Sweet v. Sweet, 2006 UT App. 216, 138
P.3d 63, the court held that agreements between spouses concerning the disposition of property
owned by them at the time of marriage are valid, so long as there is no fraud, coercion or
material non-disclosure. 13.
Petitioner is highly educated, having a master's degree in Education and Respondent is a

~

highly sophisticated business man, so to attribute lack of knowledge is not consistent with whom

'

'

they are. ''In the context of contract formation, the Utah appellate courts have held that 'each
party has the burden to read and understand the terms of a contract before he or she affixes his or
her signature to it"' Burning ham v. Westgate Resorts, Ltd. at~ 24, citing McClure Props., LLC
v. Dray Hah Family Ltd. Pasha, 2013 UT App 185, at 9t112, 307 P.3d 650 (affirming summary

i
·,
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judgment because affidavit of party's intent was insufficient to create fact question in light of
unambiguous writings to the contrary). Given these principals and the clear language contained
in the Agreement, the Court finds that the parties reached a meeting of the minds when they
executed the Agreement. "If the language within the four comers of the contract is unambiguous,
the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and
the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Burning ham v. Westgate Resorts, Ltd. at 1
25 citing generally Nolin v. S & S Constr., Inc. 2013 UT App 94, 112, 301 P. 3d 1026.
The one big exception is that the parties did not specify how to divide their financial
accounts and the provision regarding division of the checking and saving accounts is ambiguous.
The parties take vastly different positions as to their intent with respect to the division of
financial accounts. Respondent's position is that their intent was to consider the vast majority of
the accounts as his separate property. Petitioner's position is that they did not have a meeting of
the minds on the agreement at all, and she was fraudulently induced into signing the agreement.

B. The evidence does not demonstrate fraud in the inducement or coercion.
The defense of fraudulent inducement generally requires proof by clear and convincing
evidence. Anderson v. Kiser, 266P.3d 819 (Utah 2011). The evidence has not established by
clear and convincing evidence, or even a lesser standard of preponderance, that Petitioner was
fraudulently induced or coerced into signing the Agreement. As set forth supra, the Court does
not find evidence of fraud, coercion, or material non-disclosure in the formation of the
Agreement. The Court finds that both Petitioner and Respondent understood that the Agreement
29
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served the purpose of dividing their property due to their separation, and was not simply a ruse

;

for financial aid purposes. Both Petitioner and Respondent prepared the document together, with

'

'

~

Petitioner typing the terms herself. The parties acted in compliance with the Agreement for more

·.

;
'

'

vl

than 16 months after entering into the Agreement. Petitioner did not present sufficient evidence
to support her claim of fraudulent inducement or coercion in entering into the Separation
Agreement.

Ii

I
'

.

wB

lal

C. Petitioner has not proven that there was material non-disclosure when signing
the Agreement.
Additionally, there are no instances of material non-disclosure;, both parties were well
aware of the financial situations throughout the marriage. The Court finds that although

I

Petitioner may not have known the details of some of the asset values, she was well-aware of the

RTI

existence of all of the assets and their general value. She could have easily looked at the bank

.
'

Ii

01

I

statements and documentation in the drawer if she had wanted to ascertain more detail.
Respondent did not commit a material non-disclosure-the evidence does not indicate a single

I
I
'

'

asset of which Petitioner was unaware in March 2010. Moreover, even if he had, it would not
necessarily render the Agreement unenforceable because the Agreement provides that any

'

'

mm
{I

I
I

undisclosed asset is split 50/50.
Therefore, the Court concludes that there was no material non-disclosure that renders the
Agreement unenforceable.

'

.

'
'
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D. Equitable Disposition in Light of Separation Agreement.

ll

It is well-recognized Utah law that: "It is the court's prerogative to make whatever

I
I
I
I

e

disposition of property ... as it deems fair, equitable, and necessary for the protection and
welfare of the parties. The court need not necessarily abide by the terms of the litigant's
stipulations, and although such should be respected and given great weight, the court is not duty
bound to carry over the terms thereof." Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080, 1081 (Utah 1977);
see also Coleman v. Coleman, 743 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah App., 1987); Dayton v. Dayton, 2003 UT

App 205; and Jensen v. Jensen, 2008 UT App 392, 197 P.3d 117.
Because the Court has determined that the Agreement is enforceable, it respects it
and gives the Agreement great weight, but also needs to assess whether its terms are fair

iJ

and equitable. As a starting point for that analysis, the Court reiterates its Findings set

I]

forth above and concludes that all of the parties' assets are marital property, with the

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

exception of the gifts from Respondent's grandfather in his safety deposit box and 48%
of Respondent's pension, which he accrued prior to the parties' marriage and can be
separately identified and segregated from the marital portion of the pension. The Court
found that the parties paid for the various real properties with marital income, Petitioner
enhanced the values of all acquired real properties as did Respondent, the parties acquired
almost all real properties in their joint names or as tenants by the entireties, or if a

property was acquired in Respondent's name, such as 1107 BV, Respondent did not
know why it was not put in the parties joint name and it was acquired through the use of
31
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joint marital assets. Furthermore, when the parties purchased properties, often they were
acquired with a Deed of Trust in the name of both parties and entirely paid for with
marital income, and the purchase was made possible by Petitioner's employment as well
as subsequently by Respondent's monthly pension income. Additionally, the parties
deposited sale proceeds into joint accounts. Taking all of the Courts findings the Court

IIT1
~

~
'
'

Em

~

concludes that not only did Respondent abandon any attempt at segregating and
maintaining the separate identity to any premarital property (except for 48% of his
pension and the gifts from his grandfather in his safety deposit box), but, evidenced by
his conduct and the parties joint conduct, Respondent intended to merge, commingle, gift
and transmute any separate property into marital property. Given the evidence, all

I

premarital equity was commingled, merged and lost its separate identity into marital

;

property and it cannot be quantified. Respondent has failed to meet his burden of proof

'

'

'

'

'
'

regarding allegedly separate property.
Pursuant to the terms of the Separation Agreement that the Court determined were
unambiguous, the parties' property disposition and alimony would be as follows based
upon the Court's determined valuations:

PETITIONER

RESPONDENT

2007 Honda
Civic; converted
into CRV

$18,000

401K
Furnishings,

$58,107
Unknown

2007 Honda
Ridgeline;
converted into
Acura
Pension
10 Lots

$13,800

$2,632/month
$335,000
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computers, TVs,
jewelry
Alimony

value

He'eNalu

$2,000/month
or $400,000
lump sum

The Court finds this distribution and alimony award to be fair and equitable. Each party
agreed to keep their own retirement account. This division does not create a tremendous
inequality, particularly in light of the fact that at best, Petitioner would be entitled to

;

.
'

approximately $685/month if the Court did not give deference to the parties' agreement. Each
party gets an almost equal split of personal property, which the Court deems to be equitable.
Respondent receives real property valued at approximately $335,000, and similarly, Petitioner is
entitled to either a lump sum of $400,000 or $2,000/month in alimony. The Court finds this to
be a fair and equitable division as well. Because the parties have already effectuated these
distributions, nothing further needs to be done.
Although the alimony was agreed upon and neither party has addressed the requisite statutory

I

factors in any of their briefing or argument, the Court analyzes the factors set forth in Utah Code

nm

§ 30-3-5(8)(a) to ensure the parties' agreed upon award is fair and equitable. As a general rule,

.

lW

the Court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in determining
flIT!
~

fml
iJ

~
..

alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a) factors:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;

She currently earns $1, 724/month in net income and has approximately $3,400 in reasonable
expenses each month. Petitioner asserts that the standard of living during the time of their

33
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marriage would have included renting a place that was more in the range of $1, 700/month
instead of the $770/month caliber of place she is currently able to afford because
Respondent has control of the marital assets. Her current monthly deficit is $1,700.

(ii)the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
r7TI

ti\

Recipient is able to earn an income as a teacher as she has done in the past.

rm

(iii)

~

I
I
I

the ability ofthe payer spouse to provide support;

Although Respondent is unemployed, he is able to earn income from his real estate and hard

.

.'

money loan ventures. His regular monthly net income from his pension is $2,665 and his
reasonable monthly expenses are approximately $3,400 (Respondent's Financial Declaration

'

'

includes $4,000/month for educational expenses for their son, but he recently graduated and

.

.

W7

this is no longer an expense.) His monthly deficit is approximately $750 .

(iv)

the length of the marriage;

~

separated in March 20 IO; married for 24 years, which is a lengthy duration

(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
The parties' only child is now in college and no longer a minor. Respondent is the one

i
I

paying for the bulk of his education, not Petitioner.

rm,

spouse; and

'

.

,
'

~

(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payer

At times during their marriage, Petitioner worked with Respondent on renovating properties

Isl
~

for resale and supporting him in that regard instead of working as a teacher. However, she is

rmi

now, and was for many years, a teacher as her primary employment.

I

nm
~
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(vii)

whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payer

spouse's skill by paying/or education received by the payer spouse or enabling the payer spouse
to attend school during the marriage.
Not applicable; no evidence was presented that Petitioner paid for professional education for
Respondent.
Petitioner's monthly deficit is approximately $1,700, living at a lesser standard than she was
accustomed during their marriage. Respondent has the ability to pay, because he earns income in
nontraditional ways that are not reflected on his Financial Declaration (renovate/resale
properties; hard money loans). Considering all of the factors, and the standard of living during
their 28 year marriage, the Court finds that the $2,000/month in alimony agreed upon by the
parties is fair and equitable. However, the parties did not set a limit for the duration of the
alimony payments. Pursuant to Utah law, the duration cannot be longer than the parties were
together as a married couple, which is 24 years for these parties ( 1986 to 2010). In sum, the

rm

Court will give great weight to the parties' agreement for a payment of $2,000/month in alimony

I

or in the alternative a lump sum distribution of $400,000, and orders that the terms of the

I
I
I
I

I

Agreement are enforceable and Respondent shall pay $2,000/month in alimony to Petitioner,
effective as of March 2010 for up to 24 years. Per the parties' Agreement, at any time, either
Petitioner or Respondent may elect to terminate the monthly payments in lieu of a $400,000
lump sum (giving credit for the alimony already paid).
The parties' proposed division of checking and savings accounts was ambiguous. In light of
the parties' vastly opposed positions on their intent, and the fact that the Court has determined
35
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that the financial accounts are all marital property, the Court determines the most fair and

I
.

'

~

equitable approach, as well as the presumption under Utah law, is to split all of the financial
accounts equally between the parties. The Court finds that no exceptional circumstances that

'

'

1%1

I

I
i

overcome the general presumption that marital property be divided equally have been
demonstrated by the evidence. The Court orders that the financial accounts be equally
distributed as follows:

'
'

RESPONDENT

PETITIONER

'

.

Hawaii Credit
Union
Los Angeles Firemen's

$166,694 X 50%= $83,347

$83,347

$860.59 X 50%- $430.25

$430.25

$345,020 X 50%=

$172,510

Credit Union Account
#7833401

;
'
'

i
rm

Ii

I
'

'

Los Angeles
Firemen's Credit
Union Account
#7833400;all
three share
accounts (S 1, S7
and S8)
Chase Bank
Account
Mountain America
Credit Union
$ in Respondent's
Safety Deposit
Box
Attorney Trust
Account

TOTAL

$172,510

$2,400.22x50%=$1,200.1 l

$1,200.11

$250x50%=$125

$125

$40,000 X 50%=$20,000

$20,000

$310,000 x.
50%=$155,000
$432,612.36

$155,000

$432,612.36

ms!

II
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To effectuate this distribution, Petitioner should receive the entire $310,000 that is in the
attorney trust account. She has control of the Chase and MACU accounts, totaling $1,325.11.
She has already taken $90,000 from the former Hawaii account, and this needs to be accounted
for. Therefore, she is still owed $31,287.25 from the accounts controlled by Respondent.
Last, the Court concludes the most fair and equitable distribution, as well as the presumption
under Utah law, of the assets that the parties held at the time of trial that were not accounted for
in the Separation Agreement, is to split them equally. The Court finds that no exceptional
circumstances that overcome the general presumption that marital property be divided equally
have been demonstrated by the evidence. The equitable distribution shall be as follows:

PETITIONER
Foo House and
Lot
Loans to
Respondent's
sister and niece
Loan to M.
Anderson
TOTAL
Mednick
deficiency
judgment

RESPONDENT
$428,500 X
50%=$214,250
$265,000 X
50%=$132,500

$214,250
$132,500

$40,000 x.
50%=$20,000
$366,750
$181,721.98 plus
$106.85/day
interest since
June I, 2012 x
50%=$90,860. 99,
to be split if and
when the
judgment is
satisfied

$20,000
$366,750
to be split if
and when the
judgment is
satisfied

Given that the net assets and values are being assessed and distributed at the time of the final
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trial, the Court concludes that 100% of the child's tuition and college expenses were paid out of

I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

marital assets in the past and therefore are already accounted for.
By the Court's calculations, in light of the distributions ordered above, Petitioner is entitled
to an award of $398,037.25 from Respondent to achieve the distributions. Petitioner may submit
an appropriate form of judgment for this purpose. Petitioner is also entitled to receive her
$2,000/month alimony since July 2011 ($96,000), or a lump sum payment of $400,000 (net of
alimony payments made to date) if she or Respondent so elects.

ATTORNEY FEES
Each party is to bear his/her own fees. The Court determines that both Petitioner and
Respondent prevailed in part, and both parties are able to bear their own fees based upon their
financial condition and the distribution of marital property ordered herein. Therefore, the Court
finds an award of fees under Utah Code§ 30-3-3 or Rule 102 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is not warranted.
DATED this 23rd day of July, 2015.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

I~

I
I
I
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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•
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I
~

KYLEE J. SANDUSKY,
Petitioner

DECREE OF DIVORCE
AND JUDGMENT
Case No. 114500103

V.

GEORGE A. SANDUSKY,

Judge Kara L. Pettit

Respondent.

The Court has pending before it the final disposition of the issues in the case following
trial on the merits on April 28-30, 2015. On May 14, 2015, this Court entered an Order of
Bifurcated Decree of Divorce in this cause of action, nunc pro tune to April 30, 2015. The Court
having found and entered its FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and being
otherwise fully advised, adjudges and decrees as follows:

I. JURISDICTION
1.

The parties, George A. Sandusky ("Respondent") and Kylee J. Sandusky

("Petitioner") were married in Ventura County, California on November 10, 1986.
2.

On June 3, 2011, Petitioner filed a verified petition for a Decree of Divorce

pursuant to Utah Code §30-3-1 on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.

~

I
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3.

Petitioner is a resident of Park City, Summit County, Utah and she has been a

resident there for more than three months immediately prior to filing this action.
4.

Respondent is a resident of Hawaii.

5.

Respondent filed a counter petition for Decree of Divorce and Breach of Contract

based on a Separation Agreement entered into by the parties.
6.

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction of this action and personaljwisdiction

over each of the parties. Venue is proper.
7.

At the conclusion of the trial, Respondent made a motion for bifurcated Decree of

Divorce. Petitioner did not oppose the motion and said motion was granted. The Decree of
Divorce was final and effective on April 30, 2015.
8.

All other issues related to this cause of action were reserved for determination by

this Court at a later date.
9.

The parties are the parents of one child, over the age of 18.

I

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

I

The Court finds the following facts have been established in regard to the issues

I
I
I

presented in the trial of this matter:
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a) Separation Agreement and Property Valuation

10.

On or about February 10, 2010, Respondent and Petitioner executed a Separation

Agreement (the "Agreement") effective March 1, 2010.
11.

Each of the parties were competent and over the age of 18 when they entered into

the Agreement.
12.

The parties were living separate and apart at the time the Separation Agreement

was entered into, with Petitioner living in Park City and Respondent living in Hawaii.
13.

The Court finds the testimony of the parties' son very credible when he testified

that during the time he was in high school and his father was living in Hawaii, his father would

I
I
I

third bedroom or on the couch. This testimony supports Respondent's testimony that by the

I

never having sexual relations again. The Court also finds Respondent to be credible in this

I
I
I

I
I

come back for his school sporting events and holidays, but his father would typically stay in the

beginning of 2010, the parties were separated for all intents and purposes and Petitioner had told
him towards the end of2009 that he could just go back to Hawaii and divorce him and they were

regard. The Court does not find Petitioner credible that she did not believe she and Respondent
were separated by March 2010.
14.

The Separation Agreement sets forth in the preamble "WHEREAS, each of the

parties is more than 18 years of age, and they desire to confirm their separation and to make
arrangements in connection therewith, including the settlement and adjustment of their property
3
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I

rights and other rights, responsibilities, and obligations growing out of their marital
relationship".
15.

The Agreement further sets forth "WHEREAS after careful consideration, each

'

I

I
I
i
I

I

party believes it is in his or her own respective best interest to enter into this Separation
Agreement and Property Settlement and each party considers this Agreement to be fair,
reasonable and equitable."
16.

Petitioner and Respondent spent time discussing the specifics to input into the

form Separation Agreement and it was Petitioner who physically typed in the information to
complete the Agreement.
17.

The Separation Agreement states: "Each of the parties acknowledge that he or

she has read this Agreement and understands its contents and provisions; that it is a fair and

••

i
i

reasonable agreement to each of them, having due regard to the conditional and circumstances of
the parties hereto on the date hereof; that each has signed and executed the Agreement freely and

I
'

voluntarily and without fear, compulsion, duress, coercion, persuasion or undue influence

.

I

exercised by either party upon the other or by any other person or persons upon either."

'

'

I'

18.

The Separation Agreement further states above the parties signatures:

'

'

ITTTI

iJ

I
I
'

THE PARTIES AGREE AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SHOULD A
PROCEEDING OF LEGAL SEPARATION, DISSOLUTION OR
DIVORCE BE FILED IN ANY COURT OF COMOPETENT
JURISDICATIO, THIS AGREEEMNT SHALL BE INCORPORATED
INTO ANY SUCH COMPLAINT OR PETITION FOR DIVORCE,

.'

'

'

4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

r1

~

Fl
~

r7

~

DISSOLUTION OR LEGAL SEPARATION, AND THEREAFTER BE
IN CORPORATED IN WHOLD IN ANY ORDER OR JUDGEMENT OF
LEGAL SEPARATION, DISSOLUTION OR DIVORCE.
19.

The Agreement is clear on its face describing the document as a

Separation Agreement having as its purpose a desire to confirm separation of the parties
and settlement of their property rights and other rights, responsibilities and obligations
growing out of their marital relationship.
20.

Significantly, the parties also entered into an Addendum to the Agreement, dated

February 8,2010, stating: "At any time either one of the parties may terminate the monthly
alimony payments of $2000 with a lump sum cash payment of $400,000".

21.

The Addendum to the Separation Agreement became effective March 1, 2010.

Both Petitioner and Respondent signed the Addendum as well.
22.

The Court finds that no evidence was presented to support that the Addendum

served some financial aid purpose. Petitioner asserted that the sole purpose of the Agreement
was to enable their son to qualify for financial aid. If this was the sole purpose, the Addendum
was completely unnecessary. There was no testimony offered that a lump sum payment from
Respondent to Petitioner somehow enabled their son to qualify for more financial aid than if
Petitioner received it in monthly installments. The lack of such testimony undermines
Petitioner's assertion that Respondent duped her into signing the Agreement by allegedly

ffi1

aJ

misleading her that it was only for the purpose of financial aid for their son.

ffi7

I!

~
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23.

For approximately 16 months after execution, the parties complied with the terms

of the Separation Agreement, all the way up until the time Petitioner retained an attorney and
filed for divorce.
24.

Respondent made monthly alimony payments of $2,000 to Petitioner per

the terms of the Agreement. Although Respondent previously had made similar
payments to Petitioner after she moved to Utah, and he stayed in Hawaii, prior to 2010,
the parties had not treated the payments as alimony. However, in 2010, both Petitioner
and Respondent reported the payments as alimony on their income tax returns. Petitioner
later amended her 2010 tax forms to omit the word "alimony," but this was done only
after she had retained counsel and filed her petition for divorce in which she asked the
Court to declare the Separation Agreement void. The Court did not find Petitioner
credible when she alleged that she did "not know what alimony is." The Court found
Petitioner to be an intelligent, articulate person, and does not believe that Petitioner
lacked understanding of such a basic concept.
25.

Petitioner filed her 2010 taxes as head of household and Respondent filed

as single. Prior to that time, the parties had filed their taxes as married filing jointly, and
in 2009 they filed as married filing separately.
26.

Perhaps most significantly, Petitioner repeatedly reported that she and

Respondent were separated as of March 2010 on various financial aid forms starting in

6
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February 2011 and continuing through 2013. For instance, Respondent Trial Exhibits 10
and 12-14 demonstrate that Petitioner understood that she and Respondent were separated
as of March 2010. See Respondent Ex. 10 at Bates 00011 O; Ex. 12 at 000983; Ex. 13 at

000987; and 14 at 000122 (does not specify March, but states as of October 2010 the
parents were separated). Notably, Petitioner continued to report March 20 IO as the date
of separation two years after she had filed for divorce, which discredits her testimony that
she did not understand that she and Respondent were separated as of that date. To the
contrary, it supports that she understood and agreed that the Separation Agreement was
not for the sole purpose of getting financial aid for their son, but was because they were
in fact separating as of March 20 I 0.
27.

Moreover, Petitioner testified that she learned as of October 2010, that pursuant to

the University of Pennsylvania's CSS profile online, all assets counted, including first and
second homes, stepparent and noncustodial parent's assets, thus negating the need for the
Separation Agreement if it was solely for the purpose of financial aid at their son's college of
choice. However, the parties, including Petitioner, continued to comply with the Separation
Agreement after October 2010.
28.

Respondent credibly testified that although he probably did not tell Petitioner that

they were getting "divorced" at the time of the Separation Agreement, both he and Petitioner
understood and discussed that they were separated. He further credibly testified that he may not
have mentioned divorce, as opposed to separation, because divorce was contrary to their
7
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religious beliefs.
29.

Petitioner asserts that the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Chaidez demonstrates the

sole purported purpose of the Separation Agreement stated by Respondent was for financial aid.
Although the Chaidez may have been told it was for financial aid purposes, this does not negate
that Petitioner and Respondent understood it was also for purposes of their separation. Petitioner
and Respondent simply did not disclose this to the Chaidez, which was their prerogative. The
conduct of Petitioner and Respondent in living separately, filing separate taxes and complying
with the terms of the Agreement demonstrate that they were in fact separated, regardless of what
they told the Chaidez.
30.

Furthermore, Mrs. Chaidez testified that Petitioner had never indicated an intent

to divorce Respondent, and she had understood that the plan was for Petitioner to move to
Hawaii after the parties' son graduated from high school. But Petitioner obviously did not reveal
her true intentions to Mrs. Chaidez, because as soon as their son graduated, she immediately filed
for divorce on June 3, 2011.
31.

Each party testified, and the Court finds, that contrary to Article 8 of the

Separation Agreement, neither party "furnished to the other various financial statements and
information reflecting the parties' financial condition as of March 1, 2010."

However, it was

undisputed that both parties were aware of the assets of each other and the financial account
statements were located in a drawer which either of them could have accessed had they wanted
to verify how much was in the accounts as of the date they executed the Separation Agreement.

8
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32.

The parties identified no marital real property in their Separation Agreement, but

identified ten lots in Kailua-Kona, Hawaii composing the He'eNalu property as the separate
property of Respondent. See Separation Agreement at Article J.B. The market value of the
property was estimated to be $300,000. However, Respondent later sold the 8 developable lots
(the other 2 parcels are roadway lots to which the tax assessor has assigned zero value; they are
where a highway will be located) for $335,000. See Ex. 178 Respondent's Response to

Interrogatory No. 8. The Court finds that the value of the 10 lots was $335,000 at the time of the
Separation Agreement, and allocates zero value to the two roadway lots.
33.

Respondent testified that he understood the He'eNalu property to be separate

because it was titled in only his name. Petitioner testified that she did not know the legal
analysis that is applied to determine whether property is marital or separate.
34.

No other real property was accounted for in the Agreement.

35.

Pursuant to Article l.F. Petitioner was entitled to the following separate personal

property: "All home furnishings, computers, TVs,jewelry, and Honda 2007 Civic, checking and
savings accounts, and 401 K." The specific checking and savings accounts were not identified.
The Court finds this renders this provision ambiguous because: it is not specific enough to be
enforced; the parties' had numerous accounts many of which were in both of their names; the
accounts were all acquired during the marriage and contain commingled funds (the Court finds
the accounts all were marital property, see infra); and none were obviously the separate property
of either Petitioner or Respondent. In 2013, Petitioner traded the Civic vehicle in for a CRV.
She also traded in a Ford Explorer that she had purchased after she filed the petition for divorce.
9
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She was given a trade-in value of $9,500 for the Civic and Explorer. The CRV was purchased
for approximately $26,000; Petitioner estimated it had a value of$17,500 as of March 2015, and
Respondent estimated its value to be $19,300. Petitioner has been making payments on a loan
for the CRV. The Court finds the value of the CRV to be $18,000 as of April 30, 2015. No
evidence was presented to the Court by either Petitioner or Respondent upon which to ascertain
the value of the home furnishings, computers, TVs, and jewelry. The Court finds the value of
the 401K was $58,107 as of April 30, 2015. The Court finds that it was undisputed the 100% of
the 40 I K accrued during the parties' marriage. Thus, if the Separation Agreement were not
enforced by the Court, Respondent would be presumed to be entitled to 50% of $58,107, or
$29,053.

36.

Pursuant to Article l .G. Respondent was entitled to the following separate

property: "Honda Ridge line 2007 truck, checking and savings accounts and retirement pension."
The specific checking and savings accounts were not identified. For the reasons stated above,
the Court finds the lack of identification of any particular accounts renders this provision
ambiguous. Respondent sold the Ridgeline truck for $10,000, but Respondent asserted he spent
approximately $6,000 on tires, so netted $4,400. After the Separation Agreement, he also
purchased a 2006 Acura, that he valued at $12,000 as of the end of 2014, and a 2013 Honda
Scooter, which he valued at $1,800 as of the end of 2014. The Court finds the values of the
vehicles in Respondent's possession as of April 30, 2015 to be $13,800. Based upon the Court's
January 2, 2015 Order, at p. 5, and Petitioner's Exhs. 177 and 178, the Court finds the value of
Respondent's pension as follows:
10
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Monthly pension entitlement: $2635.32
Total Service Credit: 20 years and 4 days= 7,304 Days;
Service credit earned during his marriage to Petitioner: 11/01/1986 - 03/08/ 1997=
10 years and 128 days.
Respondent's lost service time = 3 days.
Respondent's service credit purchase= 0 days;
Total days (marital period) minus lost service time plus service credit purchase=
3,775 days.
Therefore, the Court finds that 48% of the pension is Respondent's separate property,
accrued prior to his marriage, and 52% is marital property, accrued during the marriage. Thus, if
the Separation Agreement were not enforced by the Court, Petitioner would be presumed to be
entitled to ½ of 52% of the monthly pension payments, or $685.18.
37.

No marital debts were identified in the Agreement.

38.

Article 4 of the Agreement established an obligation for Respondent to pay

Petitioner spousal support of $2,000/month beginning March 1, 2010. Article 4 did not provide a

ITT

specific duration for such payments. Respondent's filings indicate he understood that Petitioner

~

rn

had the option of $2,000 per month for life or the lump sum payment of $400,000. The

Uei

Addendum to the Agreement provided: "At any time either one of the parties may terminate the

~

monthly alimony payments of$2000 with a lump sum cash payment of$400,000."

'

.

39.

In
Iii
I

w
'

~

Respondent testified that he understood that Petitioner's share of the property

division was $400,000 and that under the terms of the Separation Agreement her $400,000
property share was to be paid to her by Respondent as alimony, at the rate of $2,000 per month
or a lump sum payment option of $400,000. However, this is in direct conflict with the plain

J

'

language of Article 4 which states: "The provisions for the support, maintenance and alimony of
Petitioner are independent of any division or agreement for division of property between the
11

~
.

'
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parties, and shall not for any purpose be deemed to be a part of or merged in or integrated with
the property settlement of the parties."
40.

Pursuant to Article 8: "In the event it is hereafter discovered that either party has

failed to disclose, whether knowingly or inadvertently, an asset the value of which is substantial
(herein defined as having a value in excess of $500.00) the other party shall be entitled to onehalf if it is a divisible asset or 50% of the value, as independently ascertained, of said asset."
41.

The Court finds that both parties testified that they were aware of the existence of

the following assets or debts as of March 2010, but they did not account for them in their
Separation Agreement:
a. Bishop hard money loan valued at $450,000 (Petitioner's Ex. 79). Petitioner
testified she was aware of the hard money loan, but did not know the amount. The
testimony was undisputed that Respondent received the full loan amount of $450,000
after the Separation Agreement was executed. Thus, the value of the loan will be
accounted for in the Court's distribution of the parties' financial accounts below.
b. Purchase Contract for the "Foo House" and lot (Purchase Contract dated in
January 12, 2010) (See P. Exhibits 96, 97; 3) for $415,000. Respondent listed the Foo
House (76-6230 Ali'i Dr, HI) as his address on the Separation Agreement. Petitioner
testified she was aware that Respondent was intending to purchase the home and was
living in it and fixing it up for that purpose. Petitioner was not aware that Respondent
had actually entered into a purchase contract in January 2010, but the Court does not find
this to render the agreement unenforceable. Petitioner knew he intended to purchase it at
12
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the time she entered the Separation Agreement. Respondent valued the Foo House and
the adjacent lot at $428,500 total in his September 2014 Financial Declaration, based
upon the tax assessor's values. Respondent purchased the property in 201 0 using funds
from the 55155 Bank Account. Respondent still holds title to the Foo House and adjacent
lot. The Court finds the value of the Foo House and adjacent lot to be $428,500 as of
April 30, 2015.
c. Smart Car; later sold for $7,500 by Respondent. Thus, the value of the vehicle
will be accounted for in the Court's distribution of the parties' financial accounts.
42.

Assets that were in the parties' possession at the time of trial, but were acquired

after the Separation Agreement was executed (aside from the exchange of vehicles set forth
above) include:
a.

judgment against Benita Mednick related to a hard money loan agreement

~

entered into by Respondent in 2010 after the Separation Agreement was

~
~
~

$181,721.98 plus $106.85/day interest since June 1, 2012 in a deficiency

executed, but utilizing funds from the parties' financial accounts;
b.

"Loans" to Respondent's sister of $230,000 and niece of $35,000 as
testified by Respondent and set forth in his financial declaration, made from
the parties' financial accounts. When asked why he put those monies into his
joint account with his sister, he responded, "It was an account with my sister.

w
~

~

It was separate property. Keep it away from Petitioner." Respondent, testified
that he was not hiding it from Petitioner, but that he was protecting it so that
13
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Petitioner would not take the money as she had withdrawn $90,000 from their
joint account (See also Petitioner's Exhibit #172).
c.

Loan by Respondent to M. Anderson for $40,000, in August 2010;
payable 60 days upon demand, made from the parties' financial accounts.
Petitioner's Ex. 150;

d.

$40,000 in 100 dollar bills obtained in 2011 by Respondent for "trust
deeds" and kept in a safety deposit box. The safety deposit box also contains
a gold watch, gold and silver dollar pieces given to Respondent by his
grandfather, and some gold pieces bought after the Separation Agreement by
Respondent. Petitioner's Ex. 151. The Court finds that the gifts to
Respondent from his grandfather are his separate property. He has not
commingled them with Petitioner's property and no evidence was presented
that Petitioner augmented, maintained or protected the separate property. The
Court was not provided with any evidence upon which to place a value upon
the gold pieces Respondent obtained after the Separation Agreement;

e.

$310,000 in attorney trust account from sale of Maui condo/Mednick hard
money loan

43.

At the time of the Separation Agreement in March 2010, the parties had the

following checking and savings accounts:
a.

Hawaii Community Credit Union Account #551555; balance of$453,279;

Petitioner's Ex. 147;
14
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b.

~

Petitioner's Ex. 148;
c.

~

d.

e.

~

~

Los Angeles Firemen's Credit Union Account #7833401; balance of

$8.413; Petitioner's Ex. 58;

E

~

Vanguard account #09901289798, balance of $11,855; Petitioner's Ex.

149;

[l

E

Utah Home Savings Bank Account #05 015077220 05; balance of $2,835;

Los Angeles Firemen's Credit Union Account #7833400; all three share

accounts (SI, S7 and S8) balance of$412,340; Petitioner's Ex. 90.
44.

Based upon the evidence, as of the date of trial, the parties' financial account

balances were as follows:
a.

Hawaii Community Credit Union Account #596889; balance of $166,694;

Respondent's Ex. 66; (Respondent closed out account #551555 in July 2011 and
opened this one);

~
~

~

£l

ll

I
Ii

b.

Los Angeles Firemen's Credit Union Account #7833401; balance of

$860.59; Petitioner's Ex. 184;
c.

Los Angeles Firemen's Credit Union Account #7833400; all three share

accounts (S 1, S7 and S8) balance of $345,020; Respondent's Ex. 57 A.
d.

Chase Bank Account $2,400.22 (as of 11/19/14 R Ex 70); opened by

Petitioner; and
e.

Mountain America Credit Union Account $250; opened by Petitioner;

Petitioner's Ex. 179.
15
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The Utah Home Savings Bank and Vanguard accounts were also closed out by the
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time of trial.

MARITAL VS. SEPARATE PROPERTY CLASSIFICATION
45.

Petitioner testified that she had had assets prior to the marriage, but they were not

of substantial value nor were they retained by her as separate property. Petitioner is not asserting
she owns separate property.
46.

However, Respondent claims a substantial amount of separate property.

Respondent asserts that at the time of his marriage to Petitioner, on November 1, 1986 he had
$400,000.00 in premarital assets which he was investing and which he maintained as separate
property throughout the term of the parties' marriage through various property investments. He
argues he is entitled to the entire $400,000 plus the investment returns indirectly derived from
that $400,000 as his separate property.
47.

As set forth in detail below, the Court finds that any premarital property that

Respondent brought to the marriage was commingled, marital funds were expended upon the real
estate and hard money loan ventures, and Petitioner's efforts over the 28 years of their marriage
assisted to augment, maintain or protect the property that perhaps initially was obtained through

~
~
~
~
~

the assets Respondent brought with him to the marriage. Thus, the Court disagrees with
Respondent that he has separate property of $400,000 plus the fruits of the investment of that
$400,000. In classifying property Utah law presumes that property acquired during the marriage
is marital property and subject to equitable distribution. See Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d
431, 432-33 (Utah 1982), cited in Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 23, 126 (Utah, 2015). Thus, to the
16
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extent an asset contains marital property, "Utah has a strong interest in ensuring that such
property is equitably divided in the parties' divorce action." Dahl, 126. The marital property is
equitably (presumptively equally) divided and the separate property is presumptively awarded to
the 'owner' spouse. See also Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887 (Utah App. 1999).
"Premarital property may lose its separate distinction where the parties have inextricably

~
.

commingled it into the marital estate, or where one spouse has contributed all or part of the

.

Wl

property to the marital estate." Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1321 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The

'1

Court's conclusion regarding the lack of separate property as claimed by Respondent is based

~

upon the following facts:

'

'

Dover l Ventura, CA. The Court finds that Respondent acquired a premarital 50%

,n

lW

interest in a residence on Dover I nine days before the marriage, on October 23, 1986

fl
'1

(Petitioner's Exhibit 1: Quit Claim Deed). The Court finds that Respondent financed such
purchase through jointly borrowing with Sellers and assuming a 50% obligation ($150,000) on a

~

I

'

IJ
'

Deed of Trust for $300,000 (Petitioner's Exhibit #2. Petitioner testified that she and Respondent
immediately upon marrying proceeded to work on repairing, improving and enhancing the value

'

~

of Dover I. She testified that she did the following: cleaned out garage, mixed cement, dry

'

'

f

(Fl

liid

~
'

walled a ceiling, shoveled sand, and painted. Respondent did not dispute Petitioner's testimony.
The court finds that Petitioner repaired, improved and enhanced the value of Dover I during the
marriage, and that no repairs, improvements, or enhancements to the value of Dover I were made

'

[

prior to the marriage, but only after the marriage.
Additionally, Petitioner and Respondent were both employed. Petitioner and Respondent
17
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both testified that they also took in a tenant at Dover I and that Respondent's 50% share of the
payments on principal, interest, taxes and insurance ("PIT!") and on the repair and improvement
expenses were paid solely through marital income, that income earned during the marriage
(employment compensation and rents). While Respondent asserts that he made the check
payments on the PIT!, it is undisputed, and the Court so finds, that such payments were paid

~

solely with marital income and that other marital expenses were also paid solely by marital

'

'

~

I

'

income earned by Petitioner and Respondent. And, while Respondent may have written the
check, Respondent admitted Petitioner paid for family expenses; thus enabling Respondent to
pay the PITI. Further, the Court finds that no PITI payments or repairs and improvement
expenses for his 50% share on Dover I were paid by Respondent using premarital assets,

JK7

w

~
'

premarital income or funds or separate property.

Dover II. Respondent purchased the other 50% interest in Dover on July 10, 1987,

'

~

("Dover II" Petitioner's Exhibit 3, Quit Claim Deed). It is noted on the Quit Claim Deed for

'

'

~
'

Dover II that the Deed of Trust does not reflect the total consideration for purchase, but that
Respondent paid an additional $55,000. Respondent testified that the total consideration he paid

'

for Dover II was (i) assuming the obligation to pay the other half of the original deed of trust of

~
'

'

~
'

.

$300,000, and (ii) paying an additional $55,000. According to Petitioner's testimony, Petitioner
continued to work on repairing, improving and enhancing the value of Dover I and II. Petitioner
testified that she hung drywall on the ceiling, shoveled sand, painted walls and deck railings,

W1
~

made cement, put a toilet in, pulled up carpet and carpet nails, put down new carpet, put in new

W1

doors and windows, and cleaned up after helping pull out a large wall of cement to make a large

Ui1
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window. Respondent did not dispute Petitioner's testimony. Moreover, it was their marital
home until they moved to 1516 Buena Vista in San Clemente. The court finds that Petitioner
repaired, improved and enhanced the value of Dover I and II during the marriage, along with
Respondent, and that no repairs, improvements, or enhancements to the value of Dover I and II
were made by either party prior to the marriage, but only after the marriage.
Additionally, like with Dover I, Petitioner and Respondent both testified that after the
purchase of Dover II they took in more tenants at Dover I and II and that Respondent's 100%
PITI payments on all of Dover and on the repair and improvement expenses were paid solely
through marital income, that income earned during the marriage (employment compensation and
rents). Furthermore, according to Petitioner's Exhibit 8 and the testimony of both parties'
Respondent sold Dover on 1/02/1990. Thus, for 3.25 years all PITI payments and payments for
repairs, improvements and enhancements for Dover I and II were paid entirely through marital
income. While Respondent asserts that he made the check payments on the PITI, it is
undisputed, and the Court so finds, that such payments were paid solely with marital income.
Further, the Court finds that no PITI payments or repairs and improvement expenses for Dover I
and II were paid by Respondent using premarital assets, premarital income or funds or separate
property. The Court finds from the evidence and Respondent's conduct that it was Respondent's
intent to make all such payments over the years from marital income and assets, there being no
other premarital assets to make such payments.
Promptly after selling Dover, on December

1516 Buena Vista, San Clemente, CA.

18, 1989 (Petitioner Exhibit I 0, Grant Deed recorded 01/05/90), Respondent and Petitioner
19
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purchased as Joint Tenants 1516 Buena Vista, San Clemente, CA ("1516 BV") with proceeds
from the sale of Dover and by jointly borrowing $135,000 (Petitioner Exhibit 11, Deed of Trust).
Respondent testified that he knowingly purchased 1516 BV with Petitioner as joint tenants and
they were jointly liable for the debt. Respondent testified that he thought the parties purchased it
for $535,000, but there is no supporting evidence for that price.
Subsequent to the purchase of 1516 BV, in addition to the initial loan of $135,000,
Respondent and Petitioner took out additional loans in their joint names in the amounts of
$100,000 (Petitioner Exhibit 12), $193,800 (Petitioner Exhibit 14), and $100,000 (Petitioner
Exhibit 20). While admitting to each of these loans, neither party had much recollection about
these loans or which loan may have paid off a previous loan, but Respondent testified that the
parties did use $100,000 from one of these loans (secured by 1516 BV) for the down-payment
and purchase of another property, 1107 Buena Vista, San Clemente, C~ on July 1, 1994
(Petitioner, Exhibit 23 Grant Deed for"l l 07 BV").

~

~
~
~

~
~

~

The parties owned 1516 BV from December 1989 to April 1996 (Petitioner Exhibit 18).
Petitioner testified that she substantially contributed to repairing, remodeling and enhancing the
value of 1516 BV, and provided details, such as painting, dry wall, pull up carpet and carpet
staples, put down carpet, fixed and replaced windows, and shoveled out a basement. Respondent
did not dispute Petitioner's testimony. The court finds that Petitioner repaired, improved and
enhanced the value of 1516 BV during the marriage, along with Respondent, and that all of such
repairs, remodeling and enhancements to the value of 1516 BV were made by the parties during
the marriage.
20
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Additionally, evidence shows that Petitioner and Respondent were both working and both
testified that after the purchase of 1516 BV they took in tenants and that all of the payments on
all loans (PITI) for the 6 + years and on all of the repairs, remodeling and improvement expenses
were paid solely through marital income, that income earned during the marriage (employment
compensation and rents). While Respondent asserts that he made the check payments on the

PITI, it is undisputed, and the Court so finds, that such payments were paid solely with marital
income. Further, the Court finds that no PITI payments or repairs, remodeling and improvement
expenses for 1516 BV were paid by Respondent using premarital assets, premarital income or
funds or separate property. The Court finds from the evidence, Respondent's conduct and
testimony that it was Respondent's intent for the parties' to purchase 1516 BV as Joint Tenants
and joint obligees on all loans secured by such residence and to make all such payments and
payments to repair, remodel and enhance the property over the years from marital income and
assets, there being no separate property. Moreover, it was their marital home, to which they both

~

~

[
~

~
~

contributed substantially. Furthermore, from the evidence, Respondent's conduct and his
express intent, and the pattern of Respondent and Petitioner's joint involvement in enhancing the
value of properties from 1986 through 1996 and their use of marital income to pay for all
expenses on such properties the Court finds that Respondent abandoned any intent to maintain a
separate identity of property derived from the sale of Dover I and II and that with the purchase
of 1516 BV and thereafter (see below) the identity of separate property was entirely lost,
commingled, merged with or transmuted into marital property.
When the parties sold 1516 BV in April 1996, Respondent claims that they sold the
21
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property at a catastrophic loss, that the parties "got killed." Without supporting evidence,
Respondent testified that he thought that the parties purchased 1516 BV for approximately
$535,000 ($400,000 down {from Dover proceeds} and loan of $135,000) and that it was sold for
approximately $350,000 (which included taking back a note for $35,700, Petitioner Exhibit 16,
17), thus at a loss of $185,000.

1107 Buena Vista. The parties purchased 1107 BV in July 1994, with (i) $100,000 in
borrowed funds secured by the jointly owned property at 1516 BV and a $463,000 Deed of Trust
(Petitioner Exhibit 25). Although Respondent acquired the $100,000 through a loan secured by
1516 BV, a jointly owned marital property, Respondent titled 1107 BV in his own name
(Petitioner Exhibit 23). When asked why it was so titled, Respondent testified that he was not
aware of that and that he did not know why he titled 1107 BV in his name (CD 04/30/15 at
11 :55:35).
1107 BV was sold June 13, 1996 (Petitioner Exhibit 27), shortly after the parties sold
1516 BV. Petitioner testified that from July 1994 to June 1996 Petitioner she substantially
contributed to repairing, remodeling and enhancing the value of 1107 BV, and provided details,
such as gardening, planting on the hillside, painting, carpeting, and putting in new windows.
Respondent did not dispute Petitioner's testimony. The court finds that Petitioner repaired,
improved and enhanced the value of 1107 BV during the marriage, along with Respondent, and
that all of such repairs, remodeling and enhancements to the value of 1107 BV were made by the
parties during the marriage.
Additionally, Petitioner and Respondent both testified that after the purchase of 1107 BV
22
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they took in tenants and that all of the payments on all loans (PITI) for the 2 year period and on
all of the repairs, remodeling and improvement expenses were paid solely through marital
income, that income earned during the marriage (employment compensation and rents). While
Respondent asserts that he made the check payments on the PITI, it is undisputed, and the Court
so finds, that such payments were paid solely with marital income (Respondent's marital income.
Petitioner was not employed during these two years, having given birth to MS 10/1992 and
caring for the parties' child). Further, the Court finds that no PITI payments or repairs,
remodeling and improvement expenses for 1107 BV were paid by Respondent using premarital
assets, premarital income or funds or separate property. The Court finds from the evidence,
Respondent's conduct and testimony that it was Respondent's intent to make all PITI payments
on 1107 BV and payments to repair, remodel and enhance 1107 BV from marital income and
assets. The Court further finds that although 1107 was titled in Respondent's name it was
acquired solely by funds secured by 1516 BV and solely maintained, repaired, remodeled,

~

~
~

C
C
~
~

enhanced and paid for by marital labors and income and Respondent testified that he had no idea
why he titled 1107 in his name. Also, by now the parties' had a child. Upon selling the two
"BV" properties Respondent retired from the fire department and the parties and their child
moved to Hawaii, initially renting a home for two years.
The Court finds that upon arriving in HI Respondent and Petitioner opened a joint bank
account at Hawaii Community Federal Credit Union #551555 with $100,000 in proceeds from
the sales of the BV properties (P. Exhibit 29, check and bank statement).

77-6311 A/ii Dr., Kailua-Kona, Hl Respondent testified that he and Petitioner purchased
23
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a lot for $160,000 and titled the lot in their joint names as "Tenants by the Entirety" and built a

!fl

house with $90,000 on the lot. Respondent and Petitioner constructed the home, both providing

.!

substantial labor (P. Exhibit 32, pictures), with Petitioner testifying that she razed the land, put

~

down gravel, shoveled dirt, framed, put in insulation, put windows in, put up dry wall, painted,

(fl

and carried roof tiles up two ladders to the roof. The Court finds that the house was marital

.

'

'1
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~
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'
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~

property. In July 1999, the parties sold the house for approximately $400,000 (P. Exhibit #31).

White Sands Condo, HI. In June 1999, the parties purchased the "White Sands Condo" as
"Tenants by the Entirety" for $170,000 using a portion of the proceeds of the sale of the Alii
Drive marital home. (P. Exhibit #33 ). In December 200 I the parties jointly took out an equity
line mortgage on the White Sands Condo for $200,000 in order to help purchase the "Lyman"
property (P. Exhibit #34) in January 2002. The family lived in the White Sands Condo from July

~
.

1999 until they sold it in 2002.

'

He 'eNalu 10 Lots. In January 2000 Respondent purchased 10 lots in his name for
$197,525 from the Alii Drive marital home sale proceeds (P. Exhibit 43). After the purchase of
the Lots, the parties had an approximate financial account balance of only $34,475.

Lyman Property, HJ In January 2002 the parties purchased the Lyman's property,

~
'

'

consisting of three houses, for $1,800,000. Respondent and Petitioner purchased a 50% share as
"Tenants by the Entirety." The other 50% interest was purchased by Respondent's sister and
brother-in-law, Liz and Joe Chambers. To make the purchase possible the two couples borrowed
$1 million (P. Exhibit 5 5) and each of the couples paid half of the $800,000 balance ($400,000
each). Respondent and Petitioner borrowed $200,000 on the White Sands Condo equity line.
24
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Respondent testified that he and Petitioner received a gift of $25,000 from Petitioner's parents to
help out, but they paid that back in 2004. He said they also got a kickback of approximately
$13,000 from the agent, and the rest of their $400,000 contribution came from what was left of
the proceeds of the sale of the Alii Drive marital home and BV properties in California, if
anything was left from those in their joint financial accounts.
Both parties testified that at this time the parties were "all in" and totally stretched and
maxed out. Respondent and Petitioner were jointly obligated on the $1 million loan (P. Exhibit
#55). The parties testified that Petitioner was employed full time (P. Exhibit #52) so that the
parties could cover their debt obligations, insurance and taxes, improvement expenses, and living
expenses and Respondent received pension income too. Petitioner also testified, and it is
undisputed, that Petitioner also contributed material and substantial labor on building a rock
wall, painting, pulling up carpet and carpet tacks, putting down carpet, restoring window sills,
and kept up with vegetation growth to help improve Lyman over the 5 years that they owned
Lyman (P. Exhibit #71).
The parties testified and the Court finds that the parties (and their partners) sold off a
portion of the Lyman property for $700,000 to reduce debt and that they refinanced their loan
from $1 million to $400,000 in February 2003 (P. Exhibit #57), with each couple again being
responsible for half of the debt ($200,000 per couple). The Court finds that Respondent and
Petitioner were jointly obligated on their half of this debt as well. At this time, Respondent
testified that they had a small negative cash flow. He said Petitioner contributed by paying
living expenses, such as groceries, vehicle maintenance, insurance, phone bills.
25
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Joe Chambers died in 2002, and in 2004 the parties sold the rest of the Lyman property to
Michael Rich for $3 million. Each couple received $100,000 at the time of the sale, but it took
approximately three years of legal wrangling to get the rest of the approximately $1.5 million per
couple proceeds in August 2007 due to fraud perpetrated by Mr. Rich. Petitioner and
Respondent deposited these proceeds into their joint bank account (P. Exhibit #70) and paid
federal and state taxes, leaving a net balance in their account of $1,394,046.
Once they finally received their $1.5 million, Respondent, Petitioner and their son moved
from Hawaii to Park City, Utah, in August 2007. Respondent and their son moved first. Their
son was just about to start high school. Petitioner was not as enthused about the choice of
location, but eventually came around. Petitioner gave notice to her employer in HI and joined
Respondent and their son in Park City. They discussed as a family staying in one location for
four years for their son. Neither party was employed, and they lived off the proceeds from the
Lyman property sale.
Respondent and Petitioner traveled in a motor home for approximately 13 weeks. At
some point that was not well-defined in the testimony, Respondent began to return to Hawaii
without Petitioner or their son, and the trips and duration of his stays became longer and longer.
Eventually, by late 2009, Respondent was rarely coming back to Utah, and would return for their
son's sporting events and major holidays. As set forth above, the Court finds that for all intents
and purposes, the parties were separated by early 2010.

Foo House, HI. The Court finds that Respondent was living in and renovating the Foo
house in Hawaii by approximately December 2009. The Court finds his testimony credible that
26
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he spoke to Petitioner about his intent to fix up and purchase the property so he could live in it in
Hawaii. He purchased the Foo property (house and adjacent "church" lot) in early 2010, using
funds from the parties' joint account at the Hawaii Credit Union (a portion of Lyman proceeds) ..
All monies spent on improving the house, taxes, etc. have been paid through marital assets and
marital income. The Court finds that the Foo house and lot are marital properties.

Financial Accounts. The Court finds that all of the aforementioned real property
purchases after Dover I were marital and not separate property because they were acquired
during the marriage, purchased using either joint account funds or proceeds from the sale of
property jointly held by Petitioner and Respondent, or debt for which both Petitioner and
Respondent were obligated. Moreover, as set forth and stated previously, Petitioner directly
assisted to augment, maintain or protect the property. It follows, therefore, that the proceeds
from the sale of the marital real estate is also marital property. The proceeds of the real estate
sales were ultimately deposited into the parties' financial accounts. The funds in the financial
accounts were all acquired during their marriage either from the sale of the marital real estate,
from Petitioner and Respondent's employment, Respondent's pension upon his retirement in
1997, or from Hard Money Loans (using money earned from the sale of the marital real estate) as
detailed below. The Court finds that all of the parties' checking and savings accounts are marital
property.

Hard Money Loans. In addition to the acquisition of real properties, starting in 1999 and
continuing thereafter Respondent used marital funds to make what he called "hard money loans"
secured by real property (approximately 6-7 transactions), using only marital funds to make each
27
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of these loans. The Court finds that these hard money loans were marital property.

~

II.

~

A. The Separation Agreement is a Valid and Binding Contract.

~

In Utah, both premarital and post marital agreements, as well as stipulations entered into

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

in contemplation of separation and divorce are valid, binding and enforceable. The Supreme

~

w
~

~
~
~
~
~

i
~

Court of Utah has affirmed the "general authority of spouses to arrange property rights by a
contract that is recognized and enforced by a court in the event of divorce." Reese v. Reese, 1999
UT 75, 984 P.2d 987, ~24. The court affirmed "the general principle that spouses ... may make
binding contracts with each other and arrange their affairs as they see fit, insofar as the
negotiations are conducted in good faith. Id., at 125. In Sweet v. Sweet, 2006 UT App. 216, 138
P.3d 63, the court held that agreements between spouses concerning the disposition of property
owned by them at the time of marriage are valid, so long as there is no fraud, coercion or
material non-disclosure. 13.
Petitioner is highly educated, having a master's degree in Education and Respondent is a
highly sophisticated business man, so to attribute lack of knowledge is not consistent with whom
they are. '"In the context of contract formatio·n, the Utah appellate courts have held that 'each
party has the burden to read and understand the terms of a contract before he or she affixes his or
her signature to it"' Burning ham v. Westgate Resorts, Ltd. at 124, citing McClure Props., LLC

v. Dray Halt Family Ltd. Pasha, 2013 UT App 185, at 112,307 P.3d 650 (affirming summary

~
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judgment because affidavit of party's intent was insufficient to create fact question in light of
unambiguous writings to the contrary). Given these principals and the clear language contained
in the Agreement, the Court finds that the parties reached a meeting of the minds when they
executed the Agreement. "If the language within the four comers of the contract is unambiguous,
the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and
the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Burning ham v. Westgate Resorts, Ltd. at,
25 citing generally Nolin v. S & S Constr., Inc. 2013 UT App 94,, 12, 301 P. 3d 1026.
The one big exception is that the parties did not specify how to divide their financial
accounts and the provision regarding division of the checking and saving accounts is ambiguous.
The parties take vastly different positions as to their intent with respect to the division of
financial accounts. Respondent's position is that their intent was to consider the vast majority of
the accounts as his separate property. Petitioner's position is that they did not have a meeting of
the minds on the agreement at all, and she was fraudulently induced into signing the agreement.

8. The evidence does not demonstrate fraud in the inducement or coercion.
The defense of fraudulent inducement generally requires proof by clear and convincing
evidence. Anderson v. Kiser, 266P.3d 819 (Utah 2011). The evidence has not established by
clear and convincing evidence, or even a lesser standard of preponderance, that Petitioner was
fraudulently induced or coerced into signing the Agreement. As set forth supra, the Court does
not find evidence of fraud, coercion, or material non-disclosure in the formation of the
Agreement. The Court finds that both Petitioner and Respondent understood that the Agreement
29
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served the purpose of dividing their property due to their separation, and was not simply a ruse
for financial aid purposes. Both Petitioner and Respondent prepared the document together, with
Petitioner typing the terms herself. The parties acted in compliance with the Agreement for more
than 16 months after entering into the Agreement. Petitioner did not present sufficient evidence
to support her claim of fraudulent inducement or coercion in entering into the Separation
Agreement.

C. Petitioner has not proven that there was material non-disclosure when signing
the Agreement.
Additionally, there are no instances of material non-disclosure;, both parties were well
aware of the financial situations throughout the marriage. The Court finds that although
Petitioner may not have known the details of some of the asset values, she was well-aware of the
existence of all of the assets and their general value. She could have easily looked at the bank
statements and documentation in the drawer if she had wanted to ascertain more detail.
Respondent did not commit a material non-disclosure-the evidence does not indicate a single
asset of which Petitioner was unaware in March 20 I 0. Moreover, even if he had, it would not
necessarily render the Agreement unenforceable because the Agreement provides that any
undisclosed asset is split 50/50.
Therefore, the Court concludes that there was no material non-disclosure that renders the
Agreement unenforceable.

30
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D. Equitable Disposition in Light of Separation Agreement.
It is well-recognized Utah law that: "It is the court's prerogative to make whatever
disposition of property ... as it deems fair, equitable, and necessary for the protection and
welfare of the parties. The court need not necessarily abide by the terms of the litigant's
stipulations, and although such should be respected and given great weight, the court is not duty
bound to carry over the terms thereof." Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P .2d I 080, I 081 (Utah 1977);

see also Coleman v. Coleman, 743 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah App., 1987); Dayton v. Dayton, 2003 UT
App 205; and Jensen v. Jensen, 2008 UT App 392, 197 P.3d 117.
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Because the Court has determined that the Agreement is enforceable, it respects it
and gives the Agreement great weight, but also needs to assess whether its terms are fair
and equitable. As a starting point for that analysis, the Court reiterates its Findings set
forth above and concludes that all of the parties' assets are marital property, with the
exception of the gifts from Respondent's grandfather in his safety deposit box and 48%
of Respondent's pension, which he accrued prior to the parties' marriage and can be
separately identified and segregated from the marital portion of the pension. The Court
found that the parties paid for the various real properties with marital income, Petitioner
enhanced the values of all acquired real properties as did Respondent, the parties acquired
almost all real properties in their joint names or as tenants by the entireties, or if a

n
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property was acquired in Respondent's name, such as 1107 BV, Respondent did not
know why it was not put in the parties joint name and it was acquired through the use of
31
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joint marital assets. Furthermore, when the parties purchased properties, often they were

~

~

acquired with a Deed of Trust in the name of both parties and entirely paid for with
marital income, and the purchase was made possible by Petitioner's employment as well

'' .

~
.

'.

~

as subsequently by Respondent's monthly pension income. Additionally, the parties
deposited sale proceeds into joint accounts. Talcing all of the Courts findings the Court
concludes that not only did Respondent abandon any attempt at segregating and

.
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.
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maintaining the separate identity to any premarital property (except for 48% of his
pension and the gifts from his grandfather in his safety deposit box), but, evidenced by
his conduct and the parties joint conduct, Respondent intended to merge, commingle, gift

'
.

WI

and transmute any separate property into marital property. Given the evidence, all

~

premarital equity was commingled, merged and lost its separate identity into marital

i

property and it cannot be quantified. Respondent has failed to meet his burden of proof

'
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regarding allegedly separate property.
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Pursuant to the terms of the Separation Agreement that the Court determined were
unambiguous, the parties' property disposition and alimony would be as follows based
upon the Court's determined valuations:

.
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PETITIONER

RESPONDENT

2007 Honda
Civic; converted
into CRY

$18,000

401K
Furnishings,

$58,107
Unknown

2007 Honda
Ridgeline;
converted into
Acura
Pension
10 Lots

IT'1I

111

•

$13,800

$2,632/month
$335,000

'.

32
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I
.

.

computers, TVs,
jewelry
Alimony

He'eNalu

value
$2,000/month
or $400,000
lump sum

The Court finds this distribution and alimony award to be fair and equitable. Each party
agreed to keep their own retirement account. This division does not create a tremendous
inequality, particularly in light of the fact that at best, Petitioner would be entitled to
approximately $685/month if the Court did not give deference to the parties' agreement. Each
party gets an almost equal split of personal property, which the Court deems to be equitable.
Respondent receives real property valued at approximately $335,000, and similarly, Petitioner is
entitled to either a lump sum of $400,000 or $2,000/month in alimony. The Court finds this to
be a fair and equitable division as well. Because the parties have already effectuated these
distributions, nothing further needs to be done.
Although the alimony was agreed upon and neither party has addressed the requisite statutory
factors in any of their briefing or argument, the Court analyzes the factors set forth in Utah Code
§ 30-3-5(8)(a) to ensure the parties' agreed upon award is fair and equitable. As a general rule,
the Court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in determining
alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a) factors:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;

She currently earns $1,724/month in net income and has approximately $3,400 in reasonable
expenses each month. Petitioner asserts that the standard of living during the time of their

•
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marriage would have included renting a place that was more in the range of $1,700/month
instead of the $770/month caliber of place she is currently able to afford because
Respondent has control of the marital assets. Her current monthly deficit is $1,700.

(ii)the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
Recipient is able to earn an income as a teacher as she has done in the past.

the ability of the payer spouse to provide support;

(iii)

Although Respondent is unemployed, he is able to earn income from his real estate and hard
money loan ventures. His regular monthly net income from his pension is $2,665 and his
reasonable monthly expenses are approximately $3,400 (Respondent's Financial Declaration
includes $4,000/month for educational expenses for their son, but he recently graduated and
this is no longer an expense.) His monthly deficit is approximately $750.

(iv)

the length of the marriage,·

separated in March 201 O; married for 24 years, which is a lengthy duration

(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
The parties' only child is now in college and no longer a minor. Respondent is the one
paying for the bulk of his education, not Petitioner.

(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payer
spouse; and
At times during their marriage, Petitioner worked with Respondent on renovating properties
for resale and supporting him in that regard instead of working as a teacher. However, she is
now, and was for many years, a teacher as her primary employment.
34
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(vii)

whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payer

spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payer spouse or enabling the payer spouse
to attend school during the marriage.
Not applicable; no evidence was presented that Petitioner paid for professional education for
Respondent.
Petitioner's monthly deficit is approximately $1,700, living at a lesser standard than she was
accustomed during their marriage. Respondent has the ability to pay, because he earns income in
nontraditional ways that are not reflected on his Financial Declaration (renovate/resale
properties; hard money loans). Considering all of the factors, and the standard ofliving during
their 28 year marriage, the Court finds that the $2,000/month in alimony agreed upon by the
parties is fair and equitable. However, the parties did not set a limit for the duration of the
alimony payments. Pursuant to Utah law, the duration cannot be longer than the parties were
together as a married couple, which is 24 years for these parties ( 1986 to 2010). In sum, the
Court will give great wei_ght to the parties' agreement for a payment of $2,000/month in alimony
or in the alternative a lump sum distribution of $400,000, and orders that the terms of the
Agreement are enforceable and Respondent shall pay $2,000/month in alimony to Petitioner,
effective as of March 2010 for up to 24 years. Per the parties' Agreement, at any time, either
Petitioner or Respondent may elect to terminate the monthly payments in lieu of a $400,000
lump sum (giving credit for the alimony already paid).
The parties' proposed division of checking and savings accounts was ambiguous. In light of
the parties' vastly opposed positions on their intent, and the fact that the Court has determined
35
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that the financial accounts are all marital property, the Court determines the most fair and
equitable approach, as well as the presumption under Utah law, is to split all of the financial
accounts equally between the parties. The Court fmds that no exceptional circumstances that
overcome the general presumption that marital property be divided equally have been
demonstrated by the evidence. The Court orders that the financial accounts be equally
distributed as follows:
RESPONDENT

PETITIONER
Hawaii Credit
Union
Los Angeles Firemen's

$166,694 X 50%= $83,347

$83,347

$860.59 X 50%- $430.25

$430.25

$345,020 X 50%=
$172,510

$172,510

$2,400.22x50%=$1,200. l l

$1,200.11

$250x50%=$125

$125

$40,000 X 50%=$20,000

$20,000

$310,000 x.
50%=$155,000

$155,000

$432,612.36

$432.612.36

Credit Union Account
#7833401
Los Angeles
Firemen's Credit
Union Account
#7833400;all
three share
accounts (S 1, S7
and S8)
Chase Bank
Account
Mountain America
Credit Union
$ in Respondent's
Safety Deposit
Box
Attorney Trust
Account
TOTAL
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To effectuate this distribution, Petitioner should receive the entire $310,000 that is in the
attorney trust account. She has control of the Chase and MACU accounts, totaling $1,325.11.
She has already taken $90,000 from the former Hawaii account, and this needs to be accounted

.

w
.

'

fill

~

for. Therefore, she is still owed $31,287.25 from the accounts controlled by Respondent.
Last, the Court concludes the most fair and equitable distribution, as well as the presumption
under Utah law, of the assets that the parties held at the time of trial that were not accounted for
in the Separation Agreement, is to split them equally. The Court finds that no exceptional
circumstances that overcome the general presumption that marital property be divided equally
have been demonstrated by the evidence. The equitable distribution shall be as follows:

PETITIONER

fill

w
IT7

~

1m

~

~
.

I

~

Foo House and
Lot
Loans to
Respondent's
sister and niece
Loan to M.
Anderson
TOTAL
Mednick
deficiency
judgment

RESPONDENT
$428,500

$214,250

X

50%=$214,250
$132,500

$265,000 X

50%=$132,500
$40,000 x.
50%=$20,000

$20,000

$366,750

$366.750

$181,721.98 plus
$106.85/day
interest since
June 1, 2012 x
50%=$90,860.99,
to be split if and
when the
judgment is
satisfied

to be split if
and when the
judgment is
satisfied

.

.

~

Given that the net assets and values are being assessed and distributed at the time of the final

'
'
' .
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trial, the Court concludes that 100% of the child's tuition and college expenses were paid out of
marital assets in the past and therefore are already accounted for.
By the Court's calculations, in light of the distributions ordered above, Petitioner is entitled
to an award of $398,037.25 from Respondent to achieve the distributions. Petitioner may submit
an appropriate form of judgment for this purpose. Petitioner is also entitled to receive her

rn
~

1t
.

'

$2,000/month alimony since July 2011 ($96,000), or a lump sum payment of $400,000 (net of
alimony payments made to date) if she or Respondent so elects.
ATTORNEY FEES

Each party is to bear his/her own fees. The Court determines that both Petitioner and
.

~ ·.

Respondent prevailed in part, and both parties are able to bear their own fees based upon their
financial condition and the distribution of marital property ordered herein. Therefore, the Court

D
.

finds an award of fees under Utah Code§ 30-3-3 or Rule 102 of the Utah Rules of Civil

.

~

Procedure is not warranted.

J

.

DATED this 23rd day of July, 2015.

~

.I

I

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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P USED AT DIRECTION
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Elizabeth A. Shaffer #06796
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC
2041 Sidewinder Drive, Suite 2
Park City, Utah 84060
Telephone: (453) 655-3033
Fax: (435) 655-3233
Email: eshaffer(cvlawparkcity .com

Attorney for Respondent, George Sandusky

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
(6300 Justice court Road, Park City, Utah 84098)

KYLEE J. SANDUSKY,
Petitioner

v.
GEORGE A. SANDUSKY,

(1) MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL,
AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENT
AND MOTION FOR RELIEF
FROM ORDER
(2) REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF
TIME TO SUPPLEMENT BRIEF

Respondent.
Case No. 114500103
Judge Kara L. Pettit

Respondent, by and through his attorney and pursuant to Rule 59 (a) (5), (6) and (7) and
Rule 60 (b), (1) and (6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure hereby makes his motion for new
trial in the matter tried without a jury to open the judgment, take additional testimony, amend the
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the

•
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' .
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entry of a new judgment. The Respondent further requests relief from the final order and
judgment on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, inconsistency, conflict and for other just
cause, including but not limited to clarification of the Court order and a request that the Court
order be made in conformity with the assets and evidence presented in the case.

BACKGROUND AND ARGUMENT
On June 3, 2011, Petitioner filed a verified petition for a Decree of Divorce pursuant to
Utah Code §30-3-1 on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. Respondent answered and filed
a counter petition for Decree of Divorce and Breach of Contract based on a Separation
Agreement entered into by the parties. The matter was tried before this Court on April 28, 29
and 30, 2015. At the conclusion of the trial, Respondent made a motion for a bifurcated Decree
of Divorce. Petitioner did not oppose the motion and said motion was granted. The Decree of
Divorce was final and effective on April 30, 2015. The Court took all other matters under
advisement.
On July 23, 2015, the Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
judgment.

The Court found the Separation Agreement a valid and binding contract and

enforced some provisions, specifically regarding real property identified, i.e. 10 lots and
alimony. The Court further found "there are no instances of material non-disclosure; both parties
were well aware of the financial situation throughout the marriage" that renders the Agreement
unenforceable. The Court in its ruling outlines an equitable disposition of remaining and/or
ambiguous property in conjunction with the Separation Agreement and the spirit of equitable
2
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distribution. The Court further finds "the parties proposed division of checking and savings
accounts was ambiguous and determined that the financial accounts are all marital property.
Further, the Court determines "the most fair and equitable approach, as well as the presumption
under Utah law, is to split all of the financial accounts equally between the parties."
The Courts order and findings encompass 38 pages and significant calculations of assets
resulting from a long term marriage and a 3 day trial. The Court's detailed analysis dealt with
many numbers and specific and allocations. However, in making its ruling the Court includes as
part of the division of assets, assets that do not exist and/or have been converted to cash in the
financial accounts, i.e. real property distribution of the 10 lots, loans to Mike Anderson, cash in
the safety deposit box, loans to Respondent's sister and niece. Also, the court identifies and
references assets that exceed $2.2 million dollars, approximately double the amount of the actual
assets of the marital estate testified to by the parties. In addition, the parties have expressed
different interpretations as to the final order and calculations made by the court.
The parties and counsel are currently discussing their respective understanding of the
court's order including the items set forth herein in an attempt to reconcile their differences. In
addition, the amount of information presented at trial is extensive and more time is required to go
through the record. For these reasons, respondent requests additional time in which to more fully
brief the issues supporting this motion to include the facts and evidentiary support from the
record. Respondent requests until September 21, 2015 to file a supplemental brief and detailed
brief in support of this motion.
3
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DATED this 6th day of August 2015.

Isl Elizabeth A. Shaffer (digitally)
Elizabeth A. Shaffer
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this the 6th day of August, 2015 a true and correct copy of the foregoing

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR
RELIEF FROM ORDER AND REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO

~

SUPPLEMENT BRIEF was filed via the Court's electronic filing system which automatically

~

delivered service to the following:
Paul J. Morken
P.O. Box 980691
Park City, UT 84098
Isl C.Kramer
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Elizabeth A. Shaffer #06796
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC
2041 Sidewinder Drive, Suite 2
Park City, Utah 84060
Telephone: (453) 655-3033
Fax: (435) 655-3233
Email: eshaffer@lawparkcity.com

Attorney for Respondent, George Sandusky

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
(6300 Justice court Road, Park City, Utah 84098)

KYLEE J. SANDUSKY,
Petitioner
v.

GEORGE A. SANDUSKY,

RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO
PETITIONER'S OPPOSITION TO:
(1) MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL,
AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENT
AND MOTION FOR RELIEF
FROM ORDER

Respondent.

(2) REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF
TIME TO SUPPLEMENT BRIEF
Case No. 114500103
Judge Kara L. Pettit

Respondent, by and through his attorney, Elizabeth A. Shaffer, hereby replies to
Petitioner's Opposition to Request for Extension of Time to Supplement Brief as follows:
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Respondent's Motions were timely filed on August 6, 2015, within 14 days from the
Court's Order entered on July 23, 2015. Respondent filed a motion Pursuant to Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure 59(a)(5)(6)(7) and 60(b)(l) and (6). Petitioner also filed a similar motion on the
same date.
Respondent's Motion identifies the discrepancies in the Court's Order and reasons for his
request to amend the judgment. Specifically, "the court includes as part of the division of assets,
assets that do not exist and/or have been converted to cash in the financial accounts, i.e. real
property distribution of the 10 lots, loans to Mike Anderson, cash in the safety deposit box, loans
to Respondent's sister and niece." (Respondent's motion p.3). Respondent also points outs that
the court "identifies and references assets that exceed $2.2 million dollars, approximately double
the amount of the actual assets of the marital estate." (Id. at p.3).
In addition, there was a difference in interpretation of the final order and calculations
made by the court. Counsel for the parties did have a telephone discussion, initiated by attorney
Shaffer, regarding the Court order and its interpretation. These same issues were discussed by
counsel, in an effort to come to a joint understanding of the Order. As a result, Mr. Morken and
Petitioner have knowledge of the basis for respondent's motion. These facts are significantly
different than in the case of Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook, 48 P.3d 895 (Utah 2002) cited
by petitioner. First, that case involved a motion to amend a complaint; the party requesting to
amend the complaint did not file a motion at all or articulate any reason why he needed to amend
the complaint. And the party requesting to amend the complaint did not offer a proposed
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amended complaint. Unlike this case, Counsel for the parties discussed their concern in detail
and the issues were raised specifically in the motion filed with the Court.
Petitioner's reference to Rule 6 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is erroneous.
First, Rule 6(b) applies to extending the time to act which is not the relief requested by
Respondent. (emphasis added). Respondent has acted timely in filing his motion. He seeks
only an extension of time in which to file a supplemental brief in order to more fully brief the
issues supporting the motion to include detailed facts and evidentiary support from the record.
Such a request, for a more detailed briefing is for the benefit of the court and the petitioner. A
request to be more specific and provide more detailed information to the Court is not an
admission that the original motion was insufficient on its face. The motion and its support was
sufficient.
Second, notwithstanding the fact that Rule 6(b) applies to an extension of time to act, it
specifically applies to rules 50(b) and (c), 52(b), 59(b ), (d) and (e), and 60(b ). Respondent's
motion was filed pursuant to Rule 59(a). And Rule 60(b) (1) and (6) requires that "the motion be
made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1 ), (2) or (3), not more than 90 days after the
judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken". Again, Respondent is only asking for time
to file a supplemental brief, not to extend the time act. Rule 6(b) is not applicable to respondent's
motion and even if it is determined to be applicable, Respondent acted timely in filing his motion
on August 6, 2015.

~
~

~

Rule 59 (a)(5) provides relief for new trial or amendment to the judgment for excessive
or inadequate damages. Rule 59(a)(6) provides relief for insufficiency of evidence to justify the
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verdict or other decision. As pointed out by Respondent in his motion, the "Court has referenced
2.2 Million plus assets which were not testified to by the parties." Further, Rule 59(c) does not
require supporting affidavits when filing under sections 59(6), or (7). Thus respondent's motion
was not required to be supported by affidavit.

cf)

hi

Last, respondent's request was not intended to place petitioner at any disadvantage or
create any prejudice. Exactly the opposite was the intent. That is why counsel requested a
stipulation from Mr. Morken to extend time to supplement the brief and file a response to his
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similar motion. Mr. Morken was also advised that attorney Shaffer had to be out of the office
last week for family medical matters 1• Unfortunately a stipulation could not be reached. Of
course, Respondent has no objection to permitting petitioner the time required to fully respond to

..

the motion and any supplemental briefing. The specific length of time was requested in the hope
that the parties and counsel could work through the property distribution and a collective
understanding based on the courts order and intent.
Based on the foregoing, Respondent requests that he be permitted to file a supplemental
brief to his motion until September 21, 2015.
DATED this 18 th day of August 2015.
Isl Elizabeth A. Shaffer (digitally)
Elizabeth A. Shaffer
Attorney for Respondent

1 For reasons set forth in a separate motion, Respondent has requested additional time to respond to Petitioner's
Motion to Correct Mistakes, and to Alter or Amend the court's findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and its
divorce decree and Judgment entered on July 23, 2015 filed on August 6.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this the 18th day of August, 2015 a true and correct copy of the foregoing
REPLY TO PETITIONER'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION was filed via the Court's
electronic filing system which automatically delivered service to the following:
Paul J. Morken
P.O. Box 980691
Park City, UT 84098

Isl C. Kramer
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Elizabeth A. Shaffer #06796
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC
2041 Sidewinder Drive, Suite 2
Park City, Utah 84060
Telephone: (453) 655-3033
Fax: (435) 655-3233
Email: eshaffer<a;lmvparkcitv .com

Attorney for Respondent, George Sandusky

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
(6300 Justice court Road, Park City, Utah 84098)

~
.

.

KYLEE J. SANDUSKY,
Petitioner
V.

GEORGE A. SANDUSKY,
Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S
SUPPLEMENT AL BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S
MOTION
Case No. 114500103
Judge Kara L. Pettit

COMES NOW, George Sandusky, by and through his attorney ofrecord, and hereby files
his Supplemental Brief in Support of his Motion filed on August 6, 2015. Respondent requests
that the Decree and Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law entered by this Court be amended
and clarified to accurately depict the parties' assets equitably distributes as of the time of trial as
follows:

~

.
I

I

f7

~
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A.

Deduct from the financial accounts, specifically the Los Angeles Firemen's Credit

Union Account #7833400; all three share accounts (S 1, S7 and S8) the amount of $335,000 to
account for the cash proceeds for the sale of the lots, attributed to Respondent as his separate
property;
B.

Deduct from the financial accounts, specifically the EAS IOLTA Attorney Trust

the $236,000 balance of the alimony lump sum payment to Petitioner giving credit for the
alimony already paid ($32,000), including the $90,000 Petitioner has already taken from the
former Hawaii account, and needs to be accounted for (See Decree at p. 37) and credit for
alimony overpaid.
C.

The alimony obligation should be clarified to cover only the period from July

2011 through May 2013 when the lump sum was placed in the attorney trust account, or 24
additional months for $48,000. Petitioner has been overpaid alimony by 21 months for a total of
$42,000 for which Respondent is entitled to credit. Based on the evidence, the correct amount of
alimony owed by Respondent is $236,000 ($400,000 less alimony paid $122,000 and
overpayment of $42,000). This is what the parties agreed to, is fair and equitable and meets the
requisite statutory factors set forth in Utah Code §30-3-5(8)(a).

2
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The Courts distribution table from page 36 of the Decree with high lights of coITections
required:

PETITIONER
Hawaii Cred it
Union
Los Angeles FiTemen's
Credit Union Account
#7833401
Los Angeles
Firemen's Credit
Union Account
#7833400;all
three share
accounts (S 1,S7
and S8)
Chase Bank
Account
Mountain America
Credit Union
$ in Respondent's
Safety Deposit
Box
Attorney Trust
Account

TOTAL

RESPONDENT
$166,694
860 .59

X

X

50%= $83,347

50% = $430.25

$83,347
$430.25

$345,020 X 50% = $172,510

$ 172,510

$2,400.22

$1 ,200.11

$250

X

X

50% = $ 125

$125

50% = $125

$40,000

X

50% = $20,000

$20,000

$155 000

$310,000 X
50% = $155,000
$432,612.36

$432,612.36

3
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Based on the foregoing the Court's equitable distribution, the chart should be amended
and revised as follows:

PETITIONER

RESPONDENT

Hawaii Credit
$166,694 X 50%= $83,347
Union
Los Angeles Firemen's 860.59 X 50% = $430.25
Credit Union Account
#7833401
$10,020 X 50% = $5,101
Los Angeles
Firemen's Credit
Union Account
($345,020 - $335,000 =
#7833400;all
$10,020)
three share
accounts (S l ,S7and S8)
$2,400.22 X 50% = $125
Chase Bank
Account
$250 X 50% = $125
Mountain America
Credit Union
$ in Respondent's
$40,000 X 50% = $20,000
Safety Deposit Box
$74,000 X
Attorney Trust
Account
50% = $37,000
($310,000 - $236,000 =
$74,000)
TOTAL
$147,203.36

$83,347
$430.25

$5,101

$1,200.11
$125
$20,000
$37,000

$147,203.36

The revised chart accurately reflects the financial accounts and supports the courts intent
and Findings that the financial accounts be equally distributed.

In addition the Court also

evidences its intent of a fair and equitable distribution of the parties personal property in the
distribution chart outlined on page 32-33 of the Decree and Findings and reprinted below:

4
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PETITIONER

mi

~

~
'

'

'

2007 Honda
Civic; converted
into CRV

$18,000

401K
Furninsings,
computers, TVs,
jewelry
Alimony

$58,107
Uknown value

RESPONDENT
2007 Honda
Ridgeline;
converted into
Acura
Pension
10 Lots He'eNalu

$13,800

$2,632/month
$335,000

$2,000/month or
$400,000 lump sum

"Each party gets an almost equal split of personal property, which the Court deems to be
equitable." Respondent receives real property valued at approximately $335,000 and similarly,

~

per the parties' Agreement, at any time, either Petitioner or Respondent may elect to terminate

'

'

the monthly payments in lieu of a $400,000 lump sum (giving credit for the alimony already
paid)." (Decree at p. 35).
D.

Respondent also requests that the Court clarify in the Decree the financial

responsibility of the automobile loan on the Honda CRV be the sole and separate responsibility
of Petitioner as it was incurred following the parties' separation and for the sole benefit of
Petitioner. Petitioner has assumed this obligation as her own and should continue to do so.

Fl

~

•
•

E.

Adjust and amend the Court's distribution table on page 37 of the Decree and

Findings to accurately reflect the assets of the parties at the time of trial; eliminating the Loans to

''
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Respondent's sister and niece in the amount of $265,000 and the loan to M. Anderson for
$40,000.
The Respondent specifically testified to 2 different times in which money was transferred
to his sister. The first situation was sometime after the divorce petition was filed by Petitioner
and after she unilaterally removed $90,000 from Respondent's bank account, which he testified
petitioner had never used. He testified this was done to protect the liquidity of $100,000 for their
son's college in the event that the parties were restrained from accessing their accounts as a
result of the pending divorce action.
Second, Respondent testified that on or about 2014, after he received the proceeds from
the sale of the He'eNalu lots, which the Court held were his separate property per the separation
agreement; he loaned his sister money to buy help her purchase a condominium for her daughter
and grandchildren following her daughter's divorce. George testified that this loan was for a
short period as his sister was expecting money from a foreclosure sale expected to close early
2015. The loan to George's sister came from cash proceeds in the financial accounts and was
paid back into the financial accounts on or about January or February 2015. This evidence was
uncontroverted by Petitioner. Therefore including the loan amount to George's sister in the
amount of $265,000 overstates the cash in the financial accounts of the parties. As a result, the
mistake should be corrected.

6
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Likewise, the loan to M. Anderson in the amount of $40,000 should not be included in

~
'

the Courts distribution chart on page 37 of the Decree. This loan was made from the financial

'

~
'

accounts of the parties and returned back into the financial accounts of the parties in 2010 1•

'

~
'

'

Therefore, including these items in the equitable distribution is a mistake.

And to avoid

overstating assets in the financial accounts that do not exist the Decree and Findings must be
corrected and amended. This testimony and evidence presented by respondent was not contested
by Petitioner or contrary evidence presented. The Courts table on page 37 of the Decree is

~
'

'

'

shown below with referenced items for correction highlighted.

~
'

PETITIONER

'

~
'

'

~
I

'

'

~
'

'

Foo House and
Lot
Loans to
Respondent's
sister and niece
Loan to M.
Anderson

TOTAL
Mednick
deficiency
judgment

~
'

'

RESPONDENT

$428,500 X
50% = $214,250

$214,250

$265,000 X

$132,500

50% = $132,500

$40,000 X

$20,000

50% = $20,000
$366,750
$181,721.98 plus
$106.85/day
interest since
June 1, 2012 x
50% = $90,860.99,
To be split if and
when the
judgment is
satisfied

$366,750
(cont. on next page)
to be split of
and when the
judgment is
satisfied

Wl

~

~

1 See

pages 94 and 95 ofG. Sandusky Testimony, Exhibit 6, filed as Pleading titled "Exhibits 6-10" on May 5,2014
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The Courts distribution table should be revised and amended as follows:

PETITIONER
Foo House and
Lot
Loans to
Respondent's
sister and niece
Loan to M.
Anderson
TOTAL
Mednick
deficiency
judgment

~
.

.

~
'

.

ffi7

~

RESPONDENT

$428,500 X
50% = $214,250
0

$214,250

0

0

$214,250
$181,721.98 plus
interest be split if and
when the judgment is
satisfied

$214,250
to be split of
and when the
judgment is
satisfied

0

~
.

'

The financial assets of the parties at the time of trial included the financial accounts as
identified by the court in its chart on page 36 of the Decree totaled $865,224.72. Included in
these financial assets are the cash proceeds from the sale of the He'eNalu lots and the funds

~

deposited into the attorney trust account. According to the Decree, the funds allocated to the

'

.

~

He'eNalu lots must be deducted and attributed to Respondent. The lump sum payment for

.

.

.

alimony also needs to be deducted and attributed to the Petitioner. These cash funds at the time
of trial also include all loan proceeds from the M. Anderson loan, the loan to Respondent's sister
and niece and all hard money loan repayments together with any interest.

I

Making these cash

.

.

~

allocations, leaves the financial account balance of $294,406.72.

.

.

~
.

The Court was clear and specific in its intent to enforce the unambiguous provisions of
the parties' separation agreement and to effectuate a fair and equitable distribution of the parties'

'

~
.

.

8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

assets. This Court correctly set forth and followed Utah law in this regard. It simply appears
there was a misunderstanding as to the current status of the Courts detailed description of all the
assets and transactions referred to by the parties through the course of the trial.

It is certain that the Court did not intend to distribute more financial assets than exist.
That would not be "equitable" which the court correctly points out in following Utah law and the
Findings and Conclusions that articulate over and over an equal and or equitable distribution of
the parties' assets in this case, after also giving credit to the separation agreement of the separate
property and alimony.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Respondent requests the Court deny Petitioner's request to
amend the Decree and Findings as outlined in her motion for the reasons set forth herein.
Further Respondent requests affirmatively that the Court amend the Decree and Findings to as
follows:
1.

Respondent be awarded as his sole and separate property: the 2007 Honda

Ridgeline converted to the Acura currently in his possession; his LA Fireman's pension in the
amount of $2,632/month and $335,000 cash proceeds attributable to the He'eNalu lots; 8 sold
and the remaining 2 He'eNalu lots titled in his name and the gifts from his grandfather;
2.

Petitioner be awarded as her sole and separate property: the 2007 Honda Civic

converted to the CRV currently in her possession, and her 401 k having a value of approximately

9
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$58,107, all the personal property furnishings in the parties marital residence, including
computers, TV's and her jewelry and alimony in the amount of $2,000/month or $400,000 lump
sum, less credit for the alimony already paid in the amount of $122,000, including the $42,000
for overpayment of alimony, for total payment of $236,000.

Wl

~

~

~
. ·

rn

3.

Petitioner is responsible as her sole and separate obligation for the automobile

loan for the CRV currently in her possession.
4.

The amount of $147,203.36 each to Petitioner and Respondent representing the

equitable distribution of the financial accounts.

~
5.

The Foo House and lot having a value of $428,500 to be divided equally in the

amount of $214,250 attributable to Respondent and Petitioner.
DATED this 3rd day of September 2015.

Isl Elizabeth A. Shaffer (digitally)
Elizabeth A. Shaffer
Attorney for Respondent

[f7

lilJ

Wl
~

~
.

.

r1

~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this the 3 rd day of September, 2015 a true and correct copy of the
foregoing RESPONDENT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF

RESPONDENT'S MOTION was filed via the Court's electronic filing system which
automatically delivered service to the following:
Paul J. Morken
P.O. Box 980691
Park City, UT 84098

Isl C.Kramer
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Elizabeth A. Shaffer #06796
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC
4580 N Silver Springs Drive Suite 100
Telephone: (453) 655-3033
Fax: (435) 655-3233
Email: eshaffer0llmvparkci t v .com

Attorney for Respondent, George Sandusky

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

D

•
•
D

0
[J

(6300 Justice court Road, Park City, Utah 84098)

KYLEE J. SANDUSKY,
Petitioner
V.

GEORGE A. SANDUSKY,
Respondent.

EX PARTE MOTION FOR
EXPEDITED RULING PURSUANT
TO RULE 60(b) FOR RELIEF
FROM JUDGMENT AND ORDER
Case No. 114500103
Judge Kara L. Pettit

COMES NOW, Respondent, George Sandusky, by and through his counsel of record,
Elizabeth A. Shaffer, and hereby respectfully submits his Ex Parle Motion for Expedited Ruling

•
•
D
D

•

Pursuant to Rule 60(b) for partial relief from the Court's Order on November 2, 2015 1 to pay
Petitioner $310,000 out of the attorney trust account by Friday, November 6, 2015 for the reason
that sufficient funds do not exist to pay $310, 000 to Petitioner and comply with the Orders

1 Respondent is not waiving further or additional arguments regarding other parts of the ruling and order of the
Court.
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relating to both Petitioner and Respondent and the division of the financial accounts between the

I}

parties. Effectuating this order will leave a deficiency in the financial accounts of $91,212.64.2

Ii

During the hearing on Monday, Judge Pettit questioned the evidence presented at trial on
the issue of "loans to Respondent's sister and niece" and "loan to Mike Anderson" identified on
page 37 of the Decree of Divorce and Judgment filed on July 23, 2015. And initially, the Court
requested that Counsel review the record in more detail to satisfy the outstanding evidentiary
controversy. However, upon objection by Petitioner's counsel and the late hour, the Judge
entered her ruling without review of the court record. The particular disagreement regarding the
"loans" is crucial in the final division of the parties' financial assets. The allocation of the funds
ordered by the Court cannot be made due to insufficient funds.
1. The Court ordered the financial accounts be equally distributed as follows3:
PETITIONER

.

'

RESPONDENT

.

ri
ta!
[(/
~

~
.

.

.

lrl

1W

~
.

.
.

Hawaii Credit
Union
Los Angeles Firemen's
Credit Union Account
#7833401
Los Angeles
Firemen's Credit
Union Account
#7833400;all
three share
accounts (S l ,S 7
and S8)
Chase Bank
Account

2
3

$]66,694 X 50%= $83,347

$83,347

860.59 X 50% = $430.25

$430.25

$345,020 X 50% = $] 72,510

$172,510

$2,400.22 X 50% = $] ,200.1 )

$1,200.11

This amount equals the amount over the Petitioner's 50% share of the financial accounts.
Original table from Judge Pettit's Decree of Divorce and Judgment filed 7/23/2015, page 36

2
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Mountain America Credit $250 X 50% = $125
Union
$ in Respondent's Safety $40,000 X 50% = $20,000
Deposit
Box
$310,000 X
Attorney Trust
50% = $155,000
Account
$432,612.36
TOTAL

$125
$20,000

$155,000
$432,612.36

This is a total of $865,224.72, which includes the financial accounts and the trust account to be

r,
1W

split among the parties.

~

2. Noting a mistake in the prior judgment, the Court ordered a correction in the

it,

~

distribution of the financial accounts.

Specifically, the $335,000 in proceeds from the real

.

.

property awarded to Respondent included in the bank accounts is to be taken out and awarded to
Respondent before the funds are split as follows:

r1
lid

n

-1

D
.
.

TOTAL IN ACCOUNTS

$865,224.72

Cash proceeds for the Real
Property
awarded
to
Respondent

-$335,000.00

TOTAL TO SPLIT

$530,224. 72

.

This leaves the remaining amount of $530,224.72 in the financial accounts to be split equally
between the Petitioner and the Respondent.
3. The Court also ordered that Respondent be credited $45,000 out of the $90,000 the
Petitioner had taken from the Hawaii Credit Union account required to be accounted for4 as

4

This is an adjustment to the Court's original Order, page 37

3
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'

shown below:
RESPONDENT

PETITIONER

Split of bank accounts $530,224.72
$265,112.36
and trust account

~
'

'

90K Kylie previously $265,112.36
$220,112.36
took accounted for

X

-

=

$530,224.72
$265,112.36

$45,000 =

$265,112.36
$310,112.36

50%

$220,112.36

TOTAL

X

+

50%

=

$45,000

=

$310,112.36

This leaves a cash award of $220,112.36 to Petitioner and $310,112.36 to Respondent from the
financial accounts. Petitioner already has control of the Chase and MACU accounts, totaling
$1,325.00 which as a result must also be deducted from her share of the financial assets in
Respondent's control.

This amounts to $218,787.36 to Petitioner and $311,437.36 to

Respondent as shown below:
PETITIONER

' :1

If'!

RESPONDENT

Split of accounts in Respondent's control

$220,112.36

$310,112.36

Petitioner's control ofMACU and Chase

-$1,325.00

+$1,325.00

TOTAL

$218,787.36

$311,437.36

.i

4. The Court ordered, to effectuate this distribution of the financial accounts that the
$310,000 in the trust account be paid to Petitioner by Friday November 6, 2015. However, this is
more than her 50% share of the financial accounts. Paying the full $310,000 to Petitioner does

4
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•
D

0
0
0

not provide for sufficient funds to effectuate the financial account distributions to both parties as
the Court ordered.
PETITIONER

Total Available for Distribution

0
D
Q

•
D

0

Distribution to parties

RESPONDENT

$530,224. 72
$310,000.00
(trust account funds)

$311,437.36

(*$218,787.36 Petitioner's
actual share of financial
accounts)
Total cash required for Ordered
distribution to both parties

$621,437.36

Insufficient funds

S91,212.64

To achieve the equitable distribution as the Court deemed fair and equitable, the Order must be
amended and Petitioner awarded her 50% share of the financial accounts by Friday November
6, 2015 in the amount of $218,787.36, which would leave Respondent with his awarded 50%

share of the financial account in the amount of $311,437.36 and equal $530,224.72, the total cash
available in the accounts to distribute.
5. The Court Ordered the "loans" be divided equally as follows:
PETITIONER

Loans to
Respondent's

RESPONDENT

I

I $265,000 x

$132,500

5
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0
0

•
0
0
D
n
w

sister and niece
Loan to M.
Anderson

50% = $132,500
$40,000 X
50% = $20,000

$20,000

TOTAL

$152,500

$152,500

Mednick
deficiency
judgment

$181,721.98 plus $106.85/day
interest since
June 1, 2012 x
50% = $90,860.99,
To be split if and
when the judgment is satisfied

$181,721.98 plus $106.85/day
interest since
June 1, 2012 x
50% = $90,860.99,

to be split if and when the
judgment is satisfied

There was significant discussion and argument among the parties regarding the inclusion

D

0
D
C
C
n

~

of what were identified as "loans" by the Court in the original Decree of Divorce and Judgment
on page 37 in post trial motions and during the Oral Argument. Because of the significance of
the issue, the Judge originally requested counsel to review the record and submit supplemental
briefing on the issue. However, upon objection by Petitioner's counsel and the late hour, a ruling
was made without review and incorporation of this evidence.
Upon review of the record, Respondent testified in detail regarding the transfer of
moneys identified on his financial declaration of November 4, 2011, (Petitioner's trial Exhibit
153, bates number 00994). Specifically the $90,000, $40,000 and $100,000 transferred from his
Fireman's account held jointly with his sister to his sister's account.

Petitioner's counsel

questioned Respondent on cross examination extensively in trial and even reviewing his
deposition testimony on the issue also. In reviewing his deposition, Petitioner's counsel moved
to admit the original deposition transcript into evidence. The Court accepted the tender of

6

[

.
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evidence in the cross examination testimony. 5 This is consistent with Rule 106 of Utah Rules of
Evidence and the doctrine of completeness, to qualify, explain or put in context the original
introduced evidence upon examination.
The evidence identified specifically the source of the amounts identified as "loans" in the
Court's prior order: $90,000 from respondent's pension funds, $40,000 in motorcycle accident

t

proceeds and $100,000 that was set aside for their son's college tuition. These funds were

'

.

n

ill

accounted for and there was no contradictory evidence presented by Petitioner as to the source
and use of the funds from any account over the last 5 years. The parties had a fixed amount of
assets, primarily cash from which they lived spread over a number of different accounts over the
years. However, the amount did not change significantly. Any fluctuation was due to
investments, some good and some bad. Notwithstanding the fact that Petitioner made no
allegation of misappropriation or dissipation of the assets, any reduction in the amount of assets
since the parties' separation was accounted for by Respondent without any contradictory
evidence by Petitioner. An informal review of the trial testimony from Respondent is as
follows:
April 30, 2015, cross examination of George Sandusky by attorney Morken.

5

13:57:13

$90,000 from pension and accident

13:57:46

Never loaned sister $100,000

April 30, 2015 Trial CD, 13:59:05 -13:57:43
Judge Pettit: "Are you moving to publish [Mr. Sandusky's deposition]?"
Paul Morken "Yes, please."

7
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13:59:05

Attorney Morken publishes original Depo of George

13:59:36

Judge confirms publication of the deposition and hands the
original copy of the deposition to the witness.

14:00:58

Reference to Nov. 4, 2011 and $190,000 discussed by
attorney Morken and characterized as "keep away from
Kylie"

14:01:38

George said he put it into that acct to keep Kylie's access to
the$ away

14:2:21

money comes in and goes out - there is nothing missing.

14:43:10

transferred money to sister to keep access away from Kylie.
Also was afraid an attorney would freeze his accounts and
he needed money for Micah' college

The Court found Respondent to be credible, and there were no allegations of misuse of
marital funds by Respondent at any time. It was undisputed that the parties' assets in excess of
$200,000 were used for their sons' college out of state and living expenses. The $100,000 and
the $90,000 transferred to his sister were not a loan but were for safekeeping to pay for their
son's college in the event the parties' bank accounts were frozen in the divorce action.
In addition, Respondent testified to 2 other ·'loans" that involved his sister and niece as
follows:

~

9:47:10

$335,000 loan to sister which she repaid after her condo
sold.

9:47:53

Jaime Chambers condo - loaned $35,000 then $100,000.
She paid the $100,000 back within 3 months.

13:57:01

"I loaned her [Jaime Chambers] an extra $100,000 after I
gave her $35,000, they bought a place for her to live and

.

'

8
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~
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her 3 kids. So that, she within a couple, three months paid
me back the $100,000."

April 30, 2015, cross examination of George Sandusky by attorney Morken.
Further, in his testimony George testified the parties by agreement elected to place the
lump sum alimony payment in 2013, from the proceeds of the sale of the foreclosed Mednick
property into the Shaffer trust account.
9:39:18

George testified that everyone was in agreement with him putting
the $310,000 in escrow which represented the $400,000 lump sum
alimony minus the $90,000 [taken by Kylee in 2011 from the
Hawaii Bank account].

On review of the record, it is apparent that there were no monies transferred to
Respondent's sister that remained unaccounted for or outstanding at the time of the trial.
Therefore, to require Respondent to pay to Petitioner, $310,000 which is more than her 50% of
the financial accounts ($218,787.36) based on an erroneous "loans" outstanding to Respondents
sister and niece is inequitable, prejudicial and an error of law.
Finally, the correct equitable distribution of the assets and consistent with the Court's
analysis referenced throughout the Judgment and Decree of Divorce is a division of the assets of
the parties existing at the time of trial as follows:
Cash in all of the bank accounts deemed to be marital was $865,224.72. And as the
Court determined a fair and equitable distribution of the personal assets wherein Petitioner was
awarded alimony in the amount of $2000 per month or a lump sum $400,000 less credit of
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alimony paid. 6 Respondent was awarded the real property of 10 undeveloped lots in Hawaii
having sold for $335,000. "Each party gets an almost equal split of personal property which the
Court deems to be equitable. Respondent receives real property valued at approximately
$335,000, and similarly, Petitioner is entitled to either a lump sum of $400,000 or $2000/month
in alimony." The Court finds this to be a fair and equitable division as well. And because the
parties have already effectuated this distribution, nothing further needs to be done." Judgment
and Decree, July 23. 2015 at page 33. The Court determined all the bank accounts wee marital
and ordered they be divided equally. Id. at 36.
Part of the issues in this case arose, when the Court mistakenly believed the parties had
effectuated the distribution of the alimony funds and the real property lots. Also, when the bank
accounts were divided, they included cash proceeds attributable to the Respondent from the sale
of the 10 lots awarded to him as his separate property. And the escrowed funds in the attorney
trust account that was attributed to Petitioner for alimony by agreement of the parties. The Court
also included additional assets that no longer existed at the time of trial, incorrectly inflating the
assets to be distributed.
The Court's original order attempted to fairly and equitably distribute the personal assets
of the parties. This distribution was also consistent with the intent and understanding of the
parties in their separation agreement and the conduct adhered to and discussed by the parties
prior to Petitioner filing for divorce. The assets of the parties are fixed. They retired in 2007
6

It is undisputed that at least $65,00 was previously paid in alimony for which Respondent is credited.
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ii

~
.

.

when moving to Park City. There was no allegation or finding of dissipation or misuse of the
assets. Petitioner trusted Respondent to handle the money and left her share of the assets with

~
.

him to manage. Divorce court is a court of equity and the law requires the Court to divide the

.

personal assets equitably. The Court orders as interpreted and clarified by the Court on Monday
to pay $3 I 0,000 to petitioner as her share of the financial accounts results in an inequitable

~

distribution and such allocation leads to insufficient funds for the equal distribution of the

''

financial accounts.

~
.

'

~
.

.

E

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Respondent specifically asks the Court at this time for an
Expedited Decision on his Motion for Relief from Judgment entered on November 2, 2015 so

.

.

that the complete Orders of the Court regarding the distribution of the financial accounts can be
implemented without a deficit and requests that the Court amend the Order as follows:
I.

That Respondent pay to Petitioner her 50% share of the financial accounts, less
the deductions as outlined by the court and herein, for a total amount of
$218,787.36 by Friday November 6, 2015.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of November, 2015.

Isl Elizabeth A. Shaffer
Attorney for Respondent

~
.

.

~
..
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this the 5th day of November, 2015 a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Ex Parle Motion for Expedited Ruling Pursuant to Rule 60(b) for Relief from
Judgement and Order was filed via the Court's electronic filing system which automatically
delivered service to the following:
Paul J. Morken
P.O. Box 980691
Park City, UT 84098

Isl C. Kramer

~
.·

[;
'

'
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR:.,OJ5 NOV

CUUd ., .t"•·.

-6 AH IQ: 28

FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FILED B'f

KYLEE J. SANDUSKY,

Petitioner

v.
GEORGE A. SANDUSKY,
Respondent.

ORDER DENYING EX PARTE MOTION
FOR EXPEDITED RULING PURSUANT
TO RULE 60(B) FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT
Case No. 114500103
Judge Kara L. Pettit

Before the Court is Respondent's Ex Parte Motion For Expedited Ruling Pursuant To
Rule 60(b) For Relief From Judgment filed on November 5, 2015. Respondent seeks relief
under "Rule 60(b) ... from the Court's Order on November 2, 2015 to pay Petitioner $310,000 out
of the attorney trust account by Friday, November 6, 2015 for the reason that sufficient funds do not
exist to pay $310,000 to Petitioner and comply with the Orders relating to both Petitioner and
Respondent and the division of the financial accounts between the parties." Motion at 1-2. This is
incorrect and miscomprehends the Court's order.
When the Court ordered the $310,000 to be given to Petitioner by November 6, 2015,
the Court expressly stated that it understood that amount to be greater than Petitioner's share of
the financial accounts, but that Petitioner was owed more than $310,000 by Respondent in
totality. So Respondent's arguments that $310,000 is more than "Petitioner's 50% share of the
financial accounts" miss the point of the Court's ruling. Even if the Court does not include the
amounts taken out of the parties' marital accounts by Respondent that were put into his sister's
account, loaned to his niece and loaned to Mike Anderson, Petitioner is still owed more than
$310,000 for her share of the financial accounts that remain in Respondent's possession plus the
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past due alimony owed since July 2011. 1 The Court continues to find it fair and equitable for
Petitioner to receive the full $310,000 from the trust account as her share of the parties, existing
financial accounts as well as other amounts owed to her; in particular, the remaining funds can
be applied to the amount Respondent owes her for alimony.

Respondent asserts: "The allocation of the funds ordered by the Court cannot be made due to
insufficient funds.,, Motion at 2. There are more than sufficient funds in the trust account and the
parties' marital financial accounts to pay the $310,000 to Petitioner. There is a total of$86S,224.72
in the parties' financial accounts and the trust account. After deducting the $335,000 awarded to
Respondent for proceeds from the sale of the IO lots, Petitioner,s share of the existing accounts is
$265,112.36 and Respondent's share of the existing accounts is $265,112.36.
However, she owes $45,000 to Respondent for his half of the $90,000 she previously
withdrew. But he owes her for past due alimony of at least $96,000 ($2,000/month from July 2011 to
July 2015). The accounting is as follows:
Hawaii Credit Union
Los Angeles Firemen's Credit
Union Account #7833401
Los Angeles Firemen's
Credit Union Account
#7833400; all three
share accounts (SI, S7
andS8)
Chase Bank Account
Mountain America
Credit Union
$ in Respondent's
Safety Deposit Box
Attorney Trust Account

TOTAL SHARE OF
EXISTING FUNDS

1 This also

PETITIONER
$166,694 X 50o/o= $83,347
$860.59 X 50o/o= $430.25

RESPONDENT
$83,347
$430.25

($345,020 -$335,000 for
lots = $10,020) x 50%=
$5,010

$5,010

$2..400.22x50o/o=$1,200. l l
$2S0x50o/o=$125

$1,200.11
$125

$40,000 X 50o/o=$20,000

$20,000

$310,000 x.
50%=$155,000

$155,000

$265 11I 2.36

$2651l 12.3fi

excludes Petitioner's share of the Foo House/lot that Respondent has possession of in Hawaii.
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~

Plus alimony owed to
Petitioner btwn July
2011 and July 2015
Less amount owed to
Respondent for his
share of Petitioner's
withdrawal of $90,000
from accounts
Less Accounts in
Petitioner's possession
TOTAL OWED TO
PETITIONER
(**EXCLUDING
ACCOUNTING FOR
$305,000 REMOVED
BY RESPONDENT
TO SISTER'S
ACCOUNT, NIECE
AND M. ANDERSON;
AND FOO
HOUSE/Lon

$96,000
<$45,000>

<$2,6S0.22>

$313,462.14

Thus, even with payment of the full $310,000 from the trust account to Petitioner, she will
still be owed at least $3,462. The Court realizes that Respondent does not in fact have
$265,112.36 in his possession in the existing accounts (as of the date of trial) without some of
the trust account money. However, the difference between the account balances in his
possession and his share of the financial accounts can be credited as payment towards the past
due alimony. The accounts within Respondent's possession, excluding the attorney trust
account, totaled $217,574.59 at the time of trial. The difference between $265,112.36 (his share
of existing financial accounts) and $217,574.59 is $47,537.77. Respondent may get credit for
this amount towards his past due alimony, plus the $45,000 credit from his½ of the $90,000

Petitioner had withdrawn. Therefore, of the $96,000 in past due alimony through July 2015,
only $3,462 will remain due and owing after Petitioner receives the $310,000 from the trust
account; assuming that 100% of the $310,000 is applied to account for either Petitioner's share
3
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~
~

~
~

of the financial accounts or alimony, and does not include any allocation for the $305,000 in
withdrawals/loans that were disputed by Respondent.
As for the issues related to the withdrawals/loans of $305,000, the Court is wary of allowing
further briefmg because the arguments/citations to the record should have been made in the prior
briefing and the parties need finality, but the Court reluctantly will allow one last round of
briefing on the issues. If Respondent wishes to file a supplemental brief regarding the $305,000

E

in withdrawals/loans as set forth on page 37 of the Court's Findings/Conclusions, he can do so

~

by Friday, November 20, 2015. Petitioner may file a response brief by Friday, December 4,

w
w
~
~

2015. Respondent may file a reply by Fridav, December 11, 2015. Respondent MUST file a
request to submit when briefing is completed, or the matter will not be brought before the Court
for decision. The Court will render a ruling without further hearing, as the parties have had
sufficient opportunity to be heard.
DATED this 6th day of November, 2015.

~
~

~
~
~
~

E
~
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Elizabeth A. Shaffer #06796
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC
4580 N Silver Springs Drive Suite 100
Telephone: (453) 655-3033
Fax: (435) 655-3233
Email: eshaffer(a).Jav.rparkcity.com

Attorney for Respondent, George Sandusky

~
.

.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
(6300 Justice court Road, Park City, Utah 84098)

KYLEEJ. SANDUSKY,
Petitioner

POST-TRIAL
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
Case No. 114500103

V.

GEORGE A. SANDUSKY,

Judge Kara L. Pettit

Respondent.

COMES NOW, Respondent, George Sandusky, ("George") by and through his counsel of
record, Elizabeth A. Shaffer, and pursuant to Court permission, hereby respectfully submits his
supplemental brief regarding the $305,000 in withdrawals/loans as set forth on page 37 of the
Court's Findings and Conclusions as follows:
It is understood and agreed by Mr. Sandusky that the parties need finality, however, it is
even more important that the Order reflect accurately the testimony in order to effectuate an

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

equitable distribution of the marital estate. It would be prejudicial to Respondent to be
accountable for and subject to a judgment for assets that do not exist.
LOANS

The Court should adjust and amend the Court's Findings/Conclusions distribution
outlined on page 37 of the Decree of Divorce to accurately reflect the assets of the parties at the
time of trial and eliminating the identified "Loans to Respondent's sister and niece" for a total
amount of $225,000 and the "Loan to M. Anderson" for $40,000. The Court's Findings and
Conclusions awarded 50% of the loan amounts, $132,500 each to Petitioner and Respondent.
This is error. The testimony at trial and the evidence before the Court was clear that any
withdrawals/loans related to Respondent's sister and M. Anderson were paid back. Therefore, to
include these as marital assets for distribution is erroneous and inaccurately increases the parties'
assets and subsequent award.

Specifically, Respondent's trial testimony; Respondent's

deposition testimony, admitted into evidence and reviewed on cross examination; Petitioner's
Exhibit 153 and Respondent's Exhibit's No. 5 and No. 6 entered at trial.
The Respondent specifically testified about money transferred from the Hawaii Credit
Union Account # 551555 into his LAFCU acct# 7833400, held jointly with his sister' both at
trial and in his deposition. (G. Sandusky Dep. 49:23-25). The evidence established the transfer of
funds to his account with his sister of $90,000 and $100,000 was after the divorce petition was

1 The record was also uncontroverted that Petitioner was not on this account, that the L.A. Fireman's credit union
account was established with his sister prior to his marriage to Petitioner.
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filed by the Petitioner and after she unilaterally removed $90,000 from the HIFCU Acct #
551555 bank account, which Respondent testified Petitioner had never used prior to this
withdrawal.

~

Subsequently, Respondent's financial declaration dated 2011 indicated that he

.

.

transferred $100,000 and $90,000, "given to Liz" [respondent's sister], although the exact timing
was not clear. Respondent also testified this transfer was done to protect the liquidity of cash for
their son's college in the event that the parties were restrained from accessing their financial
accounts as a result of the pending divorce action. (G. Sandusky Dep. 56:10-12).
Upon review of the record, Respondent testified in detail regarding the transfer of monies
identified on his financial declaration of November 4, 2011, (Petitioner's trial Exhibit 153, bates
number 00994).

Specifically $90,000, $40,000 and $100,000 transferred from his LAFCU

account #7833400 held jointly with his sister to his sister.

Petitioner's counsel questioned

Respondent on cross examination extensively in trial and even reviewed his deposition testimony
on the issue as well. In reviewing his deposition, Petitioner's counsel moved to admit the
original deposition transcript into evidence. The Court accepted the tender of evidence in the
cross examination testimony. 2 This is consistent with Rule 106 of Utah Rules of Evidence and
the doctrine of completeness, to qualify, explain or put in context the original introduced
evidence upon examination.

2

April 30, 2015 Trial CD, 13:59:05 - 13:57:43
Judge Pettit: "Are you moving to publish [Mr. Sandusky's deposition]?"
Paul Morken "Yes, please."

3
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The evidence identified specifically the source of the amounts identified as "loans" in the
Court's prior order: $90,000 from Respondent's pension funds, $42,000 in motorcycle accident
settlement proceeds3 and $100,000 that was set aside for their son's college tuition. 4 These funds
were accounted for and there was no contradictory evidence presented by Petitioner as to the
source and use of the funds from any account over the last 5 years. The parties had a fixed
amount of assets, primarily cash from which they lived spread over a number of different
accounts over the years. However, the amount did not change significantly. Any fluctuation was
due to investments, some good and some bad. Petitioner made no allegation of misappropriation
or dissipation of the assets, any reduction in the amount of assets since the parties' separation
was accounted for by Respondent without any contradictory evidence by Petitioner. An
informal review of the trial testimony from Respondent is as follows:

April 30, 2015, cross examination ofGeorge Sandusky by attorney Morken. Also
original deposition of Respondent which Petitioner's counsel entered into
evidence and redirect by Respondent's counsel.

I
I
3
4

•

13:57:13
"$90,000 from pension and accident?"
"Correct."
"It says from pension and accident. I got $42,000 from getting hit on a
motorcycle and I also put all my pension money in her accounts." (G.
Sandusky Dep. 53 :2-5).

•

13:57:41 - 13:57:43
"I never gave my sister $100,000 in cash. I wouldn't give it to her."

Respondent testified he was hit on his motorcycle and sustained injuries for which he received a settlement.
See specific reference and informal transcription of the testimony, p.4-5.
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I

•

13 :59:05 - 13 :59:06
Attorney Morken publishes original Deposition of Respondent (Footnote 1).

•

13:59:30- 13:59:33
Judge confirms publication of the deposition and hands the original copy of the
deposition to the witness: ''I'm handing the witness a copy of his deposition dated
April 11, 2013."

•

14:00:58
Reference to Nov. 4, 2011 and Petitioner's Exhibit 153. $190,000 discussed by
attorney Morken and characterized as "keep away from Kylie"
"The $90,000 crune out and she [Liz] had the $100,000. I don't know
when I took the $90,000 out and transferred it over to my account." (G.
Sandusky Dep. 56:10-12).

•

14:01 :38
George said he put it into that account to keep Kylie's access to the money away,
"I told you to keep it away from Kylee. If something happens to me, she'll [sister]
make sure it goes to Micah". (G. Sandusky Dep. 55:7-11)

•

14:43:33 - 14:43:38
"My intent was to get it out of her reach."

•

14:2:17 - 22
"It goes out it comes back. It goes out and comes back. There isn't tons of
money missing anywhere."

•

14:42:54- 14:43:23
Ms. Shaffer: "'You indicated that you transferred money to your sister because
Kylee had taken $90,000 out of the account and you wanted to keep it away from
Kylee?"
George: "Yes to have access to the account."

5
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Ms. Shaffer: "And that was because you wanted to make sure that Money was
available for Micah's college"
George: "I was deathly afraid of, I don't know what you call it when and
attorney comes in and says okay, you can't move money or do anything."
The Court found Respondent to be credible, and there were no allegations of misuse of

~
.

.

marital funds by Respondent at any time. It was undisputed that the parties' assets in excess of
$200,000 were used for their sons' college tuition, travel, and out of state living expenses. The
$100,000 and the $90,000 transferred to his sister were not a loan but were for safekeeping to

~
.

.

pay for their son's college in the event the parties' bank accounts were frozen in the divorce
action.
In addition, Respondent testified to 2 other "loans" that involved his sister and niece as
follows:

~
'

.

~
.

.

~
.

9:47:16-9:47:27

"I funded her [sister] $335,000 of funds and then when she
sold that condo and it all got done, she repaid my money."

9:48:05 - 9:48:20

"I loaned her [his sister] an extra $100,000 after I gave her
$35,000, 5 they bought a place for her [Respondent's niece,
his sister's daughter] a place for her to live and her 3 kids.
So that, she within a couple three months paid me back the
$100,000."

Respondent testified that in 2014, after he received the proceeds from the sale of the

.

He'eNalu lots, which the Court held were his separate property per the separation agreement; he
Upon review of the record in context with the entire testimony it is clear that Respondent's statement of$35,000
was a misstatement. Respondent was referencing the $335,000, amount he previously testified to regarding the
$335,000 loaned to his sister. This is also evident in Respondent's further testimony thereafter explaining that after
he gave her $35,000, meaning $335,000, he loaned her an ettra S/00,000 ... Respondent's exhibits, #5 and #6 and
Petitioner's Exhibit #153 also do not ever identify a third separate loan for $35.000. There were only 2 loans, the
$335,000 amount and the $100,000 amount.
5

~
'

.

ITT
~
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loaned his sister money to help her purchase a condominium for her daughter and grandchildren
following her daughter's divorce. George testified that this loan was for a short period as his
sister was expecting money from a foreclosure sale expected to close early 2015. The loan to
George's sister came from cash proceeds in the L. A. Fireman's Credit Union financial account
#7833400 and was paid back into the financial accounts in January or February 2015. This
evidence was uncontroverted by Petitioner. Therefore, including the "withdrawals/loans" related
to respondent's sister, in the amount of $225,000 in the asset distribution, overstates the cash in
the financial accounts of the parties. As a result, this error creates an incorrect award of marital
assets to be divided, and specifically, a judgment against respondent for half of loan proceeds to
be paid to petitioner from loans that do not exist. As a result the judgment must be corrected and
amended to accurately reflect the parties' assets. Failure to do so, would result in a detrimental
award to respondent.
Similarly, the loan to M. Anderson in the amount of $40,000 should not be included in
the Courts distribution chart on page 3 7 of the Decree. This loan was made from the financial
accounts of the parties and returned back into the financial accounts of the parties in 2010.

I

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

"Did you loan Mike Anderson $40,000?"
"Yes I did."
"And has he repaid the $40,000?"
"Yes he did." (G. Sandusky Dep. 94:10-18).

This evidence was uncontroverted. The loans were made and paid back. Therefore,
including these items in the equitable distribution is a mistake. And to avoid overstating assets
in the financial accounts that do not exist, the Decree and Findings should be corrected and
7
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amended consistent with the evidence. The testimony and evidence presented by Respondent
was not contested by Petitioner nor was any contrary evidence presented. The Courts table on
page 37 of the Decree is shown below with referenced items for correction highlighted:
PETITIO ER

Foo House and
Lot
Loans to
Respondent' s
sister and niece
LoantoM.
Anderson
TOTAL
Mednick
deficiency
judgment

RESPONDENT

$428,500 X
50% = $214,250
$265,000 X
50% = $132,500

$214,250

$40,000 X
50% = $20,000
$366,750
$181,721.98 plus
$106.85/day
interest since
June 1, 2012 x
50% = $90 860.99,
To be split if and
when the
judgment is
satisfied

$20,000

$132,500

$366,750
to be split of
and when the
judgment is
satisfied

The Court's table on page 37 should be AMENDED AS FOLLOWS:
RESPONDENT

PETITIONER

Foo House and
Lot
Loans to
Respondent's
sister and niece
Loan to M.
Anderson
TOTAL

$428,SQQ X
50% = $214,250

I $2 14,250
I

Repaid and funds contained in the financial account distribution
Repaid and funds contained in the financial account distribution
$214,2 50

I $214,zso

I
8
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Mednick
deficiency
judgment

$181,721.98 plus
$106.85/day
interest since
June 1, 2012 x
50% = $90,860.99,
To be split if and
when the
judgment is
satisfied

to be split if
and when the
judgment is
satisfied

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Respondent requests the Court amend the Decree of Divorce to
reflect the uncontroverted evidence that the withdrawals/loans relating to Respondent's sister,
niece and M. Anderson were repaid and are no longer outstanding, including an amendment to
the Court's table on page 37 of the Decree to exclude $265,000 in outstanding "Loans to
Respondent's sister and niece and M. Anderson" and an equal allocation distributed to the
parties.
DATED this 20th day of November, 2015.
Isl Elizabeth A. Shaffer (digitally)
Elizabeth A. Shaffer
Attorney for Respondent

•
0
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this the 20 th day of November, 2015 a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Post Trial Supplemental Brief was filed via the Court's electronic filing system which
automatically delivered service to the following:
Paul J. Morken
P.O. Box 980691
Park City, UT 84098

Isl C. Kramer
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: December 02, 2015
05:16:15 PM

?~~~.;;\ \

/
Isl Kara P~tt1~~~ i · i
Districi--f~~~/
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Elizabeth A. Shaffer #06796
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC
2041 Sidewinder Drive, Suite 2
Park City, Utah 84060
Telephone: (453) 655-3033
Fax: (435) 655-3233
Email: eshaffer@lawparkcitv.com
Attorney for Respondent, George Sandusky

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
(6300 Justice court Road, Park City, Utah 84098)

KYLEE J. SANDUSKY,
Petitioner

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S EX
PARTE MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF
TIME TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL

v.

GEORGE A. SANDUSKY,

Case No. 114500103

Respondent.
Judge Kara L. Pettit
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The Court, having considered Respondent's Ex Parle Motion for Extension of Time to File
Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of the Appellate Procedure, and good
cause appearing therefore, grants the Respondent a thirty (30) day extension in which to file his
Notice of Appeal in this case.
EXECUTED AND ENTERED by the Court as indicated by the date and seal at the top of
the first page herein.
END OF ORDER.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this the 5th day of November, 2015, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
(PROPOSED) ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S EX PARTE MOTION FOR
EXPEDITED RULING PURSUANT TO RULE 60(b) FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER
was filed via the Court's electronic filing system which automatically delivered service to the
following:
Paul J. Morken
P.O. Box 980691
Park City, UT 84098
Isl C.Kramer
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Elizabeth A. Shaffer #06796
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC
4580 N Silver Springs Drive Suite 100
Telephone: (453) 655-3033
Fax: (435) 655-3233
Email: eshaffer@lawparkcitv.com

Attorney for Respondent, George Sandusky

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

[

(6300 Justice Court Road, Park City, Utah 84098)
.
.

KYLEE J. SANDUSKY,
RULE 60(b) MOTION
Petitioner

I
.

.

Case No. 114500103
v.
Judge Kara Pettit

GEORGE A. SANDUSKY,
Respondent.

COMES NOW, Respondent, George Sandusky, ("George") by and through his counsel of
record, Elizabeth A. Shaffer, and pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
respectfully moves this Court for relief from judgment and the orders of the Court entered on
July 23, 2015 and as amended on November 2, 2015, and November 6, 2015 on the grounds of
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i4

mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, or any other reason justifying relief from operation of
the prior orders of the Court. This motion is supported by the following memorandum.

I
.

.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 23, 2015 this Court entered its judgment in the above captioned case. ("July
Order"). The Court's Order and its findings included 38 pages of calculations of assets resulting

~
'

'

from a long term marriage and a three day trial.

The Court's analysis was a lengthy

interpretation of many numbers and assets. Generally, the Court following Utah law, concluded
that the parties' separation agreement was valid and enforceable. Pursuant to the separation
agreement, Petitioner was entitled to $2,000 per month in alimony or termination of monthly
alimony with an election of a lump sum payment in the amount of $400,000 ("giving credit for
the alimony paid" pg. 35 of July Order). Respondent was entitled to IO lots identified in the
separation agreement as his separate personal property. The value of the lots was determined
$335,000 and the Court found this to be fair and equitable. The Court also determined that
essentially all assets of the parties, including the remaining real property and financial accounts

~

were marital assets 1 and divided the assets equally.

I

time of trial essentially consisted of cash bank accounts in the amount of $865,224.72; The Foo

'
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The majority of the parties' assets at the

House and Lot, having a value of $428,000; personal property in the possession of each party,

I
'

'
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and individual pension and/or retirement accounts, awarded to each party as their separate
property.
On August 8, 2015, both parties filed post trial motions. (See Respondent's Motion for

''

New Trial, Amendment of Judgment and For Relief from Order and Petitioner's Motion to
1

"The Court reiterates its findings set forth above and concludes that all of the parties' assets are marital property,
with the exception of the gifts from Respondents grandfather in his safety deposit box and 48% of Respondent's
pension, which he accrued prior to the parties' marriage and can be separately identified and segregated from the
marital portion of the pension." Decree of Divorce and Judgment, July 23, 2015, ~D, page 31.

2
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~
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Correct Mistakes and to Alter or Amend the Court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
and Its Divorce Decree and Judgment entered on July 23, 2015, filed on August 6, 2015). A
hearing was held on the post trial motions on November 2, 2015. At the hearing, the Court
admitted errors had been made specifically regarding the allotment of Respondent's separate
property ($335,000) and credits to Respondent with regard to the marital assets. It was also
established that there was evidential discrepancy of testimony regarding the inclusion of "loans"
identified by the Court as part of the marital assets (See Table P. 37, July Order). There was
further discrepancy noted regarding the record on issues surrounding the lump sum payment to
terminate alimony. Initially the Court requested that counsel review the record in more detail to
satisfy the evidentiary controversy regarding the "loans". Upon Petitioner's counsel's objection
and the late hour, the Court entered its ruling relying on its personal notes rather than the record
itself.
Thereafter Responded filed an Emergency Ex Parte Motion for Relief from Judgment
pursuant to Rule 60(b ).

The Court denied the motion related to the cash distribution, but

permitted further briefing on the issue of "loans" referenced in its July Order, specifically those
to Respondent's sister and niece and M. Anderson (See November 6, 2015 Order, P. 4).
Respondent filed a supplemental brief on November 20 and Petitioner's Response to the
Supplemental brief is due December 4, 2015. Respondent is permitted to file a reply brief by
December 11, 2015.
argument.

The Court intends to rule on the outstanding issue without further

No ruling was made on any of the other issues presented in the Post Trial motions.

There now exists a dispute regarding the distribution of the lump sum payment, terminating
3
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alimony, the allocation of the distributions to date and the amount of credits for past due
alimony.

BACKGROUND
The Post-Trial Motions filed by both parties requested clarification and amendments of
the Court's prior Order of July 23, 2015. Both parties required further interpretation of the Court
orders.
Following the tenets of Utah law the Court acknowledged its obligation of equal
distribution of the assets noting as follows:
"Each party gets an almost equal split of personal property, which the Court deems to be
equitable. Respondent receives real property valued at approximately $335,000, and
similarly, Petitioner is entitled to either a lump sum of $400,000 or $2,000/month in
alimony." (Decree and Judgement Filed 7/23/15, page 33)
"The Court finds that no exceptional circumstances that overcome the general
presumption that marital property be divided equally have been demonstrated by the
evidence. The Court Orders that the financial accounts be equally distributed as follows:"
(Decree and Judgement Filed 7/23/15, page 36)
"Last, the Court concludes the most fair and equitable distribution, as well as the
presumption under Utah law, of the assets that the parties held at the time of trial that
were not accounted for in the Separation Agreement, is to split them equally. The Court
finds that no exceptional circumstances that overcome the general presumption that the
marital property be divided equally have been demonstrated by the evidence." (Decree
and Judgment Filed 7/23/15, page 37)
There has been considerable disagreement among the parties since the court issued its
Findings of Fact and conclusions of law and Decree of Divorce and Judgment on July 23, 2015.
Some of the issues/mistakes that required correction were outlined in post trial pleadings by both

I

sides. There was also a hearing on November 2, 2015 regarding the post trial motions. After the
4

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Court ruling from the bench, Respondent filed an Emergency Ex Parte Motion requesting relief
form judgment from the Court's subsequent order. On November 6, 2015 the Court denied the
specific relief and entered a further ruling to clarify its order.
The parties continue to have differing interpretations of the distributions of the assets
based on the combined orders from July 23, 2015; the November 2, 2015 bench ruling and the
most recent November 6, 2015 Order.

The Court currently has the issue regarding "loans"

referenced in the distribution table on page 37 of the July Order outstanding (See e-mail from
Petitioner's counsel demanding additional distribution of the assets notwithstanding a
distribution of $310,000 cash made to Petitioner on November 6, 2015 attached as Exhibit "A").
The ambiguity of the combined Orders stems from mistakes in the July order.
Particularly, regarding monetary calculations of the financial accounts, where separate personal
property funds were held; assumption that the parties had effectuated prior distributions,
''Because the parties have already effectuated these distributions, nothing further needs to be
done" (July Order, P.33). And identification in the distribution of more money to the parties
than actually existed and "loans" that no longer existed, and the proceeds were contained in the
marital financial accounts. The intention of the Court, to divide the marital assets equally was
clear in the original order of July. But the assets identified were incorrect as well as some of the
value of the assets, particularly after effectuating distributions the Court assumed had been done
previously.
Reviewing the Courts Order of July 23, 2015, it is apparent that the court recognized and
acknowledged Utah law requiring the distribution of the assets between the parties, equally.
5
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However, the differing interpretation of the Court's Orders essentially come down to whether the
lump sum cash payment of $400,000 (less those credits and offsets the Court ordered applicable
to the lump sum payment) is effectuated prior to the division of the remaining financial accounts,
as the Cou1t originally assumed had occurred, resulting in a fair and essentially equal di.stribution
of the parties assets in light of the separation agreement or, whether the alimony is a trump card
on top of distribution of the parties ' assets to tip the distribution inequitably in favor of the
Petitioner.
The only proper distribution to effectuate a fair and equitable distribution of the
allocation of the personal prope1ty and an equal division of the remaining marital assets outlined
by the Court in its July Order is the following distribution:

PETITIONER

RESPONDENT
PERSONAL PROPERTY AW ARD ED

$400,000
-$32,000 (credit alimony already paid)
= $368,000 Lum
FINANCIAL ACCOUNT DISTRIBUTION
TOT AL ALL ACCOUNTS 5865,224. 72
-$368.000 distribution to Petitioner
-$33 5.000 distribution to Respondent
TOTAL TO DISTRIBUTE S162,224 .72
X 50%
= $81,112.36
-$45,000 ½ of 90k taken 6/2011
= $36,112.36
-$1 ,200 chase acct
= $34,912.25

x50%
=$ 81 ,112.36
+$45 ,000 credit 1/2 taken 6/2011
= $126, 112.36
+$ 1 200 chase acct
=$ 127,312.47
6
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TOTAL PERSONAL PROPERTY AW ARD AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS
$34,912.25 + $368,000
$402,912.25 to Petitioner

$127,312.47 + $3 35 000
$462,312.47 to Respondent

= $214,250
"LOANS ISSUE" STILL OUTSTANDING
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT DISTRIBUTION
$181 ,721.98 plus $106.85/day
to be split of
interest since June 1, 2012 x 50% =
and when the
$90,860.99, to be split if and when the
judgment is satisfied
judgment is satisfied
"PAST DUE ALIMONY"
No outstanding issue, If the Court
believes the issue of past due alimony is
warranted, alternative arguments herein.
FINAL TOTAL DISTRIBUTION TO PARTIES
$402,912.25 to Petitioner
$462,312.47 to Res ondent
- $3 10,000(paidon 11 /6/ 15),
$92,912.25 still owed to Petitioner
ARGUMENT
In fashioning a divorce decree, trial courts are expected to make "equitable orders
relating to ... property, debts or obligations." Utah Code Ann. § 30- 3- 5 (Supp . 2010). "The
major purpose of a property division ... is to achieve a fair, just, and equitable result between the
parties." Hauman! v. Hauman! , 793 P.2d 421 , 424 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In light of that goal, a trial court attempting to make an equitable prope1iy distribution
7
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should engage in a four-step process, making findings of fact that are "sufficiently detailed" and
that "include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on
each factual issue was reached." Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11,

,r,r

15-16, 176

P.3d 476 (internal quotation marks omitted). First, the trial court should distinguish between
separate and marital property; second, it should "consider whether there are exceptional
circumstances that overcome the general presumption that marital property [should] be divided
equally between the parties"; third, it should "assign values to each item of marital property";
and fourth, it should distribute the property in a manner consistent with its findings and "with a
view toward allowing each party to go forward with his or her separate life." Id. ,r 15.
In carrying out this process, trial courts are not expected to view each item of marital
property in isolation and divide each separately. Rather, the trial court is permitted to look at the
martial property in its entirety and to apportion it in a manner that best facilitates "a clean break"
between the parties and achieves a result that equitably divides the marital property as a whole.
See Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1988) (holding that the trial court could
reapportion its distribution of some items of marital property to offset the award of other items of
marital property to a single party); Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P .2d 431, 433 (Utah 1982)
(holding that, where possible, division of one spouse's retirement benefits "may best be
accomplished" by determining the other spouse's interest in those benefits and then satisfying
that spouse's share out of other assets (internal quotation marks omitted)). Boyer v. Boyer, 259
P.3d 1063, 1066-1067 (Utah App. 2011).

8
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In the allocations and distributions, we cannot lose sight of Utah law, and the underlying
equitable doctrine the court followed in its original order. The court found that the separation
agreement was valid and enforceable. And as a result, Respondent was awarded the lots as
separate property. And that the agreement provided for $2,000 per month in alimony payments
or an election by either party to a lump sum cash payment in lieu of alimony.

"At any time

either one of the parties may terminate the monthly alimony payments of $2,000 with a lump
sum cash payment of $400,000" (Separation Addendum dated February 8, 2010). "The Court
finds this distribution and alimony award to be fair and equitable." (Decree and Judgment July,
23, 2015, P. 33). The Court incorrectly acknowledged that the parties had effectuated this
transfer - presumably referring to the lots titled in respondents name and the lump sum payment
placed in the attorney trust account for the benefit of petitioner. While this was not a specific
finding by the Court, the court simply stated:
"Pursuant to the terms of the Separation Agreement that the Court determined were
unambiguous, the parties' property disposition and alimony would be as follows based upon the
Court's determined valuations:

RESPONDENT

PETITIONER
2007 Honda
Civic; converted
into CRV

$18,000

401K
Fuminsings,
computers, TVs,
jewelry
Alimony

$58,107
Uknown value

2007 Honda
Ridgeline;
converted into
Acura
Pension
10 Lots He'eNalu

$13,800

$2,632/month
$335,000

$2,000/month or
$400,000 lump sum
9

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ITT}

lfii

The Court finds this distribution and alimony award to be fair and equitable. Each party
agreed to keep their own retirement account. This division does not create a tremendous
inequality, particularly in light of the fact that at best; Petitioner would be entitled to
approximately $685/month if the Court did not give deference to the parties' agreement.
Each party gets an almost equal split of personal property, which the Court deems to be
equitable. Respondent receives real property valued at approximately $335,000, and
similarly, Petitioner is entitled to either a lump sum of $400,000 or $2,000/month in
alimony. The court finds this to be a fair and equitable division as well. Because the
parties have already effectuated these distributions, nothingfurther needs to be done."
(Decree and Judgment filed July, 23, 2015, P.32-33) (emphasis added) ..
The Court further found that the financial accounts, determined to be marital, contained

~

$865,224.72 at the time of trial. (See pg 36 of the July Order). While this is the correct amount

'

'

Fl

~

in the financial accounts, there had been no distributions of the lot proceeds to Respondent or the
lump sum payment terminating alimony as noted by the Court above. As a result, the subsequent
distribution of the financial accounts equally between the parties is incorrect. After effectuating
the distributions to the parties as assumed by the Court on page 33 of the July Order, the
financial accounts were extremely overstated.

Fl
~

Acknowledging and giving effect to the personal property distributions set out by the
Court on page 33 of the July Order, the correct financial account distribution to the parties
should be as outlined in the Table herein on page 6.
The Court further ordered that all other assets of the parties be split equally (See page 37

W7
~

f7
irJ

of the July Decree).

The Court previously made orders regarding "loans" to respondent's

sister/niece and M. Anderson, which issues presently are under further review by the Court.

10
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Specific alimony and past due alimony was also disputed by both parties in the post trial

rl

w

motions, however the Court did not address the alimony arguments at the November 2, hearing

~
. '

~
.

and subsequently, no new or amended orders were issued regarding alimony.

The court

references past due alimony in the Nov. 6 Order but the reference is the same as the findings in

.

the prior July 23 Order. There was brief argument and discussion regarding the amount of past
due alimony, termination of the monthly payments and election of the lump sum payment as a
result of stipulation by the parties placing the lump sum amount of $310,000 into the attorney
trust account. The Court, however stated that it could not make the leap at that time, saying she
could not recall such testimony, whether there had been an election of lump sum cash payment
terminating monthly alimony payments, thereby affecting an award of past due alimony.
Although these issues remain disputed, it is arguable that neither has an effect on the final
distribution of the assets. 2 For instance, following the Court's July order, "Per the parties'

fl
ill

Agreement at any time, either Petitioner or Respondent may elect to terminate the monthly
payments in lieu of a $400,000 lump sum (giving credit for the alimony already paid). " (at P.
35); If credit is given for alimony paid, then by giving full credit for $368,000 ($400,000 $32,000 - undisputed alimony credit) when and if an election for the lump sum payment was
made previously and how much past due alimony is owed, is not relevant. Because any alimony
paid is credited against the lump sum amount owed, effectively negating the issue of back
alimony. Petitioner appears to understand and acknowledges this as well (See demand made via
e-mail from her counsel on Dec. 1, 2015, attached as "Exhibit A" hereto). The crux of the
2

Provided the distribution of assets is followed as outlined by Respondent herein on page 6. This argument is also
made without any intent to waive any other arguments regarding the award of past due alimony in any amount.

11
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disputes underlying the courts orders appears to lie in exactly how the distribution of the assets is
made and the allocation of payments made to Petitioner to date.
The Court has now Ordered that the lot sale proceeds of $335,000 be deducted from the
marital financial accounts prior to the equal distribution of the balance to the parties. The same
must be done for the lump sum payment to Petitioner (See table on page 6 above). In other
words, the $368,000 lump sum payment is deducted from the marital financial accounts also and
the balance of the financial accounts is divided equally between the parties. This is the only way
a true equal and equitable distribution under the Courts prior Orders and Utah law can be
achieved.

"The Court finds that no exceptional circumstances that overcome the general

presumption that marital property be divided equally have been demonstrated by the evidence.
The Court Orders that the financial accounts be equally distributed". (See July Order, P.36).
The Court's prior mistake, not deducting the $335,000 lot proceeds from the financial
accounts before dividing the balance of the financial accounts equally between the parties,
resulted in an incorrect distribution amount. Likewise, the numbers continue to be incorrect. By
not deducting the $368,000 lump sum payment owed to Petitioner before dividing the balance of
the financial accounts equally between the parties, the distribution amounts continue to be
inequitable and incorrect. The same analysis applied to the proceeds related to the lots awarded
to Respondent also apply to the lump sum payment owed to Petitioner, pursuant to election. The
distribution outlined in the table on page 6 herein is consistent with the Court's original Order as
well as the subsequent Orders.

12
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Alternatively, Respondent sets forth his arguments regarding past due alimony and the
election of the lump sum payment as follows:

I.

MONTHLY SPOUSAL SUPPORT TERMINATED IN JUNE 2011 WITH
PETITIONER'S WITHDRAWAL OF A LUMP SUM PAYMENT.

The Separation Agreement entered into by the parties in March 2010 provided for
monthly alimony payments to Petitioner in the amount of $2,000 3 . The Agreement also had a
signed Addendum by both parties dated February 8, 2010 that provided "At any time either one
of the parties may terminate the monthly alimony payments of $2,000 with a lump sum cash
payment of $400,000."

Petitioner unilaterally took a partial lump sum payment per the

Addendum of the Separation Agreement in June 2011 when she withdrew $90,000 cash from the
Hawaii Credit Union account immediately prior to filing for divorce. At the same time, she
declined to accept any further monthly alimony payments from Respondent.

continued to make the monthly payments of $1550 (based on a calculation of 6% interest on the
balance of $310,000) from July 2011 through May 2013.

Petitioner also amended her tax

returns for 2011 recounting her claim of monthly alimony payments. She testified this was done
after consulting with her attorney. Respondent continued to make monthly alimony payments
for approximately 15 months. However, Petitioner did not utilize or claim the monthly payments
and instead used her cash proceeds from the $90,000 lump sum she had withdrawn from the
bank accounts.

II.

MONTHLY SPOUSAL SUPPORT TERMINATED IN MAY 2013.

Respondent testified that the amount of monthly alimony payments was determined as interest, at 6% on the
lump sum cash payment of $400,000 pursuant to the separation agreement addendum. 14:34 :13 August 30,
2015. This amount was later reduced to account for Petitioner's election taking the 90k lump sum in June 2011.

3

13

D

•

Mr. Sandusky
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In his testimony, on April 30, 2015, in direct examination by attorney Shaffer,
Respondent testified that the parties, by agreement, elected to place the lump sum "alimony"
payment in 2013, from the proceeds of the sale of the foreclosed Mednick property into the
Shaffer trust account.

•
•
•
•
•

The stipulated Agreement on the amount of $310,000 represented the

remainder of Petitioner's agreed upon settlement per the Separation Agreement after she had
withdrawn $90,000.
"Kylee and her attorney and you, we all had a conversation went back and forth,
and Kylee wanted all the money to turn into a thing and I said I needed it for
Micah's college and she said okay, how much will you put in. I'll put in
$3 I 0,000 plus the $90,000 you already took that's $400,000 and I needed the
other money for Micha's college."
Ms. Shaffer. "And she agreed to that?"
"Yeah, that's my understanding." (R. at 9:38:53 - 9:39:21 -April 30, 2015)
The Addendum to the Separation Agreement, typed and executed by Petitioner, clearly
states that at any time either Respondent or Petitioner "may terminate the monthly alimony
payments of $2,000 with a lump sum cash payment of $400,000." 4 It was clear that the intent of

rn
II-)

~
.

the parties was that Petitioner would receive either monthly payments Q! one lump sum
distribution, not both.(emphasis added). The language of the Separation Agreement is clear.
Respondent agreed to place $310,000 into the attorney trust account on or about May, 2013,

'

during the pendency of their divorce. Both parties agreed to the lump sum amount of $310,000
being placed in the attorney trust account by entering into a stipulation in May, 2013.

~
'

'

~ Separation Agreement Addendum,
"Was she agreeable to the addendum that she signed?" "Yes, she typed it up." (R. at 14:33:20 April 30, 2015).

14
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The election to terminate the monthly alimony payments could be unilaterally invoked
by either party, at any time. Therefore, it is irrelevant whether Petitioner agreed to Respondent's

~

decision voluntarily electing to put the lump sum amount of $310,000 ($400,000 less the

(ITT

$90,000 Petitioner withdrew in 2011) in escrow. Respondent was able to make this decision

'

'

Iii!!

independently and unilaterally, as indicated by the language in the separation Agreement.

~
I

I

Respondent testified that Petitioner wanted the entire lump sum, ($375,000) from the proceeds of
the Mednick property sale, however, he only elected to put the sum of $310,000 in escrow,
representing the lump sum cash payment less $400,000 less the $90,000 previously taken by
Petitioner. (R. at 9:38:53 - 9:31 :21, April 30, 2015). The stipulation placing the amount of
$310,000 was filed on May15, 2013. Respondent elected to place the lump sum cash payment

~

into escrow and the stipulation acknowledged this election, ending all monthly payments as of

'

.

that date. Therefore, no back alimony is owed. Judgment for back alimony or credit from prior
distributions for back alimony is not consistent with the evidence and as a result is judicial error

~

and the order must be amended accordingly.

.

,

III.

THE ADDENDUM WAS A MODIFICATION OF THE CONTRACT

The Addendum to the Settlement Agreement was a valid modification of the Agreement
and supersedes the other terms with which it is at odds. By definition, an addendum is an
agreed-upon addition signed by all parties to the original contract. It details the specific terms,
clauses, sections and definitions to be changed in the original contract but otherwise leaves it in
full force and effect. "Parties to a written contract have the right to modify, waive, or make new
contractual terms". Glenn v. Reese, 2008 UT 80, 225 P.3d 185 (citing Softsolutions, Inc. v.
15

W1
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Brigham Young University, 2000 UT 46

,r 34, 1 PJd 1095.)

The Utah Supreme Court held that

this is true even when "express contractual language to the contrary" exists in the original
contract. Id. at ,r 23.
Testimony exists that Petitioner typed the Addendum herself, agreed to the terms, and
signed the document. Testimony also exists that Respondent also consented to the terms of the
Addendum. "It is well-settled law that the parties to a contract may, by mutual consent, alter all
or any portion of that contract by agreeing upon a modification thereof." Id. at

~
',·

,quoting

Rapp v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 606 P.2d 1189, 1191 (Utah 1980). "It is fundamental

that where parties have rights under an existing contract they have exactly the same power to

1171

~

renegotiate terms ... as they had to make the contract in the first place." Id. at

~

Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86 89 (Utah 1963).

''

,r 23

iJ 23, quoting

This is exactly what the parties did when they drafted and signed the Addendum to the
Separation Agreement.

The court has found the Separation Agreement and the Addendum

thereto to be a valid and binding contract between the parties. The Addendum clearly terminates

~

any provision in the Separation Agreement regarding the payment of the $2,000 monthly

.

'

IT7

i

"alimony" payments with its wording that the election of either party of the lump sum of
$400,000. The $2,000 monthly "alimony" payments terminated by the election of the partial
lump sum in June, 2011 by Petitioner or at least, in May, 2013 at the election of Respondent.

I
.

.

IV.

THE AWARD OF BACK ALIMONYWAS IMPROPER AND NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE .
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In the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on July 23, 2015, The
Court looked to Utah Code 30-3-5(8) (a) for relevant factors in awarding Alimony including, (i)
financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse, (ii) the recipient's earning capacity or
ability to produce income, and (iii) the ability of the payer spouse to provide support. Alimony is
awarded based on need. Petitioner has the ability to earn income as a teacher as she has done on
the past. (Judge Pettit's Decree of Divorce and Judgment filed 7/23/2015, page 34).

If the Court order is interpreted how Petitioner insists, Respondent does not have not have the
ability to pay a lump sum cash payment after distribution of the marital assets. Respondent is

ffi7

fr@

~
.·

~

retired, with his only regular monthly income being from his pension in the amount of $2,665.
Although the Court found "Respondent has the ability to earn income from his real estate and
hard money loan ventures", (Decree of Divorce and Judgment filed 7/23/2015, P.34), this is no

.·

longer possible with the liquidation and distribution of the marital assets leaving him no capital
and disabling him from pursuing these ventures.
Alimony determination is not used as a form of punishment. The purpose of alimony is
support and maintenance based on need. Support and maintenance is not required if not shown.

~
'

'

'

~

The court found that Petitioner had a $1,700 deficit but did not take into account the $90,000
Petitioner took in June 2011 and spent over the 4 year period. Accounting for that money from

.

.

June, 2011 to April 2015, Petitioner had a net of $1,956.52 each month. She had more than

.

~

enough money to cover her desired standard of living expenses and any deficit based on her own

rm

income.

'

~

Ordinarily, the trial court must first divide the marital estate and then proceed to consider
17
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alimony in light of the properly determined property award.

Jensen v. Jensen, Not reported in

P.3d, 2000 WL 33244491 (Utah App. July 7, 2000). However, in this case the parties had a
settlement agreement that the Court found valid and enforceable. And specifically with respect
to the $2,000 monthly alimony payments or the ability of either party to terminate monthly
alimony payments in exchange for a lump sum cash payment.

The lump sum payment was a

guarantee to Petitioner from the marital assets.
Proper distribution of property interest of one sort of another should have come first, and
only then would alimony need to be considered. Burt v. Burt, 799 P .2d 1166, 1170 fn 3 (Utah
App. 1990). When determining an alimony award, "it is appropriate and necessary for [trial
courts] to consider all sources of income". Wilde v. Wilde, 2001 UT App. 318, ,r 27, 35 P.3d 341
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (Court rejected a recipient spouse's argument that
the trial court should not have considered her disability benefits in calculating her ability to meet
her own needs); Bollinger v. Bollinger, 2000 UT App 47

,r,r 20, 29, 997 P.2d 903 (holding that

the recipient spouse's receipt for social security benefits could constitute a material change of
circumstances permitting modification of an alimony award). After Petitioner withdrew $90,000
from the bank account in June, 2011, she no longer had a need for alimony and as a result an
award of back alimony is not supported by the evidence.

It was further acknowledged by

Petitioner that she received an additional $65,000 in inheritance, during the pendency of this
case.

All of these funds were available to Petitioner and used for her sole benefit,

notwithstanding that she later was required to account for Respondent's share of the marital
assets. The Court must consider all sources of income to Petitioner in determining the need for
18
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~
'

.

~

alimony. Therefore, Petitioner had no need for alimony from June, 2011 and no back alimony
should be awarded.

~
I

.

~

CONCLUSION

.

'

~

Based on the foregoing, Respondent requests the Court amend the Decree of Divorce to
reflect the intent of the parties in the distribution of alimony and the marital assets to effectuate
an equitable distribution as set forth herein on page 6.

am

lid

DATED this 4th day of December, 2015.

Wl

~

Isl Elizabeth A. Shaffer (digitally)
Elizabeth A. Shaffer
Attorney for Respondent

~
'.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

ml

11

th

I certify that on this the 4 day of December, 2015 a true and correct copy of the

ll

foregoing Rule 60(b) Motion was filed via the Court's electronic filing system which

[ITT

automatically delivered service to the following:

.

.

~

~
.

'

Paul J. Morken
P.O. Box 980691
Park City, UT 84098

Isl C.Kramer

~
' .

lrl
~
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From:
To:
Subject:

[l

Date:

Iii

~
.

.

Paul Morken
Elizabeth Shaffer:
Re: Sandusky
Tuesday, December 01, 2015 8:48:28 AM

Liz, also please advise George that I will be seeking damages ( tax
consequences) and interest arising out of his failure to timely pay alimony .
Paul
On Tue, Dec 1, 2015 at 10:37 AM, Paul Morken <paulmorken@gmail.
com> wrote:

~
.

'

[Liz -- As of this last November George has continued to
iknowingly fail to pay alimony for the last 53 months, while
;clearly having the ability to do so. It is now December 1 and
he owes $108,000. Time is not an issue for George; thus, if
;George does not pay Kylee that total sum by this Friday,
December 5, before 5:00 P.M., I will file an OSC for
!contempt.
!

!Additionally, pursuant to the "Addendum" to the legal
:separation agreement Kylee will exercise her option to
;terminate monthly alimony payments that come due in the
future (starting January 1, 2016) with a lump sum payment
by George to Kylee on January 1, 2016. Kylee hereby gives
,~George notice that monthly alimony payments that come due
Jin the future beginning January 1, 2016, are terminated with
1

G:~g:i:~

j$j~;~t~~ fa:u:~i~~o~~ (~:~?$~:~o~6j.4g0
0

;the required arrears of $108,000 by this Friday that sum too
;will be deducted from the $368,000 that is now due to be
:paid in full on January 1, 2016.
If you have any question, please call.
i

Paul
,Paul J. Morken, PLLC
paul J. Morken
Attorney & Counselor at Law
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!P.O. Box 980691
iPark City, Utah 84098
ffelephone: 435.659.1685
!Facsimile: 435.658.9163
:E-mail: paulmorken@gmail.com
I

INOTICE: This e-mail message (including all attachments
transmitted with it, if any) is intended solely for the use of
the addressee and may contain legally privileged and
!confidential information. If you are not the person to whom
Jthis e-mail is addressed, or an employee or agent responsible
!for delivering this message to the person to whom it is
iaddressed, you are hereby notified that any dissemination,
!distribution, copying, or other use of this message or its
iattachments is strictly prohibited. If you have received this e1mail in error, please notify the sender immediately by e-mail
:reply, and then please delete this e-mail, together with any
[attachments to it, from your computer.

ID

I

ff7
llJ

;
.

'

I
.

'

~
''

'

~
I

'

~
'
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Paul J. Morken, PLLC
Paul J. Morken
Attorney & Counselor at Law
P.O. Box 980691
Park City, Utah 84098
Telephone: 435.659.1685
Facsimile: 435.658.9163
E-mail: paulmorken@gmail.com

NOTICE: This e-mail message (including all attachments transmitted with
it, if any) is intended solely for the use of the addressee and may contain
legally privileged and confidential information. If you are not the person to
whom this e-mail is addressed, or an employee or agent responsible for
delivering this message to the person to whom it is addressed, you are
hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, copying, or other use
of this message or its attachments is strictly prohibited. If you have
received this e-mail in error, please notify the sender immediately byemail reply, and then please delete this e-mail, together with any
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Elizabeth A. Shaffer #06796
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC
4580 N Silver Springs Drive Suite 100
Telephone: (453) 655-3033
Fax: (435) 655-3233
Email: eshaffer(a).lawparkcitv .com

'

Attorney for Respondent, George Sandusky

lf1
iii
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

m

(6300 Justice Court Road, Park City, Utah 84098)

ii

~
'

KYLEE J. SANDUSKY,

.

Petitioner

RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO
PETITIONER'S RESPONSIVE BRIEF

W1

*
.

ftJ
.

v.

Case No. 114500103

GEORGE A. SANDUSKY,

Judge Kara Pettit

'

Respondent.

COMES NOW, Respondent, George Sandusky, ("George") by and through his counsel of
record, Elizabeth A. Shaffer, hereby submits his Reply to Petitioner's Responsive Brief pursuant
to the order of the Court dated December 6. 2015 as follows:
The purpose of Post-Trial Motions is to get the record straight. The aim of the Court is
equity and fairness, not to win by default. Respondent should not be prejudiced by Petitioner's
quest for "finality". Robinson v. Baggett, 2011 UT App. 250,263 P.3d 411 (citing, Moore's
Federal Practice§ 60.02 [2] (3d ed. 1999) (providing that Rule 60(b) allows "a court to grant
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relief from a judgment in circumstances in which the need for truth outweighs the value of
finality in litigation") "Clearly, a court should modify a prior decree when the interests of
equity ... require" Id. citing Boyce v. Boyce 609 P.2d 928 (Utah 1980). This case has been
pending for 5 years, there is no great urgency at this point. Further, Petitioner will not be
prejudiced as she has already received $310,000 in distributions. Financial hardship and need is
not applicable. It is more important for all parties to get a correct, fair, and equitable ruling.
PETITIONER'S OBJECTION TO ORDER REOPENING BRIEFING

Petitioner's counsel's mischaracterizes the Court's order allowing "supplemental
briefing," rather than "reopening briefing" as he provides. The case is pending post-trial motions
and permitting supplemental briefing to get the record straight is not inappropriate. In addition,
Respondent objects to Petitioner's characterization of the Court's prior rulings from November
2, 2015 and the November 6, 2015 Order. Specific objections regarding the proposed order
regarding the November 2, hearing were raised informally with Petitioner's counsel and will be
formally outlined in an objection to the pending proposed order. Respondent incorporates by
reference all those objections related to the proposed order of the November 2, 2015 hearing.
The order of November 6, 2015 speaks for itself.
Petitioner raises the new argument of collateral estoppel in the responsive brief. This not
appropriate and furthermore, collateral estoppel does not apply to this situation. Collateral
estoppel only applies when the issue against which collateral estoppel is claimed is identical to
an issue already fully litigated to a conclusion in an earlier case between the same parties. Ashe
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v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed. 2d 469 (1970); Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588
P.2d 689 (Utah 1978). There has been no final conclusion as to the issues controverted and there
exists no second case as the parties are still seeking clarification of issues from the original trial.
Petitioner's argument objecting to the Court granting further briefing is moot. This Court
permitted further briefing on the issue for the benefit of the Court, the parties and clarity of the
prior Orders. The issue of the "loans" was brought up in Respondent's post-trial Motions and
briefly addressed at the Court hearing on November 2, 2015 and final disposition remains under
consideration before the Court.
RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO PETITIONER'S RESPONSIVE BRIEF
Petitioner is now raising a new argument that Respondent paid $329,498 in personal
expenses with marital assets over the last 5 years, thus entitling Petitioner to a credit of 50% for a
total of $164,749. He further adds the argument that Respondent did not pay Petitioner any rent
or interest on the Foo property and let her pay 50 % of the taxes. These arguments are new in the
case, not pied previously, made at trial or presented in any briefings to date. As a result, they are
not appropriate to bring up at this point in responsive pleadings for the first time. Additionally,
the Petitioner did not raise any defense related to misappropriation of the parties' assets. In fact,
the opposite testimony was provided by Petitioner. She indicated she trusted Respondent with
the management of the parties' assets.

The Court entered its final order on July 23, 2015,

following a 4- day trial in April. Essentially all assets, with few exceptions, were determined to
be marital as of the date of the trial. Petitioner did not personally or unilaterally pay anything
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toward the Foo property. Respondent managed and maintained the property during the pending
proceedings. Because the arguments have not been made previously and they are not responsive
to the pending issues before the Court, Respondent is not specifically addressing these issues.
However, he reserves his right to address further these arguments should they be considered by
the Court and does not waive any objections or defenses he may raise in the future with regard to
such arguments.
Petitioner argues that the transfers of money to Respondent's sister "were not for
Micah's education, but for himself and Micah generally". However, no contrary evidence was
provided supporting Petitioner's contention. Petitioner's statements are just that, statements of
opinion, not evidence testified to at trial. The only evidence at trial was Respondent's testimony
that at least $230,000, the amount of money transferred did in fact, go to pay for Micha's college
expenses. Again, there was no testimony to the contrary and no allegations that Respondent
misappropriated those funds. Further, this court found the Petitioner is not credible multiple
times in her testimony and Respondent credible in his testimony. (See Decree of Divorce and
Judgment 1113, 22, 24, 26). Petitioner provides that ··there is no evidence that any of the
$230,000 was used for Micah's educational expenses". This statement is not supported by the
evidence. Respondent and Petitioner both acknowledged the costs associated with their son's
college education. Respondent testified as set forth in his Post-Trial Supplemental Brief filed on
November 20, 2015.
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Regarding $40,000, $90,000, and$ I 00,000 to Respondent's sister.

Again, Respondent

testified to the transfers of these monies specifically. Petitioner's counsel questioned on cross
examination and reviewed his deposition on the issue as well. In reviewing his deposition,
Petitioner's own counsel moved to admit the entire original deposition into evidence. The Court
accepted the tender of evidence in the cross examination testimony. Further it was Petitioner's
counsel that requested Respondent refer to the deposition in answering the cross examination.
The trial evidence identified specifically the source of the amounts identified as "loans"
in the Court's prior order: $90,000 from Respondent's pension funds, $42,000 in motorcycle
accident settlement proceeds and $ I 00,000 that was set aside for their son's college tuition.
These funds were accounted for and there was no contradictory evidence presented by Petitioner
as to the source and use of the funds from any account over the last 5 years. Petitioner made no
allegation of misappropriation or dissipation of the assets, any reduction in the amount of assets
since the parties' separation was accounted for by Respondent without any contradictory
evidence by Petitioner.
The Court found Respondent to be credible, and there were no allegations of misuse of
marital funds by Respondent at any time. It was undisputed that the parties' assets in excess of
$200,000 were used for their sons' college tuition, travel, and out of state living expenses. The
$ I 00,000 and the $90,000 transferred to his sister were not a loan but were for safekeeping to pay
for their son's college in the event the parties' bank accounts were frozen in the divorce action.
Again, Petitioner did not produce any testimony or evidence to the contrary of what Respondent'
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testified and presented in his supplemental brief.
$40.000 to M. Anderson
Similarly, the loan to M. Anderson in the amount of $40,000 should not be included in the
Courts distribution chart on page 37 of the Decree. This loan was made from the financial accounts
of the parties and returned back into the financial accounts of the parties. This evidence was
uncontroverted. The loans were made and paid back. Therefore, including these items in the
equitable distribution is a mistake. And to avoid overstating assets in the financial accounts that
do not exist, the Decree and Findings should be corrected and amended consistent with the
evidence. The testimony and evidence presented by Respondent was not contested by Petitioner
nor was any contrary evidence presented.
$35,000 to Niece.
In addition, Respondent testified to 2 other "loans" that involved his sister and niece.
Respondent testified that in 2014, after he received the proceeds from the sale of the He'eNalu

I
I
I

sister money to help her purchase a condominium for her daughter and grandchildren following

II

came from cash proceeds in the L.A. Fireman's Credit Union financial account #7833400 and was

I
I
I

lots, which the Court held were his separate property per the separation agreement; he loaned his

her daughter's divorce. George testified that this loan was for a short period as his sister was
expecting money from a foreclosure sale expected to close early 2015. The loan to George's sister

paid back into the financial accounts in January or February 2015. In his Post-Trial Supplemental
Brief, Respondent pointed out that a misstatement \Vas discovered in his testimony. The statement
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Elizabeth A. Shaffer #06796
Elizabeth A. Shaffer PLLC
2041 Sidewinder Drive, Suite 2
Park City, Utah 84060
Telephone (435) 655-3033
Fax (435) 655-3233
eshaffer<a;lawparkcity.com

Attorney for Respondent

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
(6300 Justice Court Road, Park City, Utah 84098)

KYLEE J. SANDUSKY,
Petitioner

v.
GEORGE A. SANDUSKY,
Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO
PETITIONER'S PROPOSED ORDER ON
MOTIONS HEARD ON NOVEMBER 2,
2015
Case No. 114500103
Judge Kara Pettit

Pursuant to Rule 7 (i)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Respondent hereby files
his Objection to the proposed order submitted to the Court on December 2 nd , 2015 on the
grounds that the proposed Order does not accurately reflect the findings and Orders of the Court.
Respondent's objection is based on the following:
This matter came before the Court on November 2, 2015 on the following motions:
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1. Petitioner's Motion and Supporting Memorandum to Correct Mistakes, and to Alter
or Amend the Courts Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and Judgment,
entered on July 23, 2015, filed on August 6, 2015 and
2. Respondent's Motion for New Trial Amendment of Judgment and Motion for Relief
from Order and Request for Extension of Time to Supplement Brief also filed on
August 6, 2015.
Respondent is entitled to an Order that reflects the Court's ruling: "It is, of course, a
lawyer's duty and responsibility to prepare an order that accurately reflects the court's ruling and
a willful failure to do so would be a violation of professional ethics." In re Judd, 629 P.2d 435,
2 (Utah 1981 ). The Petitioner's proposed order does not reflect the Court's oral ruling.
Petitioner's proposed order contains attempted additions of findings and embellishments of the
record, including distribution of the marital assets, accounting of funds, relief not request by
Petitioner, and opinions of counsel and commentary not rulings made by the Court. Respondent
objects to the order specifically as follows:
1.

No Objection.

2.

Paragraph #2 of the proposed order does not accurately reflect the findings of fact

from the prior order. Specifically, the Court indicated regarding Petitioner's withdrawal of
$90,000 at the time she filed for divorce, noting "She had already taken $90,000 from the former
Hawaii account, and this needs to be accounted for." (July 23, 2015 Order, P. 37). The Court's
oral ruling on November 2, 2015 was to correct the mistake of including accountability of the
amount of $90,000 and reduced the amount to $45,000. The court did not make any additional
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findings specifically as Petitioner has indicated in her proposed order "that 50% of the $90,000
would have been awarded to Petitioner". This is not accurate. At the time of the trial, the Court
found that the Petitioner had taken funds from a bank account in the amount of $90,000. The
bank account was determined by the Court to be marital and upon reexamination, the Court
determined that accountability for the funds was required for only half of the amount taken rather
than the full amount, reducing the required accountability by $45,000. Accordingly, The Court
orders that the amount of $45,000 be deducted from the final distribution to Petitioner.
3.

Paragraph # 3 of the proposed Order does not accurately reflect the record.

Specifically, the sentence "The Court used the values of the financial accounts at the time of
trial", should be reworded to state "the values of the assets". The relief sought by Petitioner
regarding 13, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 does not refer to financial accounts and therefore to limit the
order to financial accounts in reference to these paragraphs is not accurate. The court order
should reference "assets" rather than only financial accounts.
The sentence, "The record does not have a complete accounting of funds between March
2010 to the date of trial" should be stricken. This sentence is commentary added by Petitioner
and not a specific finding made by the court on November 2, 2015. As such, said sentence in
paragraph 3 is not appropriate in this Order and must be omitted.
4.

Regarding the court's ruling on Petitione(s request to increase the value of the

Foo House and Lot, the court specifically held that the Court would stand by the original
valuation of the Foo House and Lot in the amount of $428,500. Respondent's proposed order
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more accurately reflects the Courts findings and order and acknowledging consistency and
confirmation of the prior order when no amendment or modification was intended.
5.

Paragraph #5 of Petitioner's proposed order is objected to. First, Petitioner's

motion dealing with alimony is contained in paragraph 10 of Petitioner's motion (See
Petitioner's Motion ,r10 at P. 6) and reference to paragraph 5 is incorrect. Second, the Court
denied the requested relief in Petitioner's motion to make additional findings of fact. The Court
did not change its prior order of July 23, 2015 requiring "a payment of $2000/month in alimony
or in the alternative a lump sum distribution of $400,000 ... " (See July 23 Order at P. 35). The
Court noted again that alimony was paid March 2010 through June 2011 and back alimony is due
and owing at $2000/month. The Court did not make any further findings regarding alimony,
what has been paid or not paid to date nor enter any judgment for arrears. Petitioner attempts to
insert additional findings improperly as no such evidence was presented or relief sought. To
include the proposed statements inaccurately reflects the record and the Court's order. In fact,
subsequent to the Court's oral ruling on November 2, 2015 the Court entered a subsequent
written order on Respondent's Ex Parte Motion for relief from Judgment regarding distribution
of $310,000 stating that "The Court expressly understood that amount to be greater than
Petitioner's share of the financial accounts, but that Petitioner was owed more than $310,000 by
Respondent in totality .... The court continues to find it fair and equitable for Petitioner to
receive the full $310,000 from the trust account as her share of the parties existing financial
accounts as well as other amounts owed to her, in particular, the remaining funds can be applied
to the amount Respondent owes her for alimony." (Order Nov. 6, 2015, P. 1-2). Therefore,
4
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petitioner's proposed order is beyond the scope of the Court's ruling on November 2, 2015 and
directly contradicts subsequent orders of the Court.
Third, Petitioner's proposed order contains alleged findings of the court beyond the scope
of the record, particularly .... "finding that the record is devoid of an accounting of the source of
any such payments." This specific finding was not made by the Court yet petitioner suggests
this as the reason the Court denied Petitioner's request that Respondent be given credit for only
50% (of total $32,000) of the alimony payments he made to Petitioner from March 20 l Othrough
June 201 I. The Court denied Petitioner's request and left the prior Order of July 23, 2015
unchanged regarding the finding that $32,000 had been paid in prior alimony from March 2010
through June 201 I. Petitioner's proposed order paragraph 5 should be stricken.
6.

Paragraph # 6 of Petitioner's proposed Order contains misstatements and

Petitioner's counsel's commentary rather than actual findings of the Court. Specifically, the
Court awarded the l OHeNaLu lots to respondent as his separate property pursuant to the
separation agreement. However, the lots were sold at the time of trial and the funds located in
the financial accounts. The Court did acknowledge its mistake in including the proceeds from
the sale of the lots in the amount of $335,000 in the financial accounts equally distributed
between the parties. As a result, the Court ruled on November 2, that $335,000 be deducted
from the financial accounts before distribution of the balance equally between the parties.
Petitioner's proposed order regarding "loans" is not appropriate. The Court questioned
the evidence on this particular issue, had indicated further briefing would be permitted and on
objection of Petitioner's counsel, did not request further briefing. The Court commented that the
5
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prior ruling could not be amended based on the evidence, but this was not a final ruling by the
Court. Later, pursuant to an emergency motion filed by Respondent, the Court permitted further
review of the record and briefing and currently the specific issue relevant to the loan issue is
before the Court. As a result, no final ruling was made on November 2, 2015. And the
elaboration of the record by Petitioner's counsel is not appropriate.

The remainder of

Petitioner's proposed order is commentary and embellishment of rulings not made by the Court.
This Petitioner's proposed order regarding paragraph #6 should be stricken.
7.

Paragraph #7 does not accurately reflect the distribution of the marital assets.

With mistakes in the prior calculations by the Court in its prior order, the distribution of the
financial assets is not accurate and therefore should not be included in the Court's order of
November 2, 2015. To remain consistent with the Court's prior orders, and avoid further
confusion, additional tables in this order for clarification should be omitted.
The tables outlined in the July order of the Court are an illustration of the Court's equal
distribution analysis of the financial accounts and equitable distribution of the parties' assets. In
the end the table are illustrations not fact. In addition the information contained in the tables has
now been acknowledged was incorrect in more than one place. It is most important to
understand the Court's analysis rather than fixed on the numbers. The numbers divert the
attention from the analysis to a focus on figures. In addition, the tables reference more assets
than exist, and significant assets outlined in the tables are currently under review by this court.
Paragraph #7 contains Petitioner Counsel's interpretation of the record and not the
findings of the Court. Therefore, paragraph #7 as proposed is not correct and should be stricken.
6
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8.

Paragraph #8 of Petitioner's proposed order does not accurately reflect the

Court's ruling. It is not clear what is meant in the statement "petitioner is awarded $586,862.41
or where these calculations are derived. This paragraph of Petitioner's order contains findings
and statements as orders not made by the Court. Petitioner did not seek any relief in her motion
regarding the MACU and Chase account. The Court did not make any specific findings
regarding these bank accounts different from the prior Order of July 23, 2015. The information
Paragraph #8 is inappropriate in this Order and not representative of any Court ruling.
9.

Petitioner's proposed order paragraph #9 contains incorrect distribution amounts

and dates and times that were not ordered by the Court as indicated by petitioner in the proposed
order. Petitioner's proposed order is an enhancement of the court's orders in the proposal of
deadlines not ordered. Also, Petitioner's proposed order incorrectly inserts orders for costs and
expenses, in the event of a sale of the Foo House and Lot. This specific relief that was not
requested by petitioner and therefore could not have resulted in rulings by the Court. Inclusion
of unilateral supplemental conclusions is inappropriate and should be stricken.
Based on the foregoing, Respondent's proposed order should be entered. Petitioner's
proposed order and attempt to embellish the orders beyond the findings and rulings, should be
rejected.
Dated this 14th of December, 2015
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC
Elizabeth A. Shaffer (digitally signed)
Elizabeth A. Shaffer
Attorney for Respondent
7
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this 14th day of December 2015, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S PROPOSED ON MOTIONS HEARD

C
''

NOVEMBER 2ND, 21015 was filed via the Court's electronic filing system which automatically
delivered service to the following:
Paul J. Morken
P.O. Box 980691
Park City, UT 84098
Isl E. Shaffer
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Elizabeth A. Shaffer #06796
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC
4580 N Silver Springs Drive Suite 100
Telephone: (453) 655-3033
Fax: (435) 655-3233
Email: eshaffer@lmvparkcitv.com
Attorney for Respondent, George Sandusky

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
(6300 Justice Court Road, Park City, Utah 84098)

KYLEE J. SANDUSKY,

Petitioner

REPLY TO PETITONER'SRESPONSE
TO RULE 60(b) MOTION

Case No. 114500103

v.

GEORGE A. SANDUSKY,

Judge Kara Pettit

Respondent.

COMES NOW, Respondent, George Sandusky, ("George") by and through his counsel of
record, Elizabeth A. Shaffer, and files his reply to Petitioner's Response and Memorandum in
Opposition to Respondent's Rule 60(b) motion as follows:
Petitioner does not address or contradict the interpretation and distribution outlined by
Respondent in his motion. Stating only, Respondent '"continues, as the court found and held in
its order of November, 2015, to miscomprehend the court's order and to make incorrect
statements." (Petitioner's Response to Respondent's third Rule 60(b) motion, P.7.) The Court's
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order of November 6, 2015 referenced specifically the distribution of $310,000 in cash proceeds
at issue in Respondent's Emergency Motion. Petitioner does not identify how the respondent's
interpretation and distribution outlined in his motion miscomprehends the Court's orders nor
does Petitioner put forth an alternative interpretation.

Yet, Petitioner continues to demand

amounts in excess of an equal distribution of the assets without foundation.
A timely appeal has been filed to preserve respondent's interests. However, it is not
possible to know the precise grounds for appeal when the Court's final orders are interpreted
differently by both sides. Petitioner, by her demands asserts distribution in excess of an equal

~
I'

~

I

I

division of the assets leading to a windfall in distributions to petitioner 1•

Respondent seeks a

fair and equitable interpretation of the distribution of the assets consistent with the Court's orders
and the parties' assets.
Petitioner makes a claim of inequity and unfairness in her response without any argument

rn
IJ.j

or grounds for such claims. Seeking further interpretation of this Court's orders consistent with
previous orders is not prejudicial. The parties' understanding and positions regarding the Court's

~
.
'

intended distribution remain at odds.
The Order of July 23, 2015 contained error, acknowledged by the Court on November 2,
2015. Specifically, that the cash funds attributed to the 10 lots awarded to respondent should be
distributed to respondent prior to equally dividing the balance of the financial accounts. This

rn

~

lf7

iJ

1 See Petitioner's proposed order tiled December 7. 2015. regarding the Nov. 2, 2015 hearing. wherein she seeks judgment of an
additional amount of$585.537.30 in addition to the $310.000 cash distribution and ··not including personal property expressly
stated in the separation agreement or alimony".

2
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mistake skewed the distribution numbers indicated by the Court order back in July. Likewise,
the lump sum payment to petitioner should be distributed from the marital financial accounts
prior to equally dividing the balance of the financial accounts. This distribution reduces the total
financial accounts at the time of trial in the amount of $865,224.72 by the $335,000 cash

•
0
C

proceeds awarded to respondent for the IO lots and the $368,000 lump sum payment to the
petitioner2 leaving the balance in the financial accounts to be equally divided between the
parties. Petitioner was then ordered to account for $45,000 in funds that she took in June 2011,
and those funds in her personal Chase account reducing petitioner's share of the financial
accounts and increasing respondent's share in the like amount3. This distribution is consistent
with the Court's analysis of equal distribution in its order in July and remains consistent with the

•

Court's subsequent amended orders.
excess of an equitable distribution.

0
C

Any other distribution ends in a windfall to petitioner, in

Petitioner continues to insist on distributions in excess of ¾ of the marital assets,
notwithstanding the Court's equal awards.

Petitioner received a $310,000 cash distribution to

date, notwithstanding the Court acknowledgment in its written order, the amount is in excess of
the amount of petitioner's share of the financial accounts. However, this amount identified in the
Court's Nov. 6 order does not account for the lump sum payment petitioner was awarded being

The issue of past due alimony, the amount, when and ifan election for the lump sum payment was made remains in dispute and
Respondent does not waive his position on the issue. The election question required clarification at oral argument on November
2. 2105 when the court indicated that a determination on the issued could not be made at that time. This is one basis of the
respondent's Rule 60 motion. Notwithstanding. this dispute, respondent's distribution permits full distribution of the lump sum
amount petitioner indicates she elects as of Jan. l, 2016. leaving open the disputed question of back alimony.
3 See respondent's motion and table on page 6.
2

3
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distributed prior to the equal distribution of the financial accounts. The numbers identified by
the Court remain inconsistent with the prior orders and clarification is required.
Petitioner's lump sum payment per the addendum to the separation agreement is a lump
sum payment that terminates the monthly alimony payments identified in the separation
agreement. There is no dispute that the parties elected the lump sum payment4• As such, this
lump sum payment should be deducted from the financial accounts of the parties prior to the
equal distribution of the remaining balance in the financial accounts. The parties were both
retired when they moved to Park City and remained retired at the time of the divorce trial. As a
result, their assets remain fixed consisting of primarily cash in bank accounts (value $865,224.74
at the time of trial) and the real property identified as the Foo house and Lot (value of $428,500
at the time of trial). The Court ordered an equal division of the real property and an equal
division of the financial accounts and awarded both sides essentially equal personal property in
cars, retirement accounts, 10 lots to respondent and monthly alimony or a lump sum cash
payment to petitioner. All amounting to what the Court identified was an "equal division" and
"equitable" pursuant to Utah law, giving deference to the parties' separation agreement.
Respondent's distribution follows the equal and equitable distribution the Court outlined,
acknowledging the separateness of petitioner's separate lump sum payment and respondent's
award of the proceeds attributed to the sale of the lots. Petitioner continues to assert that she is
entitled to more than the equal distribution the Court intended and plugs in numbers to a
It is undisputed that payment has been elected by one or both sides at least as of this date. even though the exact date and time
for such election remain in dispute.

4

4
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distribution pattern amounting to three quarters of the total assets and/or more assets than exist in
the marital estate.
Petitioner's emphasis on Menzies v. Galetka is misplaced. Menzies is a criminal case,
involving a death sentence and petition for post trail conviction relief on the basis of ineffective
assistance of counsel. The Utah Supreme Court's analysis regarding the defendant's Rule 60(b)
motion was premised on the availability of relief sought by defendant through other means,
specifically constitutional relief based on the ineffective assistance of counsel. Menzies is not
applicable to this case where respondent seeks clarification of the Court's orders consistent with
its prior orders.
More accurately, the Utah Court of Appeals, in Robinson v. Baggett, 263 P.3d 411, 688
Utah Adv. Rep. 392011, UT App 250 (August 4, 2011 ). a divorce action, held specifically, "rule
60(b) is an equitable rule that allows courts to balance the competing "concerns that final
judgments should not be lightly disturbed and that unjust judgments should not be allowed to
stand." Citing Laub v. South Cent. Tel. Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1982). The Court of
Appeals also noted, 12 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice§ 60.02 [2] (3d ed.
1999) (providing that rule 60(b) allows "a court to grant relief from a judgment in circumstances
in which the need for truth outweighs the value of finality in litigation"). Indeed, ''[t]he
allowance of a vacation of judgment is a creature of equity designed to relieve against harshness
of enforcing a judgment, which may occur through procedural difficulties, the wrongs of the
opposing party, or misfortunes which prevent the presentation of a claim or defense." Boyce v.

5
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Boyce, 609 P .2d 928, 931 (Utah 1980); see also id. at 931-32 ("A liberal standard for application

of Rule 60(b) in divorce cases is justified by the doctrine of the continuing jurisdiction that a

~

divorce court has over its decrees. Clearly, a court should modify a prior decree when the

~
'

interests of equity ... require."). We are convinced that this case presents sufficiently exceptional

'

~

circumstances to justify equitable relief, despite Husband's failure to present all known grounds

.

'

rn

u.1

tn
lW

~
'

for relief in his First Rule 60(b) Motion." Id. at 421.
Equity and equality are the canons set forth by the Court in its prior orders.

The

distribution outlined by respondent in his motion and uncontroverted by petitioner follows the
Court's sound reasoning.

Because the parties disagree as to the final distribution,

'

notwithstanding amendments and clarifications made by the Court, a final interpretation by the
Court of the intended distribution is required to bring this case to a close.

f)
~

~

CONCLUSION

I

'

Based on the foregoing, the Court's prior and amended orders, respondent requests
distribution of the assets as outlined in his motion; that election of the lump sum payment date
back to petitioner's election of partial payment in June 2011 or at least, respondent's agreement

rn

~

ITT

~

to place the $310,000 into trust and no award of past due alimony is warranted.
Dated this 22 nd day of December, 2015.
Isl Elizabeth A. Shaffer (digitally)
Elizabeth A. Shaffer
Attorney for Respondent

I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this the 22ND day of December, 2015 a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Reply to Petitioner's Response in Opposition to Respondent's Rule 60(b) Motion was
filed via the Court's electronic filing system which automatically delivered service to the
following:
Paul J. Morken
P.O. Box 980691
Park City, UT 84098

Isl C. Kramer
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KYLEEJ. SANDUSKY,
Petitioner
vs.
GEORGE A. SANDUSKY,
Respondent

~
'

.

.

~

ORDER ON:
1. PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR THE
COURT TO CORRECT MISTAKES,
AND TO ALTER OR AMEND THE
COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACTS
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ITS DIVORCE DECREE AND
JUDGMENT, ENTERED ON JULY
23, 2015.
2. RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL AND RELIEF FROM
ORDER, AND FOR EXTENSION OF
TIME TO SUPPLEMENT BRIEF.

.

~
I

'

.

Case No.: 114500103
Judge: Kara L. Pettit
Commissioner: T. Patrick Casey

~

.

I

r,

~

~

This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Judge Kara L. Pettit presiding, on November 2,
2015. The court having reviewed (i) Petitioner's Motion and Supporting Memorandum under Rule 52 (b),

. '
.

Rule 59 (e) and Rule 60 (b), to Correct Mistakes, and to Alter or Amend the Court's Findings of Facts and
Conclusions of Law and Its Divorce Decree and Judgment, Entered on July 23, 2015; and, (ii) Respondent's

WI

~

~
'

' .

!fl
~

Motion and Memorandum under Rule 59 (a) (5), (6) and (7) and Rule 60 (b) (1) and (6) for a New Trial,
Amendment of Judgment and Motion for Relief from Order and Motion for Extension of Time to
Supplement Brief, and the Court having reviewed her trial notes and admitted exhibits, and having heard
arguments by each counseL and the Court having allowed and considered the supplemental briefing of the
parties filed on November 20, 2015. December 4. 2015 and December 11. 2015. as well as Respondent's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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December 14, 2015 Objections to Petitioner's proposed form of Order, and having being fully advised in the

~

premises and for good cause appearing, the Court now makes and enters its Findings and Order as follows:
1. The Court finds, and the parties agree, that they were married on November I, 1986, not November

~

10, 1986. Thus, the Court corrects its mistake and amends its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

~

Law ("FFCL") and Decree of Divorce ("DD") accordingly.
2. The Court partially grants Petitioner's motion as to the following: (i) The Court agrees that it was a

~

mistake and an accounting error to deduct the $90,000 that Petitioner had previously withdrawn from

~

~
~
~
~
~
~

~

D
~

~
~

~
~
• - - • • - - • r\t::

a marital account, from the final sum of marital assets to be distributed to Petitioner. The $90,000 was
marital property and thus 50% would have been awarded to Petitioner. Thus, only $45,000 should be
deducted from the final sum of marital assets to be distributed to Petitioner, not $90,000; and, the
Court's FFCL and DD are corrected and amended accordingly.
3. The Court denies Petitioner's motion as to the following: ,r3, ,rs, ,I6, ,r7, and ,rs of
Petitioner's motion regarding certain of the parties' assets that no longer existed at the time of trial (the
$450,000 proceeds from the Bishop Hard money loan, the smart car, the tractor and the tax refunds).
As set forth in the FFCL, the Court assessed the values and distributed those assets that existed at the
time of trial. Because the assets referred to in Petitioner's motion had already been converted to cash
and no longer existed at the time of trial, they have already been accounted for as part of the financial
accounts. The Court's order both included such proceeds in the order and determined that such
proceeds were accounted for in the final accounts. The record does not have a complete accounting of
funds between March 20 IO to the date of the trial. Thus, the Court will not add in an additional
amount for assets that did not exist at the time of trial.
4. Re:

,r 4 of Petitioner's motion -

the Court denies that portion of Petitioner's motion because

Respondent testified that he had attempted to sell the Foo house and lot at the higher price and was
unsuccessful and that he did not receive any offers at that price. Also, the tax assessment was not an
admitted exhibit and as a result cannot be considered. The Court affirms its valuation of the Foo
house and lot in the FFCL and DD.
5. Re:

,r 9 of Petitioner's
-- W.
theHunter
Court
denies
reliefClark
andLaw
confirms
its prior ruling regarding the
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deficiency judgment related to the Mednick hard money loan and interest and that such deficiency
along with any accrued interest recovered will be equally divided between the parties if/when it is
collected or satisfied.
6. Re: 110 of Petitioner's motion-the Court hereby clarifies any ambiguity in its FFCL and DD
pertaining to alimony. The Court confirms its FFCL that the evidence demonstrated that Respondent
paid Petitioner $2,000 per month in alimony from March 2010 through June 2011 (total of $32,000).
The Court further affirms its finding that Petitioner is entitled to receive her $2,000/month alimony
since July 2011, and that from July 201 I through July 2015, Respondent has not paid any alimony.
Thus, from July 2011 through July 2015, Respondent owes Petitioner $96,000 (48 months x $2,000)
in back payments of alimony. No evidence was presented at trial that either party has elected to
terminate the monthly alimony payments by requesting or making a lump sum payment of $400,000
(net of alimony payments made to date). Respondent argued at the November 2, 2015 hearing that
the $310,000 in the attorney trust account purportedly was the lump sum payment for alimony.
However, no such evidence was presented at trial, and the STIPULATION, MOTION AND
CONSENT ORDER filed with the Court on 5/14/13 when the funds were set aside in the trust
account does not state anything about the funds being some portion of the $400,000 lump sum
payment or that any election had been made for a lump sum payment. Thus, the Court affirms its
finding that as of July 2015, Respondent was obligated to pay alimony of $2,000/month to Petitioner
unless and until one of the parties elects the lump sum payment, and the payments were past due as of
July 2011 through July 2015 for a total of $96,000 owed in past due alimony as of July 2015.
Petitioner has further argued that Respondent paid the $32,000 for alimony with marital funds and
that Petitioner should be credited with 50% of those funds and thus Respondent should only be given credit
for paying $16,000 in alimony from March 20 IO through June 2011. The Court denies such request finding
that the record is devoid of an accounting of the source of any of such payments.
7. Regarding Respondenfs motion and memorandum; (i) the Court grants Respondent's motion
regarding an extension of time to file a memorandum. Respondent has submitted such memorandum, and this
order rules on Respondent's
supporting
memorandum,
asLaw
well
as the
supplemental briefing filed
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after the November 2, 2015 hearing;

~

(ii) the Court agrees that it made a mistake by not excluding the lot proceeds ($335,000) from the
LAFCU account #7833400. The court awarded such proceeds from the sale of the lots to Respondent as per

~

the terms of the separation agreement, but it mistakenly did not separate those proceeds from the balance of

~

the funds in account #7833400. Thus, the Court grants Respondent's motion under Rule 59 (a)(6) as to those
funds only and allocates to Respondent as his separate property the proceeds from the sale of the lots

~

($335,000) from such account.

~

(iii) Respondent asserts that the evidence demonstrated that the $305,000 in loans or monies
transferred by Respondent into his sister's account ($230,000), to his niece ($35,000), and to M.

~

Anderson($40,000) from the parties' marital financial accounts have been repaid. Neither Respondent nor

~
~

~
~
~

~

~

C
~
~
~
~
1 - - .. - - •

Petitioner has cited any evidence admitted at trial, either in the form of testimony or exhibits, that the sister
returned or repaid the $230,000 or that the niece or M. Anderson repaid their debts. The Court allowed
supplemental briefing for the express purpose of providing Respondent the opportunity to cite to the specific
testimony or exhibits received at trial that would demonstrate the loans were repaid. Respondent did not cite
to any trial evidence that supports these particular loans were repaid. The Respondent's deposition was not
offered nor received as a trial exhibit, and the portion of the deposition that was published during
Respondent's testimony does not establish that the loans were repaid. Moreover, the evidence at trial did not
demonstrate that loans were made from Respondent's separate property, as he now alleges; to the contrary
the evidence at trial demonstrated that the loans were made from funds that were commingled and were not
segregated. Additionally, no evidence was presented at trial to demonstrate that the any particular portion of
the loans were used to pay for marital expenses; neither side produced evidence of tracings or sufficient
accounting of their funds between the time of the Separation Agreement and trial.
(iv) the Court denies Respondent's motion as to all other claims and his motions under Rule 59 (a) (5)
and (7) and Rule 60 (b) (1) and (6) are denied. Thus, the Court denies Respondent's Motion for New Trial,
Amendment of Judgment and Motion for Relief from Order except (i) as to the $335,000 in lot proceeds as
specified above, and, (ii) allowing Respondent an extension of time to file a memorandum in support of his
motion.
nr:

l'\r\,41:- r\A,AA
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8. Based on the corrections and amendments noted above, the Court corrects and amends the
Table on page 36 of the FFCL and DD as follows:
ASSETS

PETITIONER

RESPONDENT

Hawaii Credit Union

$166,694 X 50% = $83,347

$83,347

Los Angeles Fireman's Credit Union
Account #783340 I

860.59 X 50% = $430.25

$430.25

Los Angeles Firemen's Credit Union
Account #7833400; all three share
accounts (SI, S7 and S8)

$345,020 - $335,000 for
lots = $10,020 x 50% =
$5,010

$5,010

Chase Bank Account

$2,400.22
$1,200.11

$1,200.11

Mountain America Credit Union

$250 X 50%

$ in Respondent's Safety Deposit
Box

$40,000 X 50% = $20,000

Attorney Trust Account

$310,000
$155,000

TOTAL

$265,112.36

50% =

X

=

$125

$125

$20,000

fl
~

17:

X

50% =

$155,000

~

D

$265,112.36

'

'

•

The Court affirms its findings as set forth in the Table on page 37, and confirms that Respondent's share of

I

'

the $305,000 in loans to Respondent's sister, niece and M. Anderson totals $152,500. Furthermore, the Court
corrects and amends the findings at the top of page 3 7 as follows:
"To effectuate the distribution of the $265,112.36 plus the $152,500, for a total of $417,612.36, to Petitioner
from the funds that are within Respondent's control. and/or to pay the $96,000 in past due alimony as of July
2015, Petitioner should receive the entire $310,000 that is in the attorney trust account before the close of
business on November 6, 2015. The Court takes no position as to whether the $310,000 should be first
applied to past due alimony. or to the equitable distribution of the parties marital assets. The Court simply
notes that the total amount owed by Respondent to Petitioner, excluding the Foo House and Lot, is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

summarized as follows: $265.112.36 (1/2 of financial accounts) plus $152,500 (1/2 ofloans) plus $96,000
(past due alimony July 2011 to July 2015) LESS $2,650.22 (She has control of the Chase and MACU
accounts) LESS $45,000 (She has already taken $90,000 from the former Hawaii account, and $45,000 of
this needs to be accounted for)= $465.962.14. Therefore, after receipt of the $310,000 from the attorney
trust account she is still owed $155,962.14, which does not include any distribution for the Foo House and
Lot. that will be dealt with separately below."
9. At the hearing on November 2, 2015, the parties raised the prospect of treating the Foo House and
Lot differently than the other marital assets. Based upon the discussion with counsel at the hearing,
Respondent has 30 days from November 2, 2015 by which to elect to buy Petitioner out of her half of the Foo
House and Lot ($214,250). If he elects to do so, he shall pay Petitioner $214,250 30 days after the election
deadline. If Respondent elects not to buy Petitioner's half interest in the Foo House and Lot after the 30 days,
the Foo House and Lot shall be listed for sale with an agreed upon real estate agent and at an agreed upon
price between the parties.
10. Other than the above corrections and or amendments the FFCL and DD continue to remain in
effect.

**Court's Electronic Signature is Affixed at the Top of the First Page***

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 - - • • - - . I'\~

"'l'\-4

r.

l'\-4, A

,4

All JI

Elizabeth A. Shaffer #06796
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC
4580 N Silver Springs Drive Suite 100
Telephone: (453) 655-3033
Fax: (435) 655-3233
Email: eshafter@.Jaµ,varkcity.com
Attorney for Respondent, George Sandusky

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
(6300 Justice Court Road, Park City, Utah 84098)

KYLEE J. SANDUSKY,

Petitioner
V.

GEORGE A. SANDUSKY,

Respondent.

RULE 62 MOTION
FOR STAY OF EXECUTION OF
JUDGMENT PENDING APPEAL AND
WAIVER OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND OR
IN THE ALTERNATIVE APPROVAL OF
ALTERNATE SECURITY IN LIEU OF
SUPERSEDEAS BOND
Case No. 114500103

Judge Kara Pettit

COMES NOW, Respondent, George Sandusky, ("George") by and through his counsel of
record, Elizabeth A. Shaffer, and pursuant to Rule 62(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
respectfully requests that this Court issue a Stay of Proceedings to Enforce a Judgment Pending
Appeal of the Orders and Judgments of this Court in the above captioned matter and Waiver of
Supersedeas Bond or, in the Alternative Approval of Alternate Security in Lieu of Supersedeas
Bond as follows:
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INTRODUCTION

.

rn

Respondent requests a stay of the proceedings to further enforce judgment of this Court

~

beyond that which has been paid to date, specifically the $31 Ok paid to Petitioner, the $214,250
funds offered to Petitioner for her interest in the Foo House and Lot. Staying further distribution
of the Court's orders pursuant to January 5, 2016 in the amount of $155,962.14 and any further
orders of the Court without supersedeas bond, or in the alternative permit an alternate form of

~

.I

security, specifically, the amount of $155,962.14 be held in trust with the Court or Respondent's

W1

counsel and to the extent that additional security is required , that the real property identified as

'1

the "Foo House and Lot" be considered sufficient security in lieu of supersedeas bond.
BACKGROUND

rn

~

On July 23, 2015 the Court entered its Decree of Divorce and Judgment following a 3

C
I

'

~
.

.

~

day trial. The parties each filed post-trial Motions' that were heard on November 2, 2015
wherein the Court entered a ruling from the bench and its final written order on January 5, 2016 .
As part of the oral ruling, the Court acknowledged mistakes in the prior July Order, specifically

.

.

~

regarding $335,000 in cash proceeds from the sale of IO lots awarded to Respondent as his
separate property.

The Court ordered the amount of $335,000 be distributed to Respondent

from the marital bank accounts, prior to the equal division of the financial accounts to the parties.
The Court also issued a written Order on November 6, 2015, requiring distribution of $310,000

~
.

.

to Petitioner. Petitioner received the distribution on the same date .
The Orders of the Court were automatically stayed pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The assets of
the parties remained status quo pending final Orders from the Court regarding specific distribution instructions.

1

2

[f1
~
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On December 2, 2015, Respondent advised Petitioner of his election to buy out her 50%
interest of the Foo house and lot ($214,250) pursuant to Court order. Thereafter respondent

.

~

.

transferred the money to his attorney's trust account. On December 3, 2016, Petitioner's counsel

~
.

'

advised that he wished a closing date before the end of December which was acknowledged and
agreed to by Respondent. 2 Thereafter, Petitioner refused to sign a quit claim deed relinquishing
any interest she has in the real property pursuant to the Decree of Divorce. Petitioner did not

If]
~
If]

~

If]
~

~

2 Liz•· I have received your notice re the FOO house. Kylee will sign the release and quitclaim deed upon George's compliance with the order
pertaining to the proceeds from the Foo house. We can set up a closing date at the end of December.
Paul
On Wed, Dec 2, 2015 at 7:56 PM, <cshaffcrra:lawparkcitv.com> wrote:
Paul;
George wishes to exercise his right to buy out Kylee's 50% interest in the Foo House and Lot for the amount of$214,250. I will send over the
Release and Quit Claim deed in the morning.
Regards,
Eli=abeth A. 511a/fer

.

~

Elizabeth A Shaffer. PLLC
4580 N. Silver Springs Drive. Suite I 00
Park City. Utah 84098
T: <435 l 655-3033
F: <435) 655-3233
esh aflcr:ir Iawpark cit v.com

IT7

CONFIDENTIAL NOTICE: This message is intended for the named recipient only. Jfyou receive this email by mistake please advise me
immediately and destroy the contents. This email may contain privileged information and said privilege is not intended to be waived in any way.

.

I .

~

~
.

'

Paul J. Morken, PLLC
Paul J. Morken
Attorney & Counselor at Law
P.O. Box 980691
Park City, Utah 84098
Telephone: 435.659.1685
Facsimile: 435.658.9163
E-mail: paulm(>rken 'ii' umail. com
NOTICE: This e-mail message (including all attachments transmitted with it, if any) is intended solely for the use of the addressee and may
contain legally privileged and confidential information. If you are not the person to whom this e-mail is addressed, or an employee or agent
responsible for delivering this message to the person to whom it is addressed. you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution,
copying, or other use of this message or its attachments is strictly prohibited. If you have received this e-mail in error. plea~e notify the sender
immediately by e-mail reply, and then please delete this e-mail, together with any attachments to it, from your computer.
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thereafter set up a closing date and there has been no transfer of the funds as of this date .

'

However the funds remain available.
The Court recently entered its ruling regarding the outstanding "withdrawals/loans"
referenced in the original order of July, 23, 2015 finding that the transfer of funds remain

~
'

outstanding and ordered that the amount of $305k be split equally between the parties; requiring

'

Respondent to pay to Petitioner one half of this amount. The Court ordered that $155,962.14 is
owed to Petitioner3•

~
.

'

~

A notice of appeal pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate procedure

.

'

was filed on December 15 2015.

~
'

ARGUMENT

.

A. LegalStandard

~

Rule 62(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires an automatic stay in the

.

'

~
.

.

.

~

execution of judgment for 14 days following the entry of judgment. "No execution or other writ
to enforce a judgment may issue until the expiration of 14 days after entry of judgment, unless
the court in its discretion otherwise directs.'' This automatic stay allows time for the parties to

.

.

'

~
'

file post-trial motions.

.

fl
liiJ

3

Respondent's counsel was out of the office on vacation the week of Jan. 4, 2016. Upon notification of the Court's
Order, Respondent is forwarding the funds. Receipt of the funds have not been received, but are anticipated.
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A stay pending a disposition of post-trial motions, is in the Court's discretion but should
be granted by the Court when "such conditions for the security of the adverse party as are
proper". Utah R. Civ. P. 62(b). The court temporarily grants a stay of execution in order to
prevent injustice. Taylor National, Inc. v. Jensen Bros. Constr. Co., 641 P.2d 150 (Utah 1982).
Equitable relief from the enforcement of a judgment is granted when "some injustice would
result were execution not stayed." Palmquist v. Palmquist, 6 Utah 2d 294 (1957). Post-trial
motions remain pending before the Court.
Rule 62 (d) provides an automatic stay of enforcement of a judgment upon motion and
posting a supersedeas bond. "When an appeal is taken~ the appellant by giving a supersedeas
bond may obtain a stay, unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited by law or these rules. The
bond may be given at or after the time of filing the notice of appeal. The stay is effective when
the supersedeas bond is approved by the court:' The Court also upon motion and good cause
shown may permit a deposit of money in Court or other security to be given in lieu of giving a
supersedeas bond. A stay is not prohibited by law or these rules in this case.

A. This Court Should Stay the Execution of the Judgment Pending Post-Trial Motions
And Appeal.

Respondent requests a stay of further execution of judgment pending the disposition of
the post-trial motions and pending appeal. Respondent has deposited and made available the
$214,250 payment for the petitioner's 50% interest in the real property. Respondent is placing in

5
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trust $155,962.14 pursuant to the Court's recent order. Deposit of these funds, in addition to the
previous distribution of $310,000 substantially satisfy the judgment.
There remains pending before the Court a post trial motion regarding further
distributions. Without final judgment on all pending matters, there is no final order. Petitioner
has filed contempt charges against Respondent and asks that he be incarcerated alleging he has
not complied with the Court orders. The facts are contrary. There is no dispute that Respondent
provided distribution of $310,000 as ordered by the Court; advised petitioner of his election to
purchase her 50% interest in the real property as ordered by the Court; deposited the purchase
funds within 30 days of his election as ordered by the Court; agreed to set up a closing as
requested by petitioner's counsel. And upon notice of the court's most recent order, made
arrangements to send to his counsel the amount owed to petitioner of $155,962.14. Permitting
execution of judgment not final is premature and a stay is necessary to preserve the status quo.
To the extent that respondent is required to pay additional judgment amounts, he cannot
do so quickly. It is undisputed that he is retired on a fixed income. The remaining assets held by
him are not liquid assets. The Foo House and lot, is the only viable asset available to Respondent to satisfy any further judgment that may be required. Notwithstanding respondent's arguments that petitioner elected the lump sum payment in June 2011 or May 2013, Petitioner has
indicated that she elects the lump sum pursuant to the parties' separation agreement, thereby
foregoing and terminating $2,000 per month alimony. Respondent does not have the ability to
post the bond in excess of $155,962.14.

6
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Continued execution of judgment in which a significant amount of money remains disputed on appeal and further distributions would not be able to be undone in the event the posttrial motions and appeal are decided differently. Therefore, Respondent would be irrevocably
injured by the continued execution of the judgments pending disposition of all post-trial motions
~

and appeal. Rule 62 (b) speaks directly to this issue.

The decision to stay enforcement of a

judgment is within the discretion of the reviewing court. See Utah Resources Intern., Inc. v.

Mark Technologies C01p., 2014, 2014 UT 60, 2014 WL 7273804.

B. The Court Should Waive the Supersedeas Bond and Permit an Alternative Form of
Security.
"[T]he purpose of a supersedeas bond is to protect the non-appealing parties by maintaining
the status quo during the appeal and insuring that those who have obtained the judgment under
review will not be prejudiced by a stay of the judgment pending final determination of the appeal."). See generally 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review,§ 441 (1995). There is little relevant guidance on Rule 62 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, Rule 62 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure is substantially similar to Rule 62 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Therefore, the Court may look to how federal courts have interpreted Rule 62 for guidance.
"District courts, however, have inherent discretionary authority in setting supersedeas bonds."

Miami Int'/ Realty Co. v. Paynter, 807 F.2d 871, 873(10th Cir. 1986) citing Texaco, Inc., v.
Pennzoil Company, 784 F.2d 1133, 1154, 1155 (2d Cir.1986), the court stated:
A judgment creditor's primary concern when a judgment in his favor is stayed
pending appeal is that he be "secure ... from loss resulting from the stay of execution .... " In making that determination we look to general equitable principles. Accordingly, when setting supersedeas bonds courts seek to protect judgment credi7

[l
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tors as fully as possible without irreparably injuring judgment debtors .... A full
supersedeas bond may be required "where there is some reasonable likelihood of
the judgment debtor's inability or unwillingness to satisfy the judgment in full upon ultimate disposition of the case and where posting adequate security is practicable", whereas no bond or a reduced bond would suffice when the creditor's interest, due to unusual circumstances, would not be unduly endangered ....
See: Wunschel & Small, Inc., v. United States, 554 F.Supp. 444-45 (U.S.Cl.Ct.1983) (Rule 62(d)

does not preclude the court from issuing a stay without a bond or upon the posting of a partial
bond); Miami Int'/ Realty Co. supra at 873.
This is precisely the kind of case in which the Court should exercise its discretion, and
grant a stay pursuant to Rule 62( d), waive the bond requirement and permit alternative security.
A monetary bond is unnecessary, since the stay itself preserves the status quo. Petitioner has
received a significant distribution of the judgment to date; additional cash judgment funds will be
placed in trust and respondent has real property available to secure further judgment.
Rule 62 (i)(2) provides that upon motion and good cause shown, the court may permit a
deposit of money in court or other security to be given in lieu of giving a supersedeas bond under
Subdivision (d). It is appropriate for the Court to exercise its discretion to dispense with the
bond requirement, or fashion an alternative bond based on the financial circumstances of the
parties. See Miami Int'/ Realty Co. v. Paynter, 807 F.2d 871 (I 0th Cir.1986) (looking at whether
(I) "there is a showing that the prevailing party's judgment will not be jeopardized" or (2) "a
[full] bond is impracticable [and other] adequate security is provided"). Petitioner has received
much of the judgment amount and Respondent agrees to deposit additional funds covering 75%
of the judgment. The balance of any remaining judgment owed will be sufficiently secured with

8
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no bond and alternate security in the form of the cash and the real property of respondent
pending appeal.
The 1995 amendments to Utah Rule 62 regarding Subdivision (i) was substantially
rewritten to define the requirements for both commercial and personal supersedeas bonds and to
allow the court to permit a cash deposit or other fom1 of security in lieu of a supersedeas bond.
The committee concluded that individual circumstances will determine the degree to which a
particular form of security may be affected by bankruptcy. financial instability or other
uncertainty, and that the court should be given broad discretion to permit such forms of security
as the facts may require. The partial judgment funds received by petitioner to date and deposit of
additional cash funds by respondent and the real property of respondent are sufficient security to
protect and insure judgment pending appeal.
Respondent urges this Court to find that he is entitled to a stay as a matter of right under
Rule 62 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and further that this Court should exercise its
discretion to waive the supersedeas bond requirement of Rule 62(d) or in the alternative permit

-··

i
~

I
i
~

an alternative bond of cash deposits of $155,962.14 and/or if required, real property security in
the Foo House and Lot as appropriate and satisfactory security pending appeal.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent seeks an Order staying the further execution and
enforcement of judgments pending his appeal, a waiver of supersedeas bond and approval of
alternative security in lieu of supersedeas bond as outlined herein.
9

i
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DATED: January 11, 2016
Respectfully submitted,
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC
By: Isl Elizabeth A. Shaffer (digitally)
Elizabeth A. Shaffer
Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this the I I th day of January, 2016 a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Rule 62(d) Motion for Stay of Execution ofjudgment and waiver ofSupersedeas Bond or in The
Alternative Approval ofAlternative Security in Lieu ofSupersedeas Bond Pending Appeal was
filed via the Court's electronic filing system which automatically delivered service to the
following:
Paul J. Morken
P.O. Box 980691
Park City, UT 84098
Isl E. Shaffer
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Elizabeth A. Shaffer #06796
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC
4580 N Silver Springs Drive Suite I 00
Telephone: (453) 655-3033
Fax: (435) 655-3233
Email: eshaffer@lawparkcity.com
Attorney for Respondent, George Sandusky

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
(6300 Justice Court Road, Park City, Utah 84098)

KYLEE J. SANDUSKY,

Petitioner

v.
GEORGE A. SANDUSKY,

Respondent.

REPLY TO PETITIONER'S OPPOSITION
TO RESPONDENT'S RULE 62 MOTION
FOR STAY OF EXECUTION OF
JUDGMENT PENDING APPEAL AND
WAIVER OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND OR
IN THE ALTERNATIVE APPROVAL OF
ALTERNATE SECURITY IN LIEU OF
SUPERSEDEAS BOND

Case No. 114500103
Judge Kara Pettit

COMES NOW, Respondent, George Sandusky, ("George") by and through his counsel of
record, Elizabeth A. Shaffer, and files his Reply to Petitioner's Response and Memorandum in
Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Stay of Proceedings to Enforce a Judgment Pending
Appeal and Motion for Alternative Security in Lieu of Supersedeas Bond as follows:
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1.

Judgment in his Motion for New Trial, Amendment of Judgement and Motion for Relief from
Order filed on August 6, 2015.

~

~

Rule 62(b) permits the Court, in its discretion, to stay the

execution of a judgment pending disposition of a motion for new trial or to alter or amend a
judgment made pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for relief from a judgment or order made
pursuant to Rule 60, or for additional findings pursuant to Rule 52(b). All post-trial motions,
filed by Respondent sought this relief giving the Court the discretion to stay the initial Order and
Judgment. The assets remained status quo throughout all of the post-trial Motions.
2.

Both parties asked for clarification and amendment of the July 23, 2015 Order

under those provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as outlined in Rule 62(b). The
original Order and Judgment was amended and mistakes were acknowledged, significantly
changing the original Order.
3.

Respondent reasonably relied on the Separation Agreement in his dealings since

the parties' separation and he was not sinister in doing so, particularly in light of the fact that the
Court found the Agreement to be valid and enforceable (See Court's July 23, 2015 Decree of
Divorce).
4.

il

Contrary to Petitioner's arguments in ~8, Respondent did request relief from

Respondent has followed all of the Court's Orders to date and there have been no

findings by the Court of any improper conduct, misappropriation of funds, or dissipation of
assets at any time during the marriage or throughout the duration of this case. In fact, evidence is
to the contrary. Respondent immediately paid Petitioner following the Order clarification and
2

iJ
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correction of mistakes at the November 2, 2015 hearing. The Court has no reason to believe that
Respondent will not continue follow the Orders of this Court.
5.

Respondent paid Petitioner the $310,000 on November 6, 2015, which covered all

past due alimony and alimony owed from lump sum election ($272,000) and also covers part of
the effectuation of the parties' marital assets ($38,000). Petitioner is attempting to manipulate
this distribution for her own benefit to say it does not cover the full amount owed for alimony so
she can collect additional money for interest and attempt to find Respondent in contempt, when
in fact the Court ruled otherwise. In the Court's January 5, 2016 Order, Judge Pettit stated, "The
Court takes no position as to whether the $310.000 should be first applied to past due alimony, or
to the equitable distribution of the parties [sic] marital assets." Respondent is not in violation of
any Court order to date.
6.

Petitioner consented to and permitted Respondent's control of the marital funds

throughout the marriage and throughout the Divorce proceedings. She did not seek any
temporary Orders from the Court requiring the assets be handled otherwise. She also stipulated
to placing $3 I 0,000 in trust through the pendency of this Divorce action.
7.

Per the Court's Order, Respondent timely advised Petitioner of his election to buy

her portion of the Foo house and lot. He then immediately placed the $2 I 4,250.00 to pay
Petitioner in trust. Petitioner refused to sign Quitclaim Deed or set up closing date and time in
December of 20 I 5, stalling the completion of this transaction. Her own acts delayed the
exchange of documents and payment and the Court Ordered Petitioner to sign Quitclaim Deed
3
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and required tax documents at the hearing on January 15, 2016. The closing is now currently set
for Wednesday January 27, 2016.
8.

Aside from the monies held in trust that the Court has already awarded to

Petitioner, Respondent currently has approximately $50,000 left in liquid assets (See Declaration
of George A. Sandusky attached as "Exhibit A" herein). Therefore, he is unable to post the cash
bond the surety requires to obtain a supersedeas bond or that Petitioner is requesting.
9.

Ultimately, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court has

discretion to permit an alternative line of security so long as judgement creditor is protected upon
appeal. Petitioner has requested that Respondent be required to post a bond in the amount of
$545,873.08. Respondent has requested an alternative line of security of the Foo house and lot
($428,000.00) AND the $155,962.14 that is currently in the attorney trust account. The value of
this security totals $583,962.14, which exceeds the amount Petitioner is requesting and is more
than enough to cover the Judgement providing the judgment creditor protection upon appeal.
10.

If the Court does not waive further bond, or in the alternative, allow an alternate

line of security, Respondent will be prejudiced and unable to pursue the appeal he is entitled to.
DATED this 26 th day of January, 2016.
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC
By: Isl Elizabeth A. Shaffer (digitally)
Elizabeth A. Shaffer
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this the 26 th day of January, 2016 a true and correct copy of the foregoing

Reply to Petitioner's Response and Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Rule 62 Motion
was filed via the Court's electronic filing system which automatically delivered service to the
following:
Paul J. Morken
P.O. Box 980691
Park City, UT 84098

Isl C. Kramer
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3RD DISTRICT CT- SILVER SUMMIT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

~
.

.

.

D
.

KYLEE J SANDUSKY,
Petitioner,

RULING
ON FOO HOUSE BUY OUT

vs.
GEORGE A SANDUSKY,
Respondent.

Case No: 114500103
Judge: KARA PETTIT
Date:
January 29, 2016

Immediately upon Petitioners receipt of $214,250 from Respondent for the Foo house and
Lot, Petitioner shall give to Respondent a Quitclaim Deed deeding her interest in such
house and lot to Respondent. Petitioner's execution of the quitclaim deed does not
waive any rights she might have to execute upon the property in the future to satisfy
any unpaid judgments she may have.

~
.

.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for
case 114500103 by the method and on the date specified.
EMAIL:
EMAIL:

PAUL J MORKEN paulmorken@gmail.com
ELIZABETH A SHAFFER eshaffer@lawparkcity.com
01/29/2016

/s/ KARA PETTIT

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk

E
.

.
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Elizabeth A. Shaffer #06796
Elizabeth A. Shaffer PLLC
2041 Sidewinder Drive, Suite 2
Park City, Utah 84060
Telephone (435) 655-3033
Fax (435) 655-3233
eshaffer@lawparkcity.com
Attorney for Respondent

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

~

FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
(6300 Justice Court Road, Park City, Utah 84098)

~

~
~
~

KYLEE J. SANDUSKY,

Petitioner

v.
GEORGE A. SANDUSKY,

Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO
PETITIONER'S PROPOSED ORDER ON
MOTIONS HEARD ON JANUARY 15,
2016

Case No. 114500103
Judge Kara Pettit

C
~

i
~

~

Pursuant to Rule 7 (i)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Respondent hereby files
his Objection to the proposed order submitted to the Court on January 27, 2016 on the grounds
that the proposed Order does not accurately reflect the findings and Orders of the Court. This
matter came before the Court for hearing on January 15, 2016 on Respondent's Motion and
Supporting Memorandum under Rule 60 (b), filed on December 4, 2015. Respondent's
objection is based on the following:

~
~
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Respondent is entitled to an Order that accurately reflects the Court's ruling: "It is, of
course, a lawyer's duty and responsibility to prepare an order that accurately reflects the court's
ruling and a willful failure to do so would be a violation of professional ethics." In re Judd, 629
P.2d 43512 (Utah 1981 ). Petitioner's proposed order contains attempted additions of findings
and embellishments of the record, including opinions and commentary of counsel that are not
rulings made by the Court. Portions of the proposed Order were discussed before the Court at
the hearing on January 15, 2016 and Respondent wishes to preserve his objection for the record
as follows: The proposed Respondent objects to the order specifically as follows:
1.

Specifically with regard to paragraph# 1of Petitioner's proposed Order,

Respondent requests that the Motion and Order referenced by Petitioner be left to speak for itself
and not include any interpretations of Petitioner's counsel as to what each was "pertaining to."
Respondent motion filed on December 4, 2015 referred specifically to requested distribution of
the parties' assets and the "withdrawals/loans" referenced by the Court in prior rulings. Both the
motion and Order were broader than the "specified loans" referenced by Petitioner in the
proposed order and thus the Order should be modified accordingly.
2.

Similarly, in paragraph #2 of Petitioner's proposed Order, there are insertions of

arguments by counsel which were not actual rulings by this Court. Specifically, the Court found
that the Order of January 5, 2016 appeared to clear up any outstanding issue that was brought up
in Respondent's December 4 motion and ruled accordingly. Findings of what claims were
presented in prior Rule 60(b) motions and other motions filed by Respondent were not made and
again, it is best to let the motions speak for themselves. Likewise, the any findings of "what
2
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claims should have been made" were merely argument by Petitioner's counsel and not findings
of this Court. The Respondent's proposed order more accurately reflects the findings and Order
of the Court.
3.

Following arguments by counsel before the Court on January 15, 2016, the Court

drafted the language for the Order with respect to this particular issue and filed said paragraph.
Respondent reiterates his position before the Court that Petitioner's legal rights and remedies to
the extent that they may exist are not waived by Petitioner's execution of a quit claim deed at the
present time in exchange for Respondent's buy out of her 50% interest in the Foo House and Lot.
However, this acknowledgment by Respondent does not admit to or acknowledge any automatic
legal rights and remedies on the part of Petitioner related to any further judgment and that the
normal process and procedures to enforce any judgment are required and not waived.
4.

No objection.

5.

It was understood by Respondent that Petitioner's oral request to the Court was

merely a request for change of venue from Commissioner Casey to this Court. The Court
indicated that it was not prepared to make any such ruling on the request and this was the extent
of the Court's ruling and the Order should reflect only this. To the extent that Petitioner was
requesting from the Court that the required Contempt proceedings be circumvented and no
certification of contempt proceeding be required, Respondent would object to a circumvention of
the required process. Notwithstanding Petitioner's counsel's intent underlying the request, the
Court declined to hear any argument or consider the matter. This was the only order of the
Court.
3
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Respondent submits his proposed form of order herewith and based on the foregoing,
Respondent's proposed order should be entered. Petitioner's proposed order should be rejected
and/or amended to reflect more precisely the rulings of this Court.
Dated this 151 day of February, 2016.
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC

Elizabeth A. Shaffer (digitally signed)
Elizabeth A. Shaffer
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this 151 day of February, 2016 a true and correct copy of the foregoing
RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S PROPOSED ORDER ON MOTIONS

~
~

~

HEARD ON JANUARY 15, 2016 was filed via the Court's electronic filing system which
automatically delivered service to the following:
Paul J. Morken
P.O. Box 980691
Park City, UT 84098

~

Isl E. Shaffer

~

~
~

~
~
~
~
~

~
~
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Elizabeth A. Shaffer #06796
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC
4580 N Silver Springs Drive Suite 100
Telephone: (453) 655-3033
Fax: (435) 655-3233
Email: eshaffer@lawparkcity.com
Attorney for Respondent, George Sandusky

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

~
.

(6300 Justice Court Road, Park City, Utah 84098)

'

ITT

KYLEE J. SANDUSKY,

~

Petitioner

rn

UtJ

NOTICE OF POSTING PRESUMPTIVE
AMOUNT FOR STA Y OF JUDGEMENT

Case No. 114500103

V.

GEORGE A. SANDUSKY,

Judge Kara Pettit

Respondent.

If;
~

~

COMES NOW, Respondent, George Sandusky, ("George") by and through his counsel of

,

.

record, Elizabeth A. Shaffer, and files his Notice of Posting Presumptive Amount for Stay of
Judgement. This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Judge Kara L. Pettit presiding, on
January 28, 2016. Respondent has placed the Ordered presumptive amount of $487,106.14 in
trust with the Summit County Third Judicial District Court as of February 9, 2016 (receipt

@7
~

~
,

attached herein). Per the Court's oral ruling (written Order still pending), this deposit grants
Respondent a stay of execution on the judgment amount during the pendency of his appeal.

.

'

~
.

.
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DATED this 9th day of February, 2016.
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC
By: Isl Elizabeth A. Shaffer (digitally)
Elizabeth A. Shaffer
Attorney for Respondent

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this 9th day of February, 2016 a true and correct copy of the foregoing

NOTICE OF POSTING THE PRESUMPTIVE AMOUNT FOR STAY OF JUDGEMENT was
filed via the Court's electronic filing system which automatically delivered service to the

~
.

.

Wl
Uii

following:
Paul J. Morken
P.O. Box 980691
Park City, UT 84098

Isl C. Kramer

un

~

ITT

IJ

~
'

.

~
'

'
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DISTRICT CT- SILVER SUMMIT

J2/09/16 11:37
Clerk: karenbs
~eipt Number: 20160270007
Etlror: SHAFFER, ELIZABETH A
~eived:
I/heck 8063480

$

487,106.14

:ase 114500103 Divorce/Annulment
ge: PETTIT, KARA
DUSKY, KYLEE J VS SANDUSKY,
;EORGE A

l

:r::L::::: for Cas: 11:::::::•~:
)ther Trust

$

0.00

~IE**** SAVE THIS RECEIPT*******
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Elizabeth A. Shaffer #06796
Elizabeth A. Shaffer PLLC
4580 N. Silver Springs Drive, Suite 100
Park City, Utah 84098
Telephone (435) 655-3033
Fax (435) 655-3233
eshaffer@.lawparkcity.com
Attorney for Respondent

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

ml

•

FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
(6300 Justice Court Road, Park City, Utah 84098)

KYLEE J. SANDUSKY,

Petitioner
V.

ITT

lill

GEORGE A. SANDUSKY,

Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO
PETITIONER'S PROPOSED ORDER ON
MOTIONS HEARD ON JANUARY 28,
2016

Case No. 114500103
Judge Kara Pettit

Pursuant to Rule 7 G)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Respondent hereby files
his Objection to the proposed order submitted to the Court on February 25, 2016 on the grounds
that the proposed Order does not accurately reflect the findings and Orders of the Court. This
matter came before the Court for hearing on January 28, 2016 on Respondent's Motion and
Supporting Memorandum under Rule 62 (d), filed on January 12, 2016. Respondent's objection

!ill]

is based on the following:

~
~
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Petitioner's counsel sent his draft Order to Respondent's counsel on February 3, 2016.
Respondent's counsel replied with edits and comments on February 9, 2016. Petitioner's counsel
did not respond thereafter with any changes based on counsels comments so Respondent filed a
proposed order on February 25, 2016 to achieve finality of all Orders in this case as this case is
now pending appeal.
Respondent is entitled to an Order that accurately reflects the Court's ruling: "It is, of
course, a lawyer's duty and responsibility to prepare an order that accurately reflects the court's
ruling and a willful failure to do so would be a violation of professional ethics." In re Judd, 629
P.2d 43512 (Utah 1981). Petitioner's proposed order contains attempted additions of findings
and embellishments of the record, including opinions and commentary of counsel that are not
rulings made by the Court. Portions of the proposed Order were discussed before the Court at
the hearing on January 28, 2016 and Respondent wishes to preserve his objection for the record
as follows:
1.

No objection.

2.

In paragraph #2 of Petitioner's proposed Order, there are insertions of arguments

by counsel which were not actual rulings by this Court. Specifically, the Order of the Court was
not disputed at this hearing or in Respondent's Motion, and at this point the parties' dispute
remains for the appeal court so it is not appropriate to reference the parties further dispute.
Likewise, the positions regarding findings of "what claims should have been made" were merely
argument by Petitioner's counsel and not findings of this Court. The Respondent's proposed
order more accurately reflects the findings and Order of the Court. Further, Petitioner is
2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fTl

~

~
'

'

~
'

I

referencing the order to show cause and that Motion was not before the Court, no rulings were
made as a result, and therefore is not appropriately referenced.

'

3.

Similarly in paragraph #3, Respondent requests that the Motion and Order

referenced by Petitioner be left to speak for itself and not include any interpretations or argument
of Petitioner's counsel. The Court simply found Respondent had sufficient assets and specifically
indicated it was not finding Respondent dissipated assets, rather only that the assets were within

ITR
kl)

his control. There was no evidence regarding an accounting of assets and therefore there could

fr1

not have been and was not a finding by the Court on this issue. This is another argument by

~

W1
~

~
J

'

Petitioner that is not appropriate to be included in the Order.
4.

Paragraph #4 of Petitioner's Order also contains argument and does not represent

the Orders of the Court correctly. The Court did not find that the Foo House and Lot were
"inadequate and unsuitable," but rather, the fact is the real estate market is volatile and the surety
company accepts only cash or a letter of credit, they do not accept real property as collateral so
the Court was not inclined to do so either.
5.

In Paragraph #5, Petitioner continues to include irrelevant findings that are not

appropriate to the Orders from January 28, 2016. The bond amount has already been approved

Wl

~

by the Court that was the purpose of the hearing, so an additional hearing or approval is not

fl
IJ

required in Order to effectuate a Stay of further proceedings. The payments of $310,000.00 and

~

~

$214,250.00 are history and moot points and as a result have no relevance to the current Motions
or Order.

3
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6.

Paragraph #6 should be stricken as moot. The Court entered the Order regarding

#3 and that Order speaks for itself. There were no Motions pending before the Court on any other
matters and therefore reference to things outside of the matters before the Court are not relevant
or proper.
7.

In Paragraph #7 Petitioner continues to add arguments based on his position,

rather than the accurate, straightforward Orders of the Court. The Court made no finding
regarding Petitioner's decision to postpone the hearing before Commissioner Casey. Again, this
was not an issue before the Court and the comments that it "might make sense at this time," were
not findings or Orders of the Court. In addition, Respondent does not agree to an Order to Show
cause outside the normal course pursuant to the rules of procedure. This matter was not formally
before the Court and was not briefed or argued, nor was a position taken by Respondent. This
was simply the desire of the Petitioner, thus it is not appropriate to be included in the Order.
Respondent submits his proposed form of order herewith and based on the foregoing,
Respondent's proposed order should be entered. Petitioner's proposed order should be rejected
and/or amended to reflect more precisely the rulings of this Court.
DATED this 1st day of March, 2016.
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC
Elizabeth A. Shaffer (digitally signed)
Elizabeth A. Shaffer
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

i

I certify that on this l51 day of March, 2016, a true and c01Tect copy of the foregoing

w

RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S PROPOSED ORDER ON MOTIONS

r;n

HEARD ON JANUARY 28, 2016 was filed via the Court's electronic filing system which

.

'

'1

automatically delivered service to the following:

~
.

'

lffl

~

Paul J. Morken
P.O. Box 980691
Park City, UT 84098

Isl E. Shaffer

lIT7

~

~
.

.

'

ml

~

~
'

.
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Paul J. Morken (10483)
PAUL J. MORKEN, PLLC
P.O. Box 980691
Park City, UT 84098
Telephone: 435.659.1685
paulmorken@.Btnai I.com
Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KYLEE J. SANDUSKY,
Petitioner
vs.

ORDER ON:
RESPONDENT'S THIRD MOTION
UNDER RULE 60 (b).
(Hearing January 15, 2016)

GEORGE A. SANDUSKY,
Respondent

Case No.: 114500103
Judge: Kara L. Pettit
Commissioner: T. Patrick Casey

This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Judge Kara L. Pettit presiding, on January 15,
2016. The court having reviewed (i) Respondent's Motion and Supporting Memorandum under Rule 60 (b),
filed on December 4, 2015, (ii) Petitioner's Response and Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's
motion under Rule 60 (b); and, (iii) Respondent's Reply to Petitioner's opposition, and having heard
arguments by each counsel, and having considered Respondent's objections to the form of the order and
Petitioner's reply to those objections (submitted to the Court for decision on 2/25/16) and having being fully
advised in the premises and for good cause appearing, the Court now makes and enters its Findings and
Order as follows:

I. On December 4, 2015, Respondent filed his third motion under Rule 60 (b) ("3 rd Motion").
Respondent's 3rd Motion was filed prior to the entry of the Court's written order on Respondent's 1st Motion
and its order pertaining to the specified "loans", which was entered by the Court on January 5, 2016.
2. Respondent's 3rd Motion does not fails te present any new issue or claim under Rule 60 (b) that has
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

not been made or ruled upon pursuant to should he.·te aeefl me.de ay R:espotldent ifl his prior two motions

11
II

under Rule 60 (b). In its orders pertaining to the 1st Motion and 2nd Motion the Court has already ruled on the
issues and claims made in Respondent's 3rd Motion, and it hereby denies Respondent's 3rd Motion under
Rule 60 (b).

I

3. lmmedintely upofl Petitiofler's reeeipt of $214,250 from Respotleleflt for the Foo house t1:flEI Lot
PetitioHer sha:H give to RespoHdeftt a: Quitela:im Deed deediflg her iflterest ift sueh house a:nd lot to
Respofleleftt. While doiftg so, Petitiofler sha:ll rete.ift e.11 rights to oats:ifl a:judgmeflt for the uflpe.iel aa:la:flee of

I
I

sums, if tfflj', RespotldeHt o·wes Petitiofler pursutl:ftt to the Court's Deeree ofDi·1oree entereel Oft Jttly 23,
2015, a:nd its orders entered Oft No·temaer 6, 2015, Jtl:ftullf)' S, 2016 tl:ftel JMua:ry IS, 2016, (perta:iftiftg to

property t1:fld alimony), tl:ftd to reeord suehjttdgment(s) a:ga:iftst the Foo hottse MEI lot ftfld t1:ftY other property
O'NfleEI ay Respoftdeflt. The Court addressed the Foo house and lot buyout by separate order on January 29,

4. The Court declines to hear argument regarding Respondent's pending Motion for Stay filed on
January 12, 2016, for the reason that Petitioner has not had an opportunity to file a responsive pleading.
Petitioner's responsive pleading to the motion will be due on January 21, 2016, and Respondent's reply brief
will be due on January 26, 2016. The motion is set for hearing before this Court on January 28, 2016,
beginning at 9:00 a.m.
5. Petitioner's counsel asked the Court to consider hearing Petitioner's Motion and Order to Show
cause on February 10, 2016, rather than Commissioner Casey first conducting a certification hearing. The
Court stated that it was not prepared to do so at this time, but it would consider that matter at the hearing on
January 28, 2016.
Signature of the Court appears on the top of the first page.

DA.TED this _

da:y of Jtl:ftua:ey, 2016.

BY TI IE COURT:

KA:R,t\ L. PETTIT
Third Distriet Court Judge

iO
.

.

a•
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SEEN A}JD APPROVED BY:

Elizabeth A. Shaffer
Attorney for Respondeftt
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Elizabeth A. Shaffer #06796
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC
4580 N Silver Springs Drive Suite 100
Telephone: (453) 655-3033
Fax: (435) 655-3233
Email: eshaffer<@lawparkcitv.com
"'
Attorney for Respondent, George Sandusky

~
.

.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
(6300 Justice Court Road, Park City, Utah 84098)

~
'.

I
~

KYLEE J. SANDUSKY,
Petitioner

.

'

.

~
'

'

V.

GEORGE A. SANDUSKY,

(PROPOSED) ORDER ON RESPONDENT'S
MOTION TO STAY OF EXECUTION OF
JUDGMENT PENDING APPEAL AND
WAIYER OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND OR IN
THE ALTERNATIVE APPROVAL OF
ALTERNATE SECURITY IN LIEU OF
SUPERSEDEAS BOND UNDER

Respondent.
RULE 62 (D).

~
.

.

(Hearing January 28, 2016)

Case No. 114500103

Judge Kara Pettit

This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Judge Kara L. Pettit presiding, on January 28,
2016. The Court having reviewed (i) Respondent's Motion and Supporting Memorandum under Rule 62 (d),
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

filed on January 12+, 2016, (ii) Petitioner's Response and Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's

ITT

motion under Rule 62 (d); and, (iii) Respondent's Reply to Petitioner's opposition, as well as the parties'

I

'

~

competing forms of order. objections and replies to the proposed forms of order (submitted to the Court for
decision on March 2. 2016) and having heard arguments by each counsel and having being fully advised in

~
.

the premises and for good cause appearing, the Court now makes and enters its Findings and Orders as

'

follows:

i
'

.

~
'

I. On January 12, 2016, Respondent filed under Rule 62 (d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
("URCP") a Motion and Memorandum for Stay of Execution of Judgment Pending Appeal and Waiver of

'

Supersedeas Bond or in the Alternative Approval of Alternate Security in Lieu of Supersedeas Bond.
2. The Court finds that under Rule 62 (j)(2)(A) of the URCP the presumptive amount of the bond to
be: (i) $427,962.14, plus (ii) $30,000 for attorney fees (iii) $29,144.00 interest (3 years of interest, using a
judgment rate of interest of2.27%, on the amount of the judgment of$427,962.14), for a total of
$487,106.14.

i
'
'

~
'

3. The Court finds regarding the factors listed in Rule 62 (j)(l)(A-E) of the URCP the followin~
more fully set forth on the record on January 28. 2016: (i) Re: G)( I )(A & B) -Respondent has sufficient

'

~
'

'

~

assets to post the presumptive bond amount and the Court will not accept the Foo house and lot as an
alternative line of security in lieu of a bond; (ii) Re: (j)(l )(C)-The Court found that the assets were within
Respondent's control and he would have the opportunity to dissipate assets; (iii) Re: (j)(I )(D) - Respondent's

'

'

likelihood of success on appeal is low given the large degree of discretion given to the trial court in divorce

ITT7

~

matters pertaining to property and alimony; (iv) Re: (j)( 1)(E) - The Court found that the bond amount and

Wu
ii

type does not affect Respondent's ability to appeal and a lower amount may leave Petitioner unprotected.
Thus. the Court does not find good cause to set bond at a higher or lower amount than the presumptive bond

I
'

'

~
)

amount set forth in Paragraph 2 above ..
4. The Court finds that the Foo House and Lot are not sufficient as alternate security in lieu of a

'

Supersedeas Bond or cash deposit in lieu of bond because of the volatility of the real estate market and real

ffi7

~

estate values, as confirmed by financial institutions' and bonding company's refusal to accept the property as
security ..
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5. The Court Orders the following as to Respondent's Motion under Rule 62 (d): Respondent shall
provide a Supersedeas commercial bond in the amount of$487,106.14 or deposit cash in lieu of bond in the
amount of $487, 106.14 in the trust account held by the Court (such account is non-interest bearing). Upon
posting Supersedeas commercial bond or such cash deposit in lieu of bond, Respondent is granted a stay of
execution of, or any proceedings to enforce,the-tt judgment during appeal.
EXECUTED AND ENTERED by the Court as indicated by the date and seal at the top of the first
page herein. END OF ORDER.

RULE 7 "NOTICE
Yau ·v✓ill r,lease take t10tiee that f'UfsuaHt ta Rule 7 ef the Utah Rules ef Ci·vil Pfecedufe, the fefeg0it1g 0fdef
will be submitted fef sigHatufc at the exr,irntieH ef scvet1 clays r,lus thfee days fef tnailiflg uHless \YfitteH
0ejecti0t1 is filed withiH that time r,efied .
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

•

I certify that on this the 18 th day of July, 2016, a trne and correct copy of the foregoing

:l

APPELLANT'S APPENDIX C was filed via the Court's electronic filing system

~

which automatically delivered service to the following:

•
•
•

Paul J. Morken
P.O. Box 980691
Park City, UT 84098

Isl C.Kramer

~

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
~
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